CITATION: R. v. Yusuf, 2026 ONSC 4000
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
Respondent
– and –
MUSTAPHA YUSUF
Applicant
Brigid Luke and Matthew Humphreys, for the Respondent
Leonardo Russomanno, for the Applicant
HEARD: June 29, 2026
CARTER j.
OVERVIEW
1The Applicant is charged with multiple offences, including possession of controlled substances for the purpose of trafficking, firearm‑related offences, and offences relating to proceeds of crime.
2The investigation was initiated by the Ottawa Police Service Guns and Gangs Unit and involved information obtained from confidential informants, police database queries, and physical surveillance conducted over a period from January to March 2025.
3On March 17, 2025, a justice of the peace issued search warrants pursuant to s. 11 of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act for the Applicant’s residence and vehicles. Two days later those warrants were executed. Police seized quantities of cocaine and crack cocaine, oxycodone pills, currency, and two loaded handguns.
4The Applicant brings an application under ss. 8 and 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms seeking exclusion of evidence obtained pursuant to the execution of search warrants on March 19, 2025.
5The warrants authorized the search of the Applicant’s residence at 1212‑1535 Alta Vista Drive in Ottawa and two motor vehicles associated with the Applicant.
6The Applicant submits that the warrants were issued without reasonable and probable grounds and that the resulting searches were therefore unconstitutional. The Applicant’s argument is premised primarily on deficiencies in the information provided by two confidential informers. The Respondent opposes the application and submits that the warrants were validly issued, that no breach of s. 8 occurred, and that the evidence is admissible. While it is conceded that the evidence provided by the CIs was not particularly compelling, the evidence gathered during the subsequent period of surveillance was more then sufficient to meet the requisite standard for the issuance of the warrants.
7At the hearing, I raised with counsel whether there was a difference between the evidence gathered in support of the warrant for the vehicles and the evidence for the warrant of the residence. Counsel were given time over the break to prepare submissions in response. The Applicant ultimately argued that there was insufficient evidence to establish that the drugs would be found in the residence. The Respondent took the position that while the evidence was limited, a reasonable conclusion could be drawn from it that the Applicant was storing the drugs at the residence and would take them with him when he trafficked out of the vehicles.
WAS THERE A BREACH OF THE APPLICANT’S S. 8 CHARTER RIGHTS?
8The applicable legal principles are not in dispute as between the parties.
9A search will be reasonable under s.8 of the Charter, where the search is authorized by law, the authorizing law is reasonable, and the search is conducted in a reasonable manner. A search that is authorized by law is one that conforms with the minimum constitutional standards mandated by s.8 of the Charter. A search will be reasonable where there are reasonable and probable grounds, established on oath, to believe that an offence has been committed, and there is evidence to be found at the place of the search.
10The reasonable probable grounds standard requires a balance between the state’s interest in the investigation of crimes, and civilians’ reasonable expectation of privacy. The state’s interest in the detection and prevention of crimes begins to prevail over the individuals right to be left alone when credibly based probability replaces suspicion.
11A warrant is presumed to be valid. The Applicant bears the burden of establishing that there was an insufficient basis for issuing the warrant. The test for reviewing the sufficiency of the information underlying a warrant is for the reviewing judge to determine whether there was reliable evidence that might reasonably be believed on the basis of which the authorization could have issued, not whether in the opinion of the reviewing judge, the application should have been granted at all by the authorizing judge.
12In this case, the Applicant brings a facial validity challenge to the warrants. A facial validity challenge requires the reviewing judge to examine the ITO and to determine whether, on the face of the information disclosed there, the justice could have issued the warrant. The record examined on a facial review is fixed: it is the ITO, not an amplified or enlarged record.
13As previously noted, the Applicant’s main ground of attack is on the quality of the information provided by the confidential informers. Where information from confidential informers is relied upon to contribute to the formation of reasonable and probable grounds, the reviewing Court must consider the totality of the circumstances, including the degree of detail of the informers’ tips, the informers’ source of knowledge, and the informers’ reliability. This Court must consider whether the informer information was compelling, credible, and corroborated. Weaknesses in one area may be compensated by strengths in the other two.
14I turn first to the issue of whether the informer information was compelling.
15I agree with the Applicant that the information provided by the two informants was not particularly compelling. It is general in nature, with few details about the drug related activity itself.
16CI #1 informed the Ottawa Police Services that the Applicant goes by the street name “MK”, is dealing crack and powder cocaine, has been robbing rival drug dealers, and is known to be in possession of a firearm. There is no information about how, when and where the Applicant was dealing drugs, when and where the robberies occurred, who specifically was robbed and what firearm he is in possession of.
