Lorne Joseph Goldstein

The Ontario Court of Justice dismissed Nathaniel McCausland's application for a stay of proceedings alleging abuse of process due to the Crown's alleged reneging on a plea agreement.

The court found no evidence of a formal plea agreement, only vague discussions initiated by a bail Crown attorney without proper authorization or detailed terms.

The burden of proving an abuse of process was not met, as there was no misconduct or bad faith by the Crown.

The decision clarifies the distinction between plea discussions and binding plea agreements, emphasizing the necessity of clear, authorized, and detailed terms for a plea agreement to be enforceable.

The court considered whether a complainant can consent to bodily harm in the context of BDSM sexual activity.

The accused was charged with multiple counts of sexual assault causing bodily harm and sexual assault with a weapon.

The court found the complainant's evidence unreliable and concluded that the Crown failed to prove lack of consent, vitiation of consent by abuse of authority, or intentional infliction of bodily harm beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

The decision also discusses the social value of BDSM and questions whether the law should be re-examined to reflect contemporary social norms.

The court considered whether M.R. was guilty of sexually assaulting or sexually interfering with his daughter, C.R., when she was three and four years old.

The decision turned on the credibility and reliability of the evidence provided by both M.R. and C.R. The court found that M.R.'s denial could not be rejected, and that C.R.'s evidence was inconsistent and potentially tainted, failing to meet the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

M.R. was acquitted.

This criminal trial concerned a charge of sexual assault.

The court assessed the credibility and reliability of the complainant's evidence, who had special needs, alongside testimony from other witnesses.

The judge found significant inconsistencies and implausibility in the complainant's account, both internally and when compared to other evidence.

Consequently, the Crown failed to prove the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, leading to an acquittal.

The applicant, Marcus Pearson, sought a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay.

He was charged with sexual assault offences, and the total delay from information sworn to trial completion was 26 months and 2 days, which is below the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court matters established in R. v. Jordan.

The applicant argued that the Crown's decision to prefer a direct indictment a year after the preliminary hearing was set caused unreasonable delay.

The court found that while the defence took meaningful steps to expedite proceedings, the applicant failed to demonstrate that the case took "markedly longer than it reasonably should have," particularly given that prosecutorial discretion in preferring an indictment is only reviewable for abuse of process, which was not alleged.

The application was dismissed.

The Crown applied to admit similar fact evidence against the accused, Raoul Saucier, in a sexual assault trial.

The Crown argued the evidence of a prior sexual assault conviction against K.D. was relevant to consent and the exploitation of vulnerable victims, highlighting similarities in the accused's conduct.

The court, applying the Handy test, found the asserted similarities between the prior conviction and the current allegations to be generic and lacking sufficient cogency to establish an objective improbability of coincidence.

Despite the judge-alone trial, the court found a significant risk of moral prejudice, concluding that the prejudicial effect outweighed any probative value.

The application was dismissed, rendering the similar fact evidence inadmissible.

The accused was charged with accessing, possessing, and distributing child pornography under the Criminal Code.

The trial focused on the mens rea for these offences, specifically whether the accused knowingly downloaded, possessed, or accessed the illegal files.

The court acquitted the accused on the distribution charge, finding insufficient evidence of knowledge or intent regarding file sharing via uTorrent.

However, the court found the accused guilty of possession and accessing child pornography, rejecting his testimony that his possession was unwitting and that he did not view the files.

The conviction was based on forensic evidence (e.g., a "CP" subfolder, RAM screenshots, link files) and the accused's police statement, which was interpreted as an admission of viewing child pornography to "understand the pattern" for protective reasons.

The application of the Kienapple principle for multiple convictions was deferred to sentencing.

The accused, Kimber-Lee Long, sought a bail review after being denied bail for serious charges including robbery, aggravated assault, forcible confinement, and drug offences.

The court found a material change in circumstances due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the accused's progress in custody, and a new, more suitable surety.

The court was satisfied that the proposed release plan, including house arrest with the surety, mitigated the risks on both secondary and tertiary grounds, and released the accused on a recognizance with a surety.

