Matthew Humphreys

The applicant brought a Charter application under ss. 8 and 24(2) to exclude evidence seized during the execution of search warrants at his residence and vehicles.

The warrants were based on information from confidential informants and police surveillance.

The court found that while there were sufficient grounds to issue the warrants for the vehicles, the information provided fell short of establishing a credibly based probability that drugs would be found in the residence.

The court concluded that the search of the residence violated s. 8 of the Charter.

Applying the s. 24(2) analysis, the court excluded the evidence seized from the residence, noting the serious impact on the applicant's privacy interests and the affiant's negligence in seeking a residential warrant on deficient grounds.

The accused was stopped for speeding and subsequently arrested for driving with a suspended license under the Highway Traffic Act.

During the arrest, the officer smelled alcohol and made an approved screening device demand, which the accused refused, leading to the vehicle being towed.

An inventory search of the trunk revealed a satchel containing a loaded handgun, drugs, and the accused's identification.

The court dismissed the accused's Charter applications alleging racial profiling and arbitrary detention, finding the arrest lawful and the utterances voluntary.

The accused was found guilty of multiple firearms and driving offences, possession of MDMA for the purpose of trafficking, and simple possession of cocaine.

The Crown applied for a lengthy adjournment of the accused's first-degree murder trial, citing the recent exclusion of a key expert witness, voluminous late disclosure from a third-party records application, and a newly received forensic pathology report.

The court rejected the request for a lengthy delay to replace the excluded expert evidence, noting the accused's right to a timely trial after 38 months of investigation.

However, the court granted a short adjournment of one month to allow the parties to review the late disclosure and the new pathology report.

This ruling addresses the admissibility of proposed Crown expert opinion evidence from Dr. Mark Crowther in a first-degree murder trial against Dr. Brian Nadler.

Dr. Nadler is accused of causing the deaths of four patients through the administration of narcotics and sedatives.

The Crown sought to introduce Dr. Crowther's "holistic" analysis, which contradicted the findings of forensic pathologists who concluded the deaths were due to natural causes.

The court, applying the Mohan criteria, found that Dr. Crowther, a hematologist, lacked the specific expertise in forensic pathology, toxicology, palliative care, or acute COVID-19 treatment relevant to the complex medical issues at hand.

Despite his impressive general credentials, the court determined his expertise was not properly connected to the material issues, posing a risk that his general impressiveness would give his opinion undue weight.

Consequently, Dr. Crowther's expert opinion evidence was ruled inadmissible.

The accused, an Indigenous man, pleaded guilty to manslaughter after fatally stabbing the victim once in the chest during an argument while heavily intoxicated.

The Crown sought an eight-year sentence, arguing the offence was near-murder, while the defence proposed four to seven years.

Applying Gladue principles and weighing the accused's remorse, guilty plea, and history of trauma against the aggravating factors of intoxication and use of a weapon, the court imposed a sentence of six years' imprisonment, less credit for pre-sentence custody.

Marvin Dubois pleaded guilty to possession of a restricted weapon.

The Crown sought 365 days imprisonment, while the defence sought a conditional sentence of 365 days.

The court considered the impact of anti-Black racism on the offender, as per R. v. Morris, and found that while the offence was serious, the moral blameworthiness was mitigated by the context of racism and alienation.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of 517 days (18 months less 23 days pre-sentence custody), followed by 12 months probation, a 5-year weapons prohibition, and a secondary DNA order.

The accused was found guilty of 18 counts of firearms trafficking following an undercover police operation.

He brought applications for a stay of proceedings, alleging entrapment and an abuse of process under s. 7 of the Charter.

He argued that the police exploited his vulnerability as a stateless person and that the use of a volatile police agent in public areas shocked the community.

The court dismissed the applications, finding that the police merely provided an opportunity to commit the offences and did not induce the accused.

The court also held that the police conduct, including the monitoring of the agent and the locations of the transactions, did not amount to an abuse of process.

This ruling addresses the voluntariness of a videotaped statement made by Matthew Villeneuve to police, which the Crown sought to admit as evidence in his trial for attempted murder and other charges.

The defence challenged the statement's admissibility, arguing that Villeneuve lacked an operating mind due to his mental health issues and drug use.

The court, applying the common law confessions rule, found that Villeneuve had an operating mind, understood his rights, and made the statement voluntarily, despite his aggressive behaviour prior to the interview and his stated psychological problems.

The court emphasized that Villeneuve initiated and controlled the interview, and his statements were coherent and rational, demonstrating free will.

The applicant, charged with firearms offences, brought a Charter application arguing that police lacked reasonable grounds to arrest him without a warrant and unlawfully searched his vehicle incident to arrest.

He also alleged his right to counsel was violated.

The court found that the arresting officer had objectively reasonable grounds to order the arrest based on a combination of witness descriptions, vehicle identification, and a partial licence plate match.

The subsequent search of the vehicle, which yielded a loaded handgun, was deemed a lawful search incident to arrest.

The court also found no violation of the applicant's right to counsel.

The Charter application was dismissed.

The applicant, charged with firearms offences, brought a motion for a stay of proceedings alleging a violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay was over 37 months, but the court deducted 9 months and 18 days as a discrete event due to the applicant's former counsel accepting employment with the Federal Crown.

The net delay of 27 months and 24 days fell below the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

The court found the applicant failed to demonstrate that the delay was otherwise unreasonable and dismissed the application.

The applicants, who were in pretrial detention, brought an application for a stay of proceedings or damages, alleging that COVID-19 restrictions at the detention centre violated their rights.

The Crown sought summary dismissal of the application under Rule 34.02 of the Criminal Proceedings Rules.

The court found that the restrictions were reasonable and necessary responses to the pandemic, comparable to restrictions faced by the general public.

