Paul F. Lalonde

This document is a transcript of proceeding title page for a criminal matter before Justice P.F. Lalonde.

The proceeding is subject to a publication ban under section 486 of the Criminal Code.

The offender was convicted of sexually assaulting a semi-conscious acquaintance after a party where both consumed alcohol and marijuana.

The Crown sought a sentence of two years less a day, while the defence proposed 12 to 18 months.

The court weighed the devastating psychological impact on the vulnerable victim against the offender's lack of a criminal record, positive pre-sentence report, and genuine remorse.

Concluding that denunciation and deterrence required a period of custody, the court sentenced the offender to 12 months' incarceration followed by two years of probation, along with mandatory DNA and weapons prohibition orders.

The court sentenced the offender for dangerous driving causing death and failing to remain at the scene of a fatal collision involving a pedestrian at an Ottawa intersection.

The sentencing judge treated denunciation and general deterrence as primary, emphasized the offender's deliberate conduct, prolonged deception, and poor driving record, and held that the offender's schizophrenia, while mitigating, did not cause the offences and did not displace the need for penitentiary terms.

A conditional sentence was found unavailable and consecutive sentences were required because the offences protected different societal interests.

The offender received a global sentence of four years' imprisonment, less credit for presentence custody, together with a 10-year driving prohibition, a mandatory weapons prohibition, and a DNA order.

On an interim family motion, the responding party sought joint shared custody while the applicant sought sole custody, primary parenting, support, section 7 contribution, property carrying costs, and related relief.

The court held that both parents were fit and devoted, that there was no established risk of harm to the children in either parent's care, and that the relevant status quo was the pre-tactical parenting arrangement rather than the short-lived supervised regime following criminal charges.

Applying the best interests of the children and maximum contact principles, the court imposed interim joint custody and an alternating-week parenting schedule.

The court also ordered interim child support, section 7 payments, contribution to matrimonial home carrying costs for a limited period, continued benefits coverage, ongoing assessment measures, and no costs.

The court tried a sexual assault charge arising from intercourse initiated while the complainant was asleep on a futon after a party involving alcohol and marihuana.

Applying the governing consent jurisprudence, the court found the complainant was asleep when penetration began and therefore incapable of consenting under s. 273.1 of the Criminal Code.

Although the court found an air of reality to the defence of honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent, it rejected that defence on the facts and held that reasonable steps to ascertain consent were not taken, engaging s. 273.2.

The accused's evidence was not believed, the complainant was found credible, and a finding of guilt was entered.

The applicants sought leave to have solicitor accounts assessed in relation to estate-related legal work.

The court held the application was out of time under ss. 3 and 4 of the Solicitors Act because the accounts had been delivered months before the application and had been fully paid more than twelve months before the request for assessment.

No special circumstances were established, and there was no fraud or gross misconduct to engage the court's inherent jurisdiction.

The application was dismissed and costs of $8,000 were awarded to the respondent.

The accused was charged with dangerous driving causing death and failing to remain at the scene of an accident after striking a pedestrian at an intersection in Ottawa.

The accused claimed he fled in self-defence because the pedestrian was acting erratically and touching his car.

The court rejected the accused's evidence as fabricated and found his rapid acceleration and fishtailing through a busy intersection constituted a marked departure from the standard of care.

The court also found the accused knew he had struck the pedestrian and fled to evade liability.

The accused was found guilty on both charges.

Following a prior decision on a family law motion concerning custody and parenting arrangements, the court determined the issue of costs.

The respondent mother was found to be the successful party.

The court rejected the argument that costs should not be awarded in custody and access disputes and applied the Family Law Rules governing costs, including Rule 24(11).

After reviewing the parties’ conduct, the reasonableness of settlement offers, and the complexity and importance of the issues affecting the children, the court reduced the claimed fees to a reasonable level.

The applicant father was ordered to pay fixed costs to the respondent.

The accused was charged with dangerous driving causing death and failing to remain at the scene of an accident after striking a pedestrian who had been acting erratically in front of his vehicle.

The trial judge held a hearing to determine whether there was an "air of reality" to the accused's claims of self-defence and defence of property under the amended provisions of the Criminal Code.

The court found no evidence that the accused reasonably believed force was being used or threatened against him, nor that his actions in rapidly accelerating his vehicle were reasonable in the circumstances.

Consequently, the court ruled that neither defence had an air of reality and could not be put to the trier of fact.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an interlocutory family law decision that imposed a new interim parenting regime.

The court considered the test for granting leave to appeal under the Courts of Justice Act and applicable procedural rules.

It found there were serious questions about whether the motion judge exceeded jurisdiction by making substantive orders not requested in the pleadings and without a full evidentiary record or opportunity for cross-examination.

The court held that the circumstances raised concerns about natural justice and procedural fairness.

Leave to appeal was granted and a temporary stay of the impugned order was issued pending the appeal.

Sentencing following convictions for multiple counts of touching a person under 16 for a sexual purpose involving elementary school students.

The offender, an occasional teacher, engaged in repeated inappropriate touching of several grade three girls in classroom settings while in a position of authority.

The court considered aggravating factors including multiple complainants, breach of trust, grooming behaviour, and psychological harm to the victims, while mitigating factors included the offender’s lack of prior record and community contributions.

Emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence for sexual offences against children, the court imposed a custodial sentence.

A global sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment followed by two years’ probation was ordered, along with ancillary prohibitions and sex offender registration.

The accused was sentenced following convictions for assault causing bodily harm and uttering a threat to cause death.