Michael Francis pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and simple possession of oxycodone.

Police found significant quantities of both drugs at his home, along with cash and other items.

Francis, who was addicted to oxycodone, claimed he was a "stash house" under duress and not involved in sales.

The Crown sought nine months imprisonment, while the defence argued Francis had already served the equivalent of nine months due to stringent bail conditions (rural curfew without a license) and his significant rehabilitation efforts.

The court considered sentencing principles, aggravating factors (quantity, stash house), and mitigating factors (guilty plea, first offender, addiction-driven, duress, successful rehabilitation, and restrictive bail conditions).

The judge granted a four-month credit for the bail conditions, resulting in a sentence of five months imprisonment for cocaine trafficking and one month concurrent for oxycodone possession, followed by six months probation, along with ancillary orders.

The offender was convicted after trial of three bank robberies while disguised, multiple car thefts and attempted car thefts, possession of instruments for breaking into cars, dangerous driving, and flight from police.

The Crown sought a 12-year global sentence consecutive to the offender's existing sentence, with parole eligibility restrictions under section 743.6, forfeiture of $1,350, a 15-year driving prohibition, DNA order, and lifetime weapons prohibition.

The defence sought 7-9 years consecutive.

The court imposed a global sentence of 10 years, comprising 8.5 years for robbery offences, 1 year concurrent on vehicle-related offences (consecutive to robbery sentence), and 6 months concurrent on dangerous driving and flight offences (consecutive to prior sentences).

Parole eligibility was restricted to 50% of the 8.5-year robbery sentence (4 years 3 months).

The court also imposed the requested ancillary orders including a 13-year driving prohibition and 22 years to pay the victim fine surcharge.

The three accused, Ashton Larmond, Carlos Larmond, and Suliman Mohamed, pleaded guilty to various terrorism-related offences and other charges.

Ashton Larmond pleaded guilty to knowingly instructing persons to enhance terrorist activity, Carlos Larmond to attempting to leave Canada for terrorist activity, and Suliman Mohamed to conspiring to enhance a terrorist group's ability.

The Larmond brothers also pleaded guilty to offences committed in custody, including threats to correctional officers and inmates, and unlawful communication.

The court accepted joint sentencing submissions, emphasizing the gravity of "home grown" terrorism and the importance of denunciation and deterrence.

Sebastien Bouchard was found guilty of second-degree murder after a jury re-trial.

This ruling determined the period of parole ineligibility, which is a mandatory component of the life sentence.

The Crown sought 15 years, while the defence sought 10 years.

The court considered the character of the offender, the nature and circumstances of the offence, and jury recommendations, as mandated by section 745.4 of the Criminal Code.

The court also considered the impact of new evidence and the offender's rehabilitation efforts since the first trial.

Ultimately, the court maintained the previous determination of 15 years parole ineligibility, finding that the new facts were not sufficient to derogate from the original reasoning.

The accused brought an application under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms alleging unreasonable delay in bringing the matter to trial.

The accused was charged with attempted murder and numerous firearms-related offences arising from a drive-by shooting on July 23, 2014.

The trial was scheduled for July 11-22, 2016, representing a delay of approximately 23.5 months from the laying of charges.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the Crown was responsible for approximately one month of delay in disclosing a sealed Information to Obtain a search warrant, the overall delay was reasonable when considering the complexity of the case, the inherent time requirements, the accused's implicit waiver through his actions and tactical choices, and the significant societal interest in trying serious offences on the merits.

The accused brought an application under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms alleging unreasonable delay in bringing the matter to trial.

The accused was charged with numerous counts related to firearms use and two counts of attempted murder arising from a drive-by shooting incident on July 23, 2014.

The delay from charge to trial was approximately 23.5 months.

The court rejected the application, finding that while the Crown was responsible for approximately one month of delay in disclosing a sealed Information to Obtain a search warrant, the majority of the delay was attributable to inherent time requirements of the complex case, actions of the accused (including multiple changes of counsel), and institutional scheduling constraints.

