Paul F. Lalonde

The applicant child protection agency sought a 12-month supervision order regarding five children, placing them in the care of the father subject to conditions.

The mother, who suffered from a psychotic condition, refused to take prescribed medication or attend psychiatric follow-ups, arguing her symptoms were due to past postpartum depression.

The court accepted expert psychiatric evidence that the mother's untreated psychosis posed a risk of physical and emotional harm to the children.

Finding the children in need of protection, the court granted the supervision order and required the mother to leave the family home if she continued to refuse treatment.

A motion and cross‑motion addressed whether a parent must contribute child support for an adult child pursuing post‑secondary education.

The respondent argued the adult child had withdrawn from parental control and squandered prior educational opportunities, while also asserting inability to pay.

The court found the adult child had not withdrawn from parental control and was enrolled in a serious course of studies.

Applying principles from the Family Law Act and the Child Support Guidelines, the court ordered ongoing support based on the respondent’s income together with contributions from the applicant and the child.

Conditions were imposed requiring proof of attendance, disclosure of income and educational progress.

The applicant sought a declaration to dissolve a partnership with the respondent and an accounting of assets, primarily an Ottawa taxi plate.

The parties had a five-year partnership agreement that expired, but the respondent continued to use the taxi plate exclusively.

The court found it just and equitable to dissolve the partnership under the Partnership Act and directed a reference to a Master to supervise the sale of the taxi plate and conduct an accounting.

The Crown appealed an order staying criminal proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter for unreasonable delay.

The lower court had found that the elapsed time between charge and trial violated the accused’s right to be tried within a reasonable time.

Applying the framework from Morin and related jurisprudence, the appeal judge reassessed the allocation of delay, finding that certain periods—including intake procedures and delay following a mistrial—were neutral and not attributable to the Crown.

After deducting these neutral periods, the institutional delay fell within acceptable guidelines.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

In a child protection proceeding under the Child and Family Services Act, all parties agreed the children remained in need of protection due to parental incapacity and sought a permanent care plan under s. 57.1.

Competing plans proposed placement with maternal grandparents, with the paternal grandmother, or maintenance of split placements.

After reviewing extensive evidence on caregiving capacity, family conflict, cultural and religious issues, and the children’s best interests, the court ordered shared legal custody between the maternal grandparents and the paternal grandmother on an alternating weekly schedule.

The court also set terms for religious holidays, birthday exchanges, and transition arrangements.

L'appelante a interjeté appel du rejet de son action en diffamation à la Cour des petites créances.

Elle alléguait que l'intimée avait tenu des propos diffamatoires à son égard lors d'une évaluation de rendement et à deux de ses connaissances qui enquêtaient sous un faux prétexte.

La Cour divisionnaire a confirmé que le juge de première instance n'a pas erré en concluant que les deux connaissances agissaient comme agents de l'appelante, ce qui annulait la publication à des tierces parties.

De plus, le refus d'accorder un ajournement pour faire entendre un technicien audio constituait un exercice raisonnable de la discrétion judiciaire.

L'appel a été rejeté.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her Small Claims Court action for defamation against the respondent, who had appraised her performance as a teacher's aide.

The appellant alleged the respondent made defamatory statements to her husband and an acquaintance who had contacted the respondent under false pretenses to elicit information.

The Divisional Court upheld the trial judge's findings that the husband and acquaintance acted as the appellant's agents, meaning there was no publication to a third party in law.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's refusal to grant an adjournment to call an audio technician, nor in his refusal to infer publication to other school boards based on the appellant's lack of job offers.

The applicant physician sought judicial review of a decision by the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board, which had made findings of criminal conduct against him based on undisclosed evidence.

The Board conceded it exceeded its jurisdiction and consented to its decision being quashed.

The Divisional Court quashed the decision and, finding exceptional circumstances including a ten-year delay and lack of clear evidence, refused to remit the matter back to the Board for reconsideration.

Costs were awarded to the applicant on a partial indemnity scale.

The plaintiff brought a slip and fall action under the simplified procedure, capping his claim at $25,000.

The trial judge assessed damages at $34,933.14 but found the plaintiff 50% contributorily negligent, resulting in an award of $17,466.57.

The defendant appealed, arguing the 50% reduction should have been applied to the $25,000 cap rather than the assessed damages.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the abandonment of a claim in excess of $25,000 under Rule 76 applies only to the final judgment amount, not the assessed damages.

The Union applied for judicial review of an arbitration board decision that dismissed its grievances concerning contracting out and refused to issue a single employer declaration under s. 1(4) of the Labour Relations Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the board did not deny natural justice by refusing further document production, and that its decisions on the single employer issue and the interpretation of the collective agreement were not patently unreasonable.