Ian Carter

The plaintiff commenced a defamation action against the defendant relating to comments made by the defendant about the plaintiff, her former partner.

The defendant brought an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1(3) of the Courts of Justice Act seeking to dismiss the proceedings.

The court found that some expressions engaged the public interest while others did not, and granted the motion.

The action was dismissed without prejudice to the plaintiff to commence a new action regarding one of the expressions.

The parties subsequently disagreed on costs, with the defendant seeking full indemnity costs of $125,617.50 and the plaintiff arguing for no costs or drastically reduced costs.

The court awarded costs to the defendant in the amount of $60,795.56, comprising $50,000 in legal fees plus $10,795.56 in disbursements.

The defendant insurer brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claim based on contractual releases and statutory limitations periods.

The plaintiff, self-represented, claimed damages for inadequate insurance coverage, contractor negligence, lost income, and emotional distress arising from a water loss claim.

The court found that while portions of the claim were covered by the releases or barred by limitations, other aspects concerning alleged damage caused by the insurer's retained contractor were not.

The court declined to grant partial summary judgment, finding it inappropriate to bifurcate the issues and determining that all matters should be resolved together at trial.

The appellant successfully appealed his convictions on the basis of a reasonable apprehension of bias by the trial judge.

The Crown sought clarification regarding whether the new trial would include two counts on which the appellant had been acquitted and which were not appealed.

The court held that the acquittals remain in force and the appellant is to be retried only on the counts for which he was convicted.

This is a costs endorsement following a family law trial.

The applicant was largely successful on the issues litigated, including parenting time, decision-making responsibility, and restrictions on the respondent's attendance at the applicant's residence.

The respondent prevailed on certain travel-related issues.

The court awarded costs to the applicant on a partial indemnity basis, apportioning the award to reflect the divided success and the difficulty in determining time allocation across contested issues.

The appellant was convicted at trial in Ontario Court of Justice on nine counts including uttering threats, assault, assault by choking, assault with a weapon, and mischief against his former spouse.

On summary conviction appeal, the appellant raised grounds of appeal including reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appellate judge found that the trial judge's extensive questioning of the appellant during cross-examination—intervening on 20 separate occasions with approximately 70 questions—created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The trial judge appeared to align herself with the Crown's case and pre-judged the appellant's credibility.

The appellate court set aside the convictions and ordered a new trial.

The decision addresses an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act in a defamation action brought by Prasanth Tella against A.B., his former partner.

The allegedly defamatory statements were made primarily to the Ottawa Police Service’s Professional Standards Section and to a few other individuals.

The court finds that most of the statements at issue relate to a matter of public interest, but some do not.

The court concludes that the statements made to the Professional Standards Section are protected by absolute privilege and that the plaintiff has not met the burden to show there are no valid defences.

The action is dismissed, with leave to bring a new action regarding certain statements if desired.

The court also grants an anonymity order and a publication ban regarding the defendant’s identity.

The applicant, E. Automotive Inc., sought to unwind a transaction under section 248 of the Business Corporations Act, RSO 1990, c B.16, after its shareholding in Autocorp.

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Inc. was diluted below 33 1/3% through the issuance of shares to Blossom Street Ventures.

The court found that E. Automotive Inc. did not have a reasonably held expectation that its shareholding would not be diluted below a certain threshold, nor that shares would not be issued below market value for the purpose of affecting a vote.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant, Alex Beseiso, sought a stay of proceedings on the basis that his right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Charter was breached.

The court analyzed the periods of delay, attributing some to the defence and some to exceptional circumstances, and found the net delay to be below the 30-month ceiling for Superior Court matters.

The application was dismissed.

This costs endorsement addresses entitlement and quantum of costs following a family law dispute regarding a change of school for the parties' child and a withdrawn claim for an interest in the proceeds of sale of a home.

The court apportions costs based on success on the various issues, the reasonableness of the parties' conduct, and the use of withdrawn claims as litigation leverage.

The result is a net costs award of $10,000 payable from the Applicant to the Respondent.

The applicant, Alex Beseiso, brought an application alleging abuse of process and seeking a stay of proceedings.

The Crown sought summary dismissal of the application.

The court, proceeding in writing, found that all of the applicant’s allegations were manifestly frivolous and summarily dismissed the application.

The ruling applies the Supreme Court’s guidance in R. v. Babos and R. v. Haevischer regarding the test for abuse of process and the standard for summary dismissal.

The court considered an application for interim support and possession by the deceased’s common law spouse, Louise Gabrielle Nadeau, following the death of Joseph Jean Paul Aubut.

The applicant sought to remain in the property rent-free or, alternatively, to receive interim support.

The court found that the applicant was not entitled to interim support, as her need should be assessed only until the hearing, not for the rest of her life, and she had sufficient resources for that period.

The court further held that the applicant must pay occupation rent and utilities, as she had been unjustly enriched by living in the property without payment since the deceased’s death.

The court declined to order arrears and prohibited the limited estate from disposing of assets until the matter’s final determination.