The offences arose from a violent attack in a restaurant washroom where the accused struck the complainant, banged her head against a wall, and threatened to kill her.

The court considered aggravating factors including the vulnerability of the victim, the gratuitous violence, and the offender’s significant criminal record, including prior robbery convictions, while recognizing mitigating factors such as the offender’s youth and difficult upbringing.

Applying the sentencing principles in ss. 718–718.2 of the Criminal Code, the court imposed a custodial sentence of two years for assault causing bodily harm and three months concurrent for the uttering threats offence, followed by probation.

Credit was granted for pre‑sentence custody and time spent in a residential facility, and ancillary orders including a DNA order and lifetime weapons prohibition were imposed.

Following a motion and cross-motion concerning amendments to a statement of claim, the court determined costs.

The moving party sought substantial indemnity costs relying on a Rule 49 offer to settle and alleging improper litigation conduct by opposing counsel.

The court found the motion unnecessary and concluded that counsel for the responding party engaged in improper conduct, including impugning opposing counsel’s integrity and taking procedural steps that lengthened the proceedings.

Applying s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rules 57.01, 57.03, and 49 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court awarded substantial indemnity costs after the offer date.

Costs of $7,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST were ordered payable within 30 days.

Parents sought costs against a child protection agency after the agency withdrew its protection application and entered into a voluntary agreement with the family.

The parents argued the agency acted unfairly by apprehending the children without a sufficient investigation and relying on uncorroborated allegations.

The court held that costs against a children’s aid society are awarded only in exceptional circumstances where conduct is patently unfair or indefensible.

Given the agency’s reliance on multiple police reports, the family’s prior history with the agency, and the existence of a warrant authorizing the apprehension, the court found the investigation and apprehension were reasonable.

The court concluded the agency had fulfilled its statutory duty and that an ordinary observer would not view its conduct as unfair.

The offender was sentenced after a jury convicted him of criminal negligence causing death, impaired driving causing death, and refusing to provide a breath sample following a fatal collision.

The offender had driven the wrong way down a downtown street after consuming alcohol and struck and killed a pedestrian.

The court considered mitigating factors including the offender’s lack of criminal record, strong employment history, remorse, and positive character references, but emphasized aggravating factors such as the fatal consequences of impaired driving, the dangerous manner of driving, and the refusal to provide a breath sample after learning of the death.

The court highlighted appellate authority indicating a rising range of custodial sentences for impaired driving causing death, emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence.

A global custodial sentence was imposed along with a lengthy driving prohibition and a DNA order.

Following a four‑day simplified procedure trial concerning the removal of trees and vegetation along a ditch, the plaintiffs obtained a modest damages award slightly above the Small Claims Court monetary limit.

The plaintiffs sought over $86,000 in partial indemnity costs, asserting more than 421 hours of legal work.

The defendants argued the request was excessive and asked that costs be refused or capped.

The court emphasized that cost awards under Rule 76 simplified procedure must remain reasonable and proportionate to the amount recovered.

Exercising discretion under Rule 57.05(1), the court fixed costs at $12,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The moving party sought leave to amend a statement of claim in a defamation action after documentary discovery revealed additional allegedly defamatory emails authored by the responding party.

The responding party opposed the amendment on the basis that the communications were unrelated, privileged, and statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002 and the Libel and Slander Act.

The court applied Rule 26.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, emphasizing the presumption in favour of permitting amendments absent non-compensable prejudice.

It found the amendments merely provided further particulars of an existing defamation claim rather than advancing a new cause of action, and that any prejudice could be addressed through procedural steps.

The motion to amend was granted and the responding party’s cross‑motion to compel answers to undertakings was dismissed.

On an interim family law motion, the applicant sought sole custody, exclusive possession of the matrimonial home, and other ancillary relief following a high‑conflict separation involving allegations related to parental mental health and domestic conflict.

The court considered conflicting affidavit evidence, a report from the Children’s Aid Society confirming emotional risk to the children from exposure to parental conflict, and the respondent’s mental health treatment.

Emphasizing the best interests of the children and the need for stability, the court granted the applicant interim sole custody and interim exclusive possession of the matrimonial home.

The respondent received structured access several times per week.

The court declined to issue a restraining order and ordered each party to bear their own costs.

The Crown brought an application under s. 715 of the Criminal Code to admit preliminary inquiry testimony of an independent witness who had moved to Nicaragua and was therefore unavailable to testify at trial.

The defence argued the Crown failed to make sufficient efforts to secure the witness’s testimony through technological means such as videoconference under ss. 714.1 and 714.2 of the Criminal Code.

The court held that while efforts to obtain live testimony are a relevant factor, failure to pursue electronic testimony is not fatal to an application under s. 715.

Applying the principles in Potvin and Saleh, the judge concluded the accused had a full opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the preliminary inquiry and that the evidence was reliable and corroborated.

The prior testimony was therefore admitted to be read into the trial record.

In a criminal proceeding involving allegations of sexual offences against students, the accused sought to introduce evidence that he offered to take a polygraph test during a police interview.

The defence argued that the offer demonstrated consciousness of innocence and constituted admissible after-the-fact conduct.

The court reviewed the governing principles from appellate authority concerning prior consistent statements and the limited probative value of offers to take polygraph tests.

It held that such an offer, particularly where the accused had received legal advice and the results would be inadmissible, was essentially a self-serving protestation of innocence with no meaningful probative value.

The court concluded that the evidence would risk prejudicing the trial process and dismissed the application to admit it.