Alan Brass

The accused, RP, was charged with sexual assault.

The complainant, DJ, alleged that RP sexually assaulted her when she was 10 years old, an incident she claims to have repressed and later recovered memory of.

The court assessed the credibility and reliability of the complainant's evidence, noting the significant passage of time and potential for memory distortion due to family acrimony.

While finding the complainant credible, the court found her evidence unreliable due to the passage of time and external influences, which raised a reasonable doubt as to the accused's guilt.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused, detained for over six months without a judicial interim release hearing, sought a 90-day bail detention review under s. 525 of the Criminal Code.

Despite a lengthy criminal record and a history of breaching release orders, the accused had been accepted into a residential addiction treatment program.

The court applied the Antic-ladder principle and the Supreme Court's guidance in R. v. Myers, emphasizing that pre-trial detention is the exception and release is favoured.

Considering the significant time already spent in pre-trial custody and the structured nature of the proposed treatment program, the court found that the continued detention was no longer justified.

The accused was ordered released to the treatment facility under strict conditions.

This appeal concerned the interpretation of section 18.1 of the Civil Remedies Act, 2001, regarding court approval of settlements in forfeiture proceedings.

The Attorney General of Ontario sought approval for a settlement with an interested party (Rosa Norwood) for a payment from seized property proceeds, without a prior judicial determination that the property was tainted by unlawful activity.

The appellants (Michael Norwood's Estate and 947014 Ontario Inc.) argued this was an error.

The Court of Appeal held that a "settlement in relation to a proceeding under this Act" must relate to in rem property interests, which necessitates a prior finding that the property is proceeds or instruments of unlawful activity.

The court found the motion judge erred in approving the settlement without such a finding, as it purported to settle in rem interests of others without their rights being displaced.

The appeal was allowed, and the settlement approval order was set aside.

The Attorney General brought a motion under the Civil Remedies Act to approve a settlement with the mother of the deceased, whose estate's assets were subject to civil forfeiture proceedings as alleged proceeds of crime.

The mother claimed she had advanced funds to her son to renovate his property and held a promissory note.

The estate trustee opposed the settlement, questioning the legitimacy of the mother's claim.

The court approved the settlement, finding the mother was a legitimate owner and the Attorney General acted reasonably in recognizing her claim, ordering $120,000 paid out of the preserved funds.

Jeffrey Wills was found guilty of four sexual offenses involving two young girls in his home daycare.

This decision addresses his sentencing.

The Crown sought a five-year sentence, while the defense proposed 12-24 months and a conditional stay for two counts related to one victim based on the Kienapple principle.

The court denied the Kienapple stay, finding the offenses distinct.

Aggravating factors included the high position of trust as a daycare operator, the young age of the victims, and the egregious breach of trust.

Mitigating factors were the offender's education and family support, though media coverage impact was not accepted as mitigating without evidence.

The court considered the prior 60-month sentence from the first trial, noting the increased impact on victims due to testifying in the second trial.

The court imposed a total sentence of 60 months, with specific concurrent and consecutive terms for each count, and ancillary orders including DNA submission, communication prohibitions, Sex Offender Information Registration Act compliance, and s. 161 prohibitions.

The Crown brought an application during a trial for sexual offences to admit evidence of the accused's subsequent discreditable conduct as similar fact evidence.

The accused operated a home daycare where the offences allegedly occurred against two young children.

Three years later, neighbours observed the accused masturbating naked in his living room window.

The court applied the four-part test for discreditable conduct and found the evidence admissible regarding one complainant due to striking similarities in the location and nature of the act.

The application was dismissed regarding the second complainant as the conduct lacked sufficient similarity.

During a trial for sexual offences alleged to have occurred at a home daycare, the Crown applied to admit the out-of-court statements of two young complainants under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The complainants, who were 3.5 and 5 years old at the time of the alleged offences, were unable to adopt their video-recorded police statements under section 715.1 of the Criminal Code due to a lack of present memory.

The court found that the necessity criterion was met because the children's direct evidence was unavailable despite reasonable efforts.

The court also found that the statements met the threshold reliability criterion based on substantive reliability, noting the children's lack of motive to lie, the absence of leading questions, and the fact that the sexual acts described were outside the expected knowledge of children their age.

The court declined to exercise its residual discretion to exclude the statements, finding their probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect.

The accused applied for a review of his detention order on charges of robbery and assault.

The initial show cause hearing resulted in his detention on secondary grounds due to an insufficient release plan.

The accused presented new proposed sureties, which the court found constituted a material change in circumstances.

After reviewing the statutory factors, the court concluded that the new sureties and strict conditions, including house arrest and a ban on cell phones, would adequately address public safety concerns.

The application was granted and the accused was released on bail.

The applicant, K.H., brought an application under section 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to exclude all evidence seized at his residence and three statements made to the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP).

K.H. argued that the OPP breached his rights under sections 7, 8, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter, and that his statements were not voluntary.

The court found that K.H. was psychologically detained when he entered the police vehicle, and his Charter rights under sections 7, 10(a), and 10(b) were breached because he was not immediately informed of his rights.

The first and second statements were excluded due to these breaches.

The third statement was excluded because the Crown failed to prove its voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt due to inadequate police record-keeping during the search and subsequent interactions.

The warrantless search of K.H.'s residence was found to be unreasonable and in breach of section 8 of the Charter, as exigent circumstances were not established, and the police had sufficient grounds to obtain a warrant.

Applying the Grant factors under section 24(2), the court concluded that admitting the evidence (statements, handgun, ammunition, and long guns) would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, and therefore excluded all evidence.

The accused applied for a bail review under s. 522 of the Criminal Code after previously being detained on the secondary ground following a multi‑day show cause hearing.

The charges arose from an alleged group assault that left the victim with severe and life‑threatening injuries.

The court considered whether there had been a material change in circumstances and whether detention remained necessary under the secondary or tertiary grounds in s. 515(10).

The judge found the evidence against the accused relatively weak, consisting largely of presence at the scene and hearsay evidence of motive, with little direct evidence of personal participation.

A revised release plan involving residence with two sureties providing full‑time supervision constituted a material change sufficient to mitigate concerns about further offences or interference with the administration of justice.

The accused brought a motion to sever one robbery count from a fourteen-count indictment alleging multiple robberies and attempted robberies of convenience stores over several months.

The defence argued that the later robbery count lacked a sufficient legal and factual nexus to the earlier incidents and that trying all counts together would cause unfair prejudice.

The Crown opposed severance, asserting substantial similarities between the incidents and indicating an intention to rely on similar fact evidence across the counts.

Applying the factors from R. v. Last, the court held that the Crown had a viable similar fact argument and that the similarities among the robberies established a sufficient nexus.

The court concluded that any risk of prejudice could be mitigated through appropriate jury instructions and dismissed the severance application.

Following a criminal trial for robbery arising from a school incident, identity was the only live issue.

The court considered eyewitness evidence from the complainant and a corroborating student witness, evidence from school officials, and the photo line-up evidence.

Applying the reasonable doubt standard and the framework in R v W (D), the court rejected the denial evidence and found the identification evidence reliable.

The court held that the Crown proved all elements of robbery beyond a reasonable doubt and convicted both defendants.