Sarah Ahsan

The accused brought an application under s. 11(b) of the Charter to stay charges of possession for the purpose of trafficking due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay from arrest to the anticipated end of trial was over 53 months.

After deducting defence delay and delay caused by exceptional circumstances, including the COVID-19 pandemic and the death of the preliminary hearing judge, the net delay was calculated at 35 months and 21 days.

As this exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling and the case was not particularly complex, the court found the delay unreasonable and stayed the charges.

The applicants, charged with firearms and drug offences, brought a Charter application to exclude evidence seized during the execution of a search warrant at a residence.

They argued the Information to Obtain (ITO) lacked reasonable and probable grounds to believe the firearm would be located at the specified addresses.

The court found the ITO lacked any case-specific evidence linking the firearm to the residences, rendering the search a violation of section 8 of the Charter.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the serious state conduct of searching a private residence based on mere speculation outweighed the societal interest in adjudicating the case on its merits.

The evidence was excluded under section 24(2).

Two young offenders were convicted of aggravated assault on two unprovoked victims and various breach offences.

The Crown sought four years custody for each.

The court imposed differentiated sentences of 695 days for Hussein and 669 days for Sahal, accounting for pre-sentence custody, restrictive bail conditions, and pandemic-related hardship.

The court considered Hussein's significant mental health issues and remorse as mitigating factors, while noting Sahal's prior criminal record, lack of remorse, and failure to heed prior judicial warnings.

Both received two years probation with conditions including weapons prohibitions and DNA orders.

M.M. sought a bail review of a detention order, arguing a material change in circumstances due to COVID-19 and his underlying health conditions.

The applicant, charged with multiple drug trafficking and compliance offences, proposed a release plan with a surety (K.D.) and GPS monitoring.

The court accepted the COVID-19 pandemic as a material change but ultimately found the proposed surety unsuitable due to a shared history of drug addiction with the applicant, which jeopardized the applicant's sobriety and the plan's ability to mitigate secondary grounds risks.

The court also considered the strong Crown's case and the public's confidence in the administration of justice.

The bail review application was dismissed, and the applicant remained detained on secondary and tertiary grounds.

The accused, Jormond Fraser, sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code, following two previous detention orders.

The application cited a material change in circumstances due to a new surety, the proposed use of a GPS monitoring bracelet, and the elevated health risks posed by the COVID-19 pandemic within the Ottawa Carleton Detention Centre, particularly given Fraser's history of leukemia.

The court acknowledged the COVID-19 pandemic as a material change allowing a de novo hearing and a relevant factor in assessing the tertiary ground for bail.

However, the proposed surety was deemed unsuitable due to a past failure to report a breach of conditions and current mental health challenges, raising concerns about her ability to supervise effectively.

Despite the increased risk of infection in custody and Fraser's expressed fear, his extensive criminal record, including numerous convictions for failing to comply with court orders and violence against women, led the court to conclude that the proposed bail plan was insufficient to manage the substantial likelihood of him committing further offences.

The bail review was dismissed, and the detention order remained undisturbed.

The accused, Maurice Landriault, faced charges of criminal negligence causing bodily harm and dangerous driving causing bodily harm.

In pre-trial applications, the court addressed the classification and disclosure of first and third-party records related to a Crown witness's criminal record, the voluntariness of the accused's statement to police, and alleged Charter breaches (ss. 7, 8, 10(a), 10(b)).

The court found that records related to the Crown witness's criminal history were first-party records requiring Crown disclosure.

It also determined that the accused's statements to police were involuntary due to a significant change in jeopardy and the failure to re-caution and re-advise of the right to counsel.

Consequently, the accused's Charter rights under ss. 7, 10(a), 10(b) were breached, and the search of his recording device breached s. 8.

The court excluded the entirety of the accused's interview and the replaying of his recording from evidence at trial under both the common law confessions rule and s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings on the grounds that her right to trial within a reasonable time had been violated.

The accused was charged with offences including trafficking in a Schedule II substance and firearm-related offences arising from a search warrant executed in March 2017.

The total delay from the swearing of the Information to the anticipated end of trial was 714 days (approximately 23 months and 12 days).

Applying the Jordan framework, the court calculated net delay of 600 days (20 months) after deducting defence delay.

The court found no exceptional circumstances, as the case was not particularly complex and there were no discrete events beyond the change of counsel.

The court granted the stay of proceedings.

The defendants brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking to stay proceedings on the grounds that their right to be tried within a reasonable time had been breached.

The total delay from arrest to anticipated trial conclusion was 21 months and 6 days, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling by 3 months and 6 days.

The Crown conceded there was no defence delay, waiver, or discrete event.

The court found the case was not particularly complex and that the Crown's decision to join multiple defendants together late in the proceedings, and subsequent partial severance, created unnecessary delay.

The court granted the application and stayed the proceedings.

The accused pleaded guilty to possession for the purpose of trafficking in cannabis in an amount less than 3 kg.

She was an employee at a marijuana dispensary that was subject to a police search warrant.

Both the Crown and Defence agreed that a discharge was appropriate, but disagreed on whether it should be conditional or absolute.

The court granted an absolute discharge, finding that the accused was a young first offender with no criminal record, strong remorse, low risk of reoffending, and significant rehabilitative potential.

The court found that conditions were unnecessary and would be disproportionately harsh given the accused's future employment and travel prospects.

The offender was convicted after trial of possessing a weapon (knife) for the purpose of committing a criminal offence and knowingly uttering a threat to cause bodily harm.

He subsequently pled guilty to failing to appear in court and breaching a recognizance condition.

The central sentencing issue was whether to impose a conditional discharge or a suspended sentence, given the offender's status as a permanent resident and the potential immigration consequences of a conviction.

The court considered the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. Pham regarding the relevance of collateral immigration consequences to sentencing decisions and concluded that while such consequences may be considered, they cannot dominate the sentencing process or result in inappropriate sentences.

The court imposed suspended sentences with probation rather than a discharge, finding that the serious nature of the offences and the offender's disregard for the justice system precluded a discharge despite significant personal mitigating circumstances.