The court found the accused had implicitly waived his right to a speedy trial through his conduct and tactical choices.

This is a preliminary inquiry decision determining whether there is sufficient evidence to commit seven accused persons to stand trial on charges of attempted murder, aggravated assault, unlawful confinement, and unlawful entry arising from a brutal attack on the victim in the early morning hours of November 17, 2013.

The Crown's theory is that the attack was undertaken in retaliation for an assault on the brother of one of the accused the previous day.

The court applies the prima facie case standard, examining whether there is evidence upon which a reasonable jury could return a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on each element of each charge.

The decision addresses complex issues regarding the mens rea of attempted murder, the admissibility of hearsay statements, the evaluation of circumstantial identification evidence, and the requirements for party liability.

The Crown brought a section 540(7) application seeking to admit witness statements as evidence at a preliminary inquiry without requiring the witnesses to testify.

The application involved four key witnesses: Jessica Walker, Samantha Daoust, Mark Sudiacal, and Jason Klein.

The Crown sought to admit their statements under the Criminal Code provision that permits justices to receive evidence that would not otherwise be admissible if the justice considers it credible or trustworthy.

The court admitted the statements of Daoust, Sudiacal, and Klein, as well as the videotaped statements of Walker, but excluded Walker's off-camera statement recorded in police notes.

The decision provides comprehensive guidance on the interpretation and application of section 540(7).

The Crown sought reconsideration of a preliminary inquiry judge's ruling denying a section 540(7) application to file transcripts of witness statements.

The initial judge had rejected the application as inadequately presented and lacking sufficient grounding.

The Crown subsequently renewed the application with a fuller record.

The presiding judge ruled that reconsideration was permissible, finding that the initial ruling was not a final determination on the merits of section 540(7) admissibility but rather a rejection of the application as presented.

The judge held that interlocutory evidentiary rulings can be reconsidered where there is no prejudice to the defence and where the interests of justice support reconsideration, particularly in preliminary inquiries where evidentiary errors cannot be appealed.

During a criminal trial for trafficking in a substance represented as crack cocaine, the court ruled on two voir dires concerning evidentiary admissibility.

First, the Crown sought to admit police Booking Summary Reports and associated mug shots as business records under s.30(1) of the Canada Evidence Act without calling the identification officer who created them.

The court held that the records were administrative in nature and not caught by the investigative-record exclusion in s.30(10), making the mug shots admissible as reliable business records.

Second, the Crown sought to introduce non‑expert recognition evidence from a police officer who claimed to recognize one accused from surveillance photographs based on a brief prior interaction.

Applying the “prior acquaintance/better position” test from appellate authority, the court concluded the officer lacked sufficient familiarity to provide a reliable basis for recognition and excluded that evidence.

The accused applied to exclude statements refusing to provide a breath sample following a fatal collision, arguing that his Charter rights under ss. 10(a) and 10(b) were breached.

He contended that once the victim died, the legal jeopardy associated with refusal to provide a breath sample increased to life imprisonment and he should have been informed and given a further opportunity to consult counsel.

The Crown argued that the accused had already been advised of his right to counsel, had consulted a lawyer, and that the jeopardy had not meaningfully changed because he was already facing charges carrying life imprisonment.

The court held that the accused understood the general jeopardy he faced and that no discrete change in the investigation triggered a renewed right to counsel.

The application to exclude the refusal evidence was dismissed.

The accused applied under s. 591(3)(a) of the Criminal Code to sever counts in an indictment relating to two alleged sexual assaults occurring two days apart at the same military base.

The defence argued that trying the counts together would cause reasoning prejudice and interfere with the accused’s intention to testify on one incident but not the other.

The court considered factors including prejudice, factual nexus, complexity of the evidence, multiplicity of proceedings, delay, and the possible admissibility of similar fact evidence.

Although some risk of reasoning prejudice existed, the court held that appropriate jury instructions could mitigate it and that the interests of justice favoured a single trial.

The accused failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that severance was required.