17CI#2 provided slightly more detailed information. They informed the Ottawa Police Services that the Applicant is a drug dealer and is in possession of a firearm. CI#2 also indicated that the Applicant’s cellphone number is 873-660-9191, but that he uses a cellphone number 613-698-1034 to arrange drug deals. CI #2 purported that the Applicant cooks his own crack cocaine. CI #2 also indicated that the Applicant has been seen driving a grey SUV with ON Plate CZCX040, and that in late 2024 or early 2025, he got a new vehicle, 2025 White Toyota Corolla, ON Plate DDEC880. CI #2 also indicated that the Applicant has a girlfriend named Imeeka Kilbride-Williams. While there is more detail, once again there is no information about how, when and where the Applicant was dealing drugs.
18Furthermore, given the manner in which the ITO is drafted, it would appear that the information provided by both CIs is second hand. This is a factor which makes the already relatively general information even less compelling.
19On the issue of credibility, the affiant notes that CI#1 has provided information to OPS related criminal activities and the criminal landscape of Ottawa more than fifty times, resulting in twenty judicial authorizations. While this does imbue CI#1 with a certain degree of credibility, it is diminished somewhat by the fact that the information he provided appears, as noted above, to be second hand.
20The affiant indicated that CI#2 has “provided information to OPS related to criminal activities and the criminal landscape in the City of Ottawa ‘numerous’ times.” The affiant does not indicate how many investigations CI#2 has participated in, the success of those investigations, and the value or quality of the tips provided. Without a proven track record, his credibility is reduced.
21Finally, the affiant is silent on both of the CI’s criminal records. Whether the CI’s have a criminal record, including for crimes of dishonesty, is unknown. The affiant is similarly silent on whether the CI’s have outstanding charges before the court.
22If the ITOs relied solely on the information provided by the two CIs, the warrants could not have issued. The information provided was too general, came from a second hand source and was given in circumstances in which there was insufficient evidence for the issuing justice to properly gauge the credibility of the two CIs. That is not the end of the story, however.
23The investigative team conducted surveillance of the Applicant on 11 separate days between January 22, 2025, and March 14, 2025. The surveillance was targeted at 1535 Alta Vista Drive, 2011 and the two vehicles associated with the Applicant. Police observed the Applicant engage in a total of 23 interactions which the affiant believed, based on his extensive experience, were drug transactions. The inferences drawn by the affiant were reasonable given the duration and manner of the interactions. Indeed, the evidence of the Applicant trafficking from the two vehicles was so overwhelming that the warrants for the vehicles could have issued even without much of the evidence from the CIs and the evidence of the previous traffic stops.
24In my view, there was more than sufficient grounds that drug trafficking was being committed by the Applicant and that there would be evidence found in the vehicles given that the trafficking was occurring out of them.
25The evidence that the items sought would be found in the residence rests on a different footing. The CIs did not provide any information that the Applicant stored the drugs at his residence, as opposed to in the vehicles or at a stash house. Although CI#2 stated that the Applicant cooks his own crack cocaine, no information was provided that it was done at his home. Despite an extensive period of surveillance, not a single transaction was observed occurring in the Applicant’s residence.
26At it’s highest, the information in the ITO as to whether drugs would be found at the Applicant’s residence is as follows:
a. Under the heading “Grounds To Believe That The Things To Be Seized Are At The Place To Be Searched”, the affiant writes: [a]s Mustapha Yusuf leaves from his residence and goes directly to conducting drug transactions, I believe Mustapha Yusuf's residence located at 1212-1535 Alta Vista Drive, Ottawa …will contain the items listed to be searched for including cocaine and other Controlled Substances, proceeds of trafficking including money and other property of monetary value, packaging, weighing devices, debt lists, cellphones, or other mobile devices for electronic communication, and safes used to secure the drugs and/or money.
b. On February 8th, the surveillance team observes what appears to be a drug transaction by the Applicant out of one of his vehicles. After that, he and Imeeka Kilbride-Williams are seen entering the residence. He has a satchel across his chest and she is carrying a bag. Approximately 30 minutes later they are both seen leaving the residence. There is no evidence as to whether they are still carrying their bag and satchel. Another alleged drug transaction occurs in the vehicle shortly after they exit.
c. On February 12th, the surveillance team observes the Applicant and Ms. Kilbride-Williams exit the residence. He is wearing the satchel. She is carrying a bag over her shoulder. The Applicant leaves the satchel in his vehicle and exits it.
d. On a number of other occasions, the Applicant is seen leaving his residence with the satchel before driving away in his vehicle and allegedly trafficking.
