Anne Elizabeth Fitzpatrick

This criminal trial concerned an allegation of common assault against Robert Bender, an elementary school teacher, involving a student with autism spectrum disorder.

The Crown alleged that Mr. Bender used excessive force when he grabbed the student's wrist and pulled him away from another student who was approaching aggressively.

The defence invoked section 43 of the Criminal Code, arguing the force was justified as corrective.

The court assessed witness credibility, finding one Crown witness unreliable and accepting another's account of the events.

Applying the principles from Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth & the Law v. Canada (Attorney General), the court found that Mr. Bender's actions were by way of correction, not motivated by anger or frustration, and that the student was capable of benefiting from such correction.

The force used was deemed minor, transitory, trifling, and reasonable given the immediate need to prevent harm to another child.

Consequently, the court found the Crown had not proven the case beyond a reasonable doubt and dismissed the charge.

This decision concerns a new trial to determine if the accused, René Goudreau, was not criminally responsible (NCR) by reason of mental disorder for the first-degree murder of his mother.

The accused had previously been convicted by a jury, but the Ontario Court of Appeal ordered a new trial solely on the NCR issue.

The court considered expert psychiatric evidence, the accused's behaviour before and after the offence, and evidence of extensive planning related to life insurance policies on the victim.

Despite evidence of mental disorder, the court found that the accused failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that he was incapable of appreciating the nature and quality of his acts or knowing they were wrong.

The court concluded that the accused engaged in detailed planning for financial gain and acted rationally in many aspects, tipping the scales against an NCR finding.

Jalaledin Eftekhar was found guilty by a jury of procuring, obtaining sexual services for consideration, common assault, and human trafficking/exploitation.

The court conducted a sentencing hearing, rejecting the accused's version of events and finding the complainant highly credible and vulnerable.

The primary sentencing objectives were denunciation and deterrence.

Considering aggravating factors such as the complainant's vulnerability, the violence involved, and the duration of exploitation, balanced against mitigating factors like the accused's short criminal record, rehabilitative prospects, and lack of material benefit, the court imposed a global sentence of four years for exploitation, with concurrent sentences for the other offences.

Credit for pre-sentence custody and onerous release conditions was applied, resulting in three years remaining to serve.

Ancillary orders included a communication prohibition, a lifetime weapons prohibition, and a DNA order.

C.G. pleaded guilty to two counts of sexual assault.

The Crown sought a dangerous offender designation and an indeterminate sentence.

C.G. argued against the dangerous offender designation, proposing a determinate sentence followed by a long-term supervision order.

The court, relying on expert psychiatric and psychological evidence, found that while C.G. posed a substantial risk of reoffending, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt a "likelihood" of future harm required for a dangerous offender designation.

Consequently, the court designated C.G. as a long-term offender, imposing a determinate sentence of seven years (including four years of pre-sentence custody) and a ten-year long-term supervision order, emphasizing public safety and the need for comprehensive sexual offender programming.

The Crown sought an order for the production of a defence expert's draft report in a dangerous offender application, arguing that litigation privilege was waived when the expert testified.

The court denied the Crown's request, holding that litigation privilege over draft reports is not automatically waived by an expert testifying.

Applying principles from *Moore v. Getahun*, the court found that production of draft reports is only warranted if there are reasonable grounds to suspect improper influence on the expert's independence and objectivity, which was not alleged in this case.

The accused pleaded guilty to three counts of sexual assault contrary to section 271 of the Criminal Code.

The offences involved unwanted sexual touching of three female victims during yoga classes where the accused was the instructor.

The Crown sought six to nine months imprisonment; the defence sought 90 days intermittent jail.

The court imposed a six-month conditional sentence to be served in the community with strict house arrest conditions for two-thirds of the sentence, followed by two years' probation.

The court balanced denunciation and deterrence against mitigating factors including the accused's guilty plea, lack of prior record, remorse, and serious degenerative medical condition (Primary Progressive Multiple Sclerosis).

The accused, Jose Herrera, was charged with possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose, assault with a weapon, and aggravated assault following a stabbing incident.

The court found Herrera not guilty of possession of a knife for a dangerous purpose due to insufficient evidence that a knife specifically was used.

However, he was found guilty of assault with a weapon (a sharp-edged object) and aggravated assault.

The defense of self-defense was rejected as lacking an "air of reality," given that Herrera initiated both altercations and there was no evidence of force or threat from the complainant prior to the stabbing.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay was approximately 34 months, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court cases following a preliminary inquiry as per R. v. Jordan.

The court identified 13 months of defence-caused delay, including unavailability of counsel, re-election for a preliminary inquiry, conflict of interest by original counsel, and rejection of earlier trial dates.

After subtracting defence-caused delay, the net delay fell below the Jordan ceiling.

The applicant failed to demonstrate that they took meaningful steps to expedite proceedings or that the case took markedly longer than reasonably required.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The accused was charged with dangerous operation of a motor vehicle, impaired operation, and operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited concentration of blood alcohol following an incident on Highway 417 on April 9, 2011.

The defence challenged the admissibility of breath readings on Charter grounds, alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) regarding reasonable grounds for arrest, failure to facilitate access to counsel due to language barriers, and failure to follow R. v. Prosper procedures when the accused changed his mind about contacting counsel.

The court found the arrest was properly justified based on the totality of circumstances, that the accused understood his rights to counsel despite speaking broken English, and that no Prosper violation occurred as the accused made an informed decision to defer contacting counsel.

The breath readings were admitted as evidence.