This costs endorsement follows the dismissal of an appeal by the Defendants, David Wu and Opus Fitness Investment Inc., against a decision of Associate Justice Perron.

The Defendants argued that the Plaintiff, Ottawa Credit Exchange Limited, increased costs by raising a new argument on appeal.

The Court disagreed, finding the Plaintiff’s argument was responsive and that the Defendants themselves increased costs by raising an unfounded jurisdictional argument.

The Court awarded costs to the Plaintiff in the amount of $4,881.60, inclusive of HST.

The court considered whether a complainant can consent to bodily harm in the context of BDSM sexual activity.

The accused was charged with multiple counts of sexual assault causing bodily harm and sexual assault with a weapon.

The court found the complainant's evidence unreliable and concluded that the Crown failed to prove lack of consent, vitiation of consent by abuse of authority, or intentional infliction of bodily harm beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

The decision also discusses the social value of BDSM and questions whether the law should be re-examined to reflect contemporary social norms.

At the conclusion of the Crown's case in a first-degree murder trial, the accused applied for a directed verdict, seeking to remove the elevation of murder to first degree based on unlawful confinement and criminal harassment from jury consideration.

The court orally dismissed the application regarding criminal harassment.

In these written reasons, the court granted the application concerning unlawful confinement, finding no evidence of a distinct act of confinement separate from the murder itself, thus precluding first-degree murder liability on that ground.

The plaintiffs brought an action for damages arising from catastrophic failures of emergency generators at a hospital.

Defendants SDMO and Kohler moved to stay proceedings, arguing lack of jurisdiction or that Ontario was not an appropriate forum.

The court found Ontario had jurisdiction simpliciter as the torts (property damage, failure to warn, negligent misrepresentation) occurred in the province.

The court also found the forum selection clause in the contract between SDMO and GAL Power was not properly before the court and would not apply to third parties or be enforceable against GAL Power.

Finally, the court determined Ontario was the most appropriate forum, considering the location of parties, witnesses, and evidence, and the existence of related proceedings.

The motion for a stay was dismissed.

The applicant, Marcus Pearson, sought a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay.

He was charged with sexual assault offences, and the total delay from information sworn to trial completion was 26 months and 2 days, which is below the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court matters established in R. v. Jordan.

The applicant argued that the Crown's decision to prefer a direct indictment a year after the preliminary hearing was set caused unreasonable delay.

The court found that while the defence took meaningful steps to expedite proceedings, the applicant failed to demonstrate that the case took "markedly longer than it reasonably should have," particularly given that prosecutorial discretion in preferring an indictment is only reviewable for abuse of process, which was not alleged.

The application was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on an "over 80" charge, following a trial judge's finding of a s. 10(b) Charter breach and exclusion of breath results.

The trial judge had accepted the respondent's testimony that her request to call her mother was "obvious" in its purpose to facilitate finding a lawyer.

The appeal court found that the trial judge erred by failing to make a critical factual finding: whether the police officer knew or assumed the respondent's request to call a third party was for the purpose of facilitating her right to counsel.

Precedent requires the detainee to articulate this purpose, or for the officer to have such knowledge/assumption.

Without this finding, the s. 10(b) breach could not be established.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered for the "over 80" charge.

The City of Kingston sought a permanent injunction to dismantle a homeless encampment in Belle Park, citing safety and public use concerns.

Respondents argued the By-Law prohibiting camping violated sections 7 and 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the By-Law was unconstitutional insofar as it prohibited homeless individuals from erecting temporary overnight shelter in public parks, as this grossly disproportionately affected their life, liberty, and security of the person.

However, the court did not extend this finding to daytime sheltering due to insufficient evidence.

The City's application for injunctive relief was dismissed because the proposed terms were too broad and did not comply with the ruling.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay proceedings against the respondent for refusing an approved screening device sample.

The trial judge found a s. 9 Charter breach due to the respondent being arbitrarily detained for 74 minutes after arrest while the officer continued investigating Highway Traffic Act offences.

The appeal court upheld the finding of arbitrary detention, clarifying that placing a suspect in a police cruiser, of itself, requires reasonable necessity, and that the trial judge's reliance on *R. v. Aucoin* was correct.

However, the court remitted the matter to the trial judge to reconsider the appropriate remedy, as the Crown had not fully advanced arguments for alternative remedies at trial.

The appellant, David Zomou, appealed his convictions for impaired operation of a motor vehicle and refusal to provide a breath sample.

The appeal raised issues of reasonable apprehension of bias by the trial judge, arbitrary detention, sufficient grounds for arrest for public intoxication, and the voluntariness of the appellant's utterances.

The court found no reasonable apprehension of bias or arbitrary detention, and upheld the lawfulness of the arrest for public intoxication.

However, the court found that the trial judge erred in relying on inadmissible hearsay evidence to determine the voluntariness of the appellant's statements, which were crucial to the impaired operation conviction.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered solely for the impaired operation charge, while the refusal conviction was upheld.