27Based on this evidence, it is certainly possible that the Applicant was storing drugs in his residence and transporting them to the vehicles in his satchel. It is also possible, although less likely given the nature of the bags and the fact that she was only observed with them twice, that Ms. Kilbride-Williams was transporting the drugs from the residence to the vehicles. However, it is also equally possible that the drugs were simply stored in the vehicles, which is consistent with the opinion given by the affiant in the ITO. And as counsel for the Applicant points out, the surveillance was not continuous. On none of the surveillance days did the police observe where the Applicant ended the day. It is possible he was visiting a stash house to pick up the drugs and store them in one or the other of the vehicles.
28I find that the evidence in the ITO falls far short of establishing to the level of credibly based probability that drugs and other associated items sought would be located in the residence. Based on the limited evidence before the issuing justice, the warrant for the residence could not have issued. In light of my finding that the warrant for the residence could not have issued, there has been a breach of the Applicant’s s. 8 Charter rights. As a result, I now turn to a consideration of whether the evidence obtained from a search of the residence should be excluded pursuant to s. 24(2).
SHOULD THE EVIDENCE FROM THE SEARCH OF THE EVIDENCE BE EXCLUDED?
29Evidence improperly obtained is prima facie admissible. The onus is on the applicant to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.
30In determining whether evidence should be excluded under s. 24(2), the Court must balance three factors in assessing the effect of admitting the evidence on society’s confidence in the justice system: (1) the seriousness of the Charter-infringing state conduct; (2) the impact of the breach on the Charter-protected interests of the accused; and (3) society’s interest in the adjudication of the case on its merits.
31I will deal with each of the three prongs of the analysis in turn.
32The first prong engages an examination of the degree of the infringing state conduct on a range from willful/bad faith to inadvertent/good faith. The more intentional, flagrant, reckless, or negligent the conduct, the greater the need for the court to dissociate itself from such conduct. Negligence or willful blindness cannot be equated with good faith. A finding that a judicial authorization was obtained in the absence of reasonable and probable grounds is, in and of itself, a very serious breach of s.8 that favors exclusion of the impugned evidence.
33The Respondent argues that the Applicant has not shown any attempt to mislead the issuing justice. Nor has he shown any wilful or reckless disregard of Charter rights. To the contrary, police engaged the prior authorization procedure, evidencing their respect for the applicant’s s. 8 rights. Any state conduct in this case allegedly infringing the applicant’s Charter rights is consequently not serious.
34While I agree with the Respondent that there is no evidence of any attempt to mislead on the part of the affiant, there is a degree of negligence that is present. The grounds that drugs would be found in the residence were very limited. This is a statutory requirement that is crystal clear. There is no ambiguity in the law. To attempt to obtain a warrant of a residence when the evidence of grounds that the items sought would be present is deficient, cannot be said to have been done in good faith. Rather, it demonstrates a certain disregard for Charter protections. The fact that the warrant was issued by a judicial officer despite the lack of sufficient evidence, cannot act to excuse the affiant’s own conduct. This factor weighs heavily in favour of exclusion.
35With respect to the second branch of the analysis, the court must consider the extent to which the breach has undermined the Charter protected rights of the accused. The more serious the impact on the accused’s protected Charter interest, the greater the risk that the admission of the evidence may signal to the public that Charter rights are of little actual avail to the citizen. A warrantless intrusion into an individual’s home attracts a significant breach of the individual’s section 8 Charter rights.
36The Crown concedes that the Applicant’s expectation of privacy would be high in his residence. The interest engaged by the Charter-protected right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure is the privacy interest. The search of one’s dwelling intrudes significantly upon an individual’s privacy interest. This factor therefore weighs in favour of exclusion of the evidence. I agree.
37Finally, the court must determine whether the truth-seeking function of the criminal trial process would be better served by admission of the evidence, or by its exclusion. Relevant factors include the reliability of the evidence, the importance of the evidence to the prosecution’s case, and the seriousness of the alleged offences. Here, the evidence is reliable, reasonably important to the Crown’s case (although not critical given the validity of the vehicle warrants) and the offences are relatively serious. This factor favours admission.
38Nevertheless, as noted by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Le, 2019 SCC 34, 2019 SCC34 at para. 142, where the first and second inquiries, taken together, make a strong case for exclusion, the third inquiry will seldom if ever tip the balance in favour of admissibility. I have found that the first two inquiries taken together make a strong case for exclusion. This is not the rare case whether the third inquiry tips the balance in favour of admissibility. As result, the evidence seized from the Applicant’s residence will be excluded pursuant to s. 24(2).
Justice I. Carter
Released: July 8, 2026