Concluding there was no reasonable prospect of success, the court summarily dismissed the application.

Two young offenders were convicted of aggravated assault on two unprovoked victims and various breach offences.

The Crown sought four years custody for each.

The court imposed differentiated sentences of 695 days for Hussein and 669 days for Sahal, accounting for pre-sentence custody, restrictive bail conditions, and pandemic-related hardship.

The court considered Hussein's significant mental health issues and remorse as mitigating factors, while noting Sahal's prior criminal record, lack of remorse, and failure to heed prior judicial warnings.

Both received two years probation with conditions including weapons prohibitions and DNA orders.

The accused was charged with accessing, possessing, and distributing child pornography under the Criminal Code.

The trial focused on the mens rea for these offences, specifically whether the accused knowingly downloaded, possessed, or accessed the illegal files.

The court acquitted the accused on the distribution charge, finding insufficient evidence of knowledge or intent regarding file sharing via uTorrent.

However, the court found the accused guilty of possession and accessing child pornography, rejecting his testimony that his possession was unwitting and that he did not view the files.

The conviction was based on forensic evidence (e.g., a "CP" subfolder, RAM screenshots, link files) and the accused's police statement, which was interpreted as an admission of viewing child pornography to "understand the pattern" for protective reasons.

The application of the Kienapple principle for multiple convictions was deferred to sentencing.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired and with a blood-alcohol concentration over 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, contrary to s. 253(1)(a) and (b) of the Criminal Code.

The vehicle in question was an electric scooter.

The court determined that the electric scooter constituted a motor vehicle within the definition in s. 2 of the Criminal Code, as it was designed to be propelled by means other than muscular power.

The court rejected the defence argument that the vehicle was not a motor vehicle when operating without battery power, finding that the nature of the vehicle, not its operability at a particular moment, determines its classification.

The court also found that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's blood-alcohol concentration exceeded 80 at the time of operation, rejecting the defence argument regarding bolus drinking based on the presence of a partially consumed bottle of wine.

The accused was found guilty on both counts.

On a Crown application in a criminal trial, the court determined the admissibility of multiple out-of-court statements made by the deceased to family members, friends, and police.

Applying the principled hearsay approach, the court held that necessity was established by the declarant's death and assessed threshold reliability statement by statement.

Statements made under oath in a peace bond application were admitted as sufficiently reliable, as were certain statements to police tendered as circumstantial evidence of the deceased's state of mind.

Other statements were excluded where their meaning was unclear, relevance was lacking, or the surrounding circumstances did not provide sufficient indicia of reliability.

This was a criminal evidentiary ruling on the admissibility of statements made by a deceased declarant.

The court admitted several statements on consent, admitted others under the state of mind exception, and excluded certain statements as irrelevant or for failure to meet threshold reliability.

The ruling was interlocutory and addressed itemized statements individually by chart number.

The offender was sentenced after a jury convicted him of criminal negligence causing death, impaired driving causing death, and refusing to provide a breath sample following a fatal collision.

The offender had driven the wrong way down a downtown street after consuming alcohol and struck and killed a pedestrian.

The court considered mitigating factors including the offender’s lack of criminal record, strong employment history, remorse, and positive character references, but emphasized aggravating factors such as the fatal consequences of impaired driving, the dangerous manner of driving, and the refusal to provide a breath sample after learning of the death.

The court highlighted appellate authority indicating a rising range of custodial sentences for impaired driving causing death, emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence.

A global custodial sentence was imposed along with a lengthy driving prohibition and a DNA order.

During a jury trial for multiple robberies and a conspiracy charge, the Crown brought a similar fact application seeking permission for the jury to use evidence from several robbery counts as proof of identity across those counts.

The court analyzed similarities between four convenience store robberies occurring within a short time frame in the Ottawa area, including the method of operation, division of labour among perpetrators, use of masks and firearms, handling of store clerks, and the repeated presence of a distinctive heavy-set participant.

Applying the principles governing similar fact evidence in identity cases, the court held that the cumulative similarities were sufficiently significant to render coincidence objectively improbable.

The probative value of the evidence outweighed potential prejudice, particularly because each event was already charged in the indictment.

The court therefore permitted the jury to consider the four group robbery counts as similar act evidence for identity and allowed evidence of robberies or attempted robberies to be considered on the issue of intent regarding the conspiracy charge.

During a jury trial for multiple convenience store robberies where the perpetrators wore masks, the Crown sought to admit a 2009 police booking photograph of the accused showing him wearing a jacket with three stripes.

The Crown argued the photograph was admissible as a police business record under s. 30(1) of the Canada Evidence Act and constituted circumstantial evidence linking the accused to robbery surveillance footage depicting a similarly striped jacket.

The defence objected on the basis that the evidence carried significant prejudicial risk and minimal probative value.

The court held that while the photograph could qualify as a business record, admissibility still required a balancing of probative value against prejudicial effect.

Given the common nature of the clothing, the two‑year time gap, and the risk the jury would infer prior police involvement, the prejudicial effect outweighed the probative value.

The Crown brought a pre‑trial motion seeking admission of similar fact evidence relating to several convenience store robberies to prove identity of the perpetrators in a multi-count indictment involving robberies committed by one or more offenders.

The court applied the framework governing similar fact evidence from R. v. Perrier, R. v. Handy, and R. v. Arp, including the additional requirements where group criminal activity involves rotating participation.

The court found sufficient distinctive similarities among three robberies committed by a single offender to admit evidence of a prior conviction as similar fact evidence against one accused on the issue of identity.

However, the Crown failed to establish the necessary distinctive modus operandi among the group robberies because numerous material differences undermined the alleged common signature.

As a result, most of the requested similar act evidence was excluded.