Stephen Joseph Donoghue

The accused, Paul Needham, was charged with one count of sexual assault on his former spouse.

The case involved diametrically opposed accounts of a sexual encounter on January 10, 2019, while the parties were co-habiting post-separation.

The Crown argued the complainant said "no" and "don't," while the accused claimed consensual oral sex initiated by the complainant.

The court assessed credibility and reliability under the W.(D.) framework, finding the accused's testimony credible and reliable.

The court concluded that the accused's actions, based on his accepted account, did not constitute sexual assault, as there was communicated consent through gestures and verbal requests, and he stopped when consent was clearly withdrawn.

The defendant was charged with aggravated assault following a road rage incident on Ogilvie Road in Ottawa.

The defendant cut off the complainant's vehicle, stopped abruptly, and exited her car to confront the complainant.

After an aggressive verbal altercation, the defendant pushed the complainant, causing her to fall to the roadway and sustain serious injuries including a fractured pelvis and broken pubic bone.

The defendant argued the charge should be dismissed on grounds that her action was reflexive rather than voluntary, or alternatively that she acted in self-defence.

The court found the defendant's actions were voluntary and rejected the self-defence claim, finding the force used was not reasonable in the circumstances.

The defendant was convicted of aggravated assault.

The accused, JS, was found guilty of eight offences, including assault, sexual assault, assault with a weapon, and uttering threats against his common-law partner, AG, and her dog.

The offences included two distinct sexual assaults, one involving a knife and threats of death.

The court considered mitigating factors such as no prior criminal record, pro-social history, and attempts at anger management, alongside aggravating factors including abuse of a common-law partner, the domestic setting of the crimes, forced vaginal intercourse, and use of a weapon.

The victim suffered significant psychological harm.

The court imposed a total sentence of five years and thirty days imprisonment, to be served partly concurrently and partly consecutively, rejecting the defence's request for a stay on the Kienapple principle for the second sexual assault.

Ancillary orders included a mandatory DNA order, a lifetime weapons prohibition, lifetime registration under the Sex Offender Information Registration Act, and a non-communication order with the victim.

The accused, A.J., brought an application under section 276 of the Criminal Code to admit evidence of the complainant's prior sexual activity with the accused in a sexual assault trial.

The Crown and counsel for the complainant opposed the admission, arguing it was not relevant or significantly probative.

The court found the evidence admissible, determining it was not adduced to support "twin myths," was relevant to the issue of consent and credibility given the differing accounts of the parties' relationship, consisted of specific instances of sexual activity, and had significant probative value not substantially outweighed by prejudice.

The court emphasized the accused's right to make full answer and defence and the need for a complete factual picture.

The accused, Maurice Landriault, faced charges of criminal negligence causing bodily harm and dangerous driving causing bodily harm.

In pre-trial applications, the court addressed the classification and disclosure of first and third-party records related to a Crown witness's criminal record, the voluntariness of the accused's statement to police, and alleged Charter breaches (ss. 7, 8, 10(a), 10(b)).

The court found that records related to the Crown witness's criminal history were first-party records requiring Crown disclosure.

It also determined that the accused's statements to police were involuntary due to a significant change in jeopardy and the failure to re-caution and re-advise of the right to counsel.

Consequently, the accused's Charter rights under ss. 7, 10(a), 10(b) were breached, and the search of his recording device breached s. 8.

The court excluded the entirety of the accused's interview and the replaying of his recording from evidence at trial under both the common law confessions rule and s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The applicant, Lachlan MacGregor, sought a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging a breach of his s. 7 and s. 12 Charter rights.

The breach arose from police administering a taser in drive stun mode to his thigh after he was arrested, handcuffed, and not demonstrating violence, while exhibiting signs of impairment.

The court found that the force used was unreasonable and excessive, constituting a breach of s. 7 and s. 12 of the Charter.

However, the court declined to grant a stay of proceedings, determining that the case did not meet the 'clearest of cases' threshold required for such a drastic remedy, as there was no prejudice to the accused's right to a fair trial and alternative remedies existed.

The accused, JS, was charged with eight counts including assault, sexual assault, assault with a weapon, and uttering threats against the complainant, AG.

The defence conceded guilt on six counts but disputed the sexual assault charges.

The court assessed the credibility and reliability of both AG and JS's testimonies, along with corroborating physical and witness evidence.

The court rejected JS's version of events regarding the sexual activity, finding AG's testimony credible and corroborated.

The defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent was also rejected.

JS was found guilty on all eight counts.

A young person pleaded guilty to sexual interference with an 11-year-old victim and breach of probation.

The offence constituted an attempted rape occurring only three months after the offender had been placed on probation for a prior sexual interference conviction involving a 13-year-old victim.

The court determined that a deferred custody and supervision order was unavailable because the offence caused serious bodily harm to the victim.

The court imposed a custodial sentence of 4 weeks secure custody followed by 2 weeks community supervision and 2 years probation with extensive conditions, including counselling, community service, and participation in culturally-appropriate programming.

The sentence balanced the seriousness of the offence against the offender's Inuit background, tragic personal circumstances, and rehabilitative potential.

The accused brought a renewed motion for disclosure of Ottawa Police occurrence reports relating to prior police contacts within 90 days prior to the alleged offence.

The Crown initially opposed disclosure under the Mills regime for third party records in sexual offence prosecutions.

Following the Ontario Court of Appeal's decision in R. v. Quesnelle, which held that police occurrence reports prepared by the investigating police force are not "records" under section 278.1 and are therefore governed by the Stinchcombe disclosure regime rather than the Mills regime, the court reconsidered its initial ruling.

The court found that Quesnelle could be reconciled with prior authority from R. v. McNeil and R. v. Thompson and determined that the Crown must apply the Stinchcombe disclosure obligation to produce occurrence reports relating to the complainant that are in the possession of the investigating police force.

The offender was convicted of aggravated assault after striking a taxi driver with a metal rod while acting jointly with a co‑accused who punched the victim and knocked him to the ground.

The victim suffered a fractured skull, a coma lasting several days, lengthy hospitalization, rehabilitation, and permanent loss of smell.

The court considered aggravating factors including the unprovoked group attack, use of a weapon, severe and lasting injuries, the vulnerability of taxi drivers, and the offender’s lengthy criminal record and lack of remorse.

The court addressed parity with the co‑accused’s lesser sentence but held that mitigating factors available to the co‑accused did not apply.

Applying principles of denunciation and deterrence, the offender was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment with credit for pre‑trial custody on a one‑for‑one basis.

The applicant, convicted of first‑degree murder and serving life imprisonment with 25 years’ parole ineligibility, sought a reduction of the ineligibility period under the “faint hope” provisions of s. 745.6 of the Criminal Code.

The court conducted the initial judicial screening required under s. 745.61 to determine whether the application demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success before a jury.

The materials showed exceptional institutional conduct, rehabilitation efforts, and declining health, though the Crown challenged the applicant’s credibility and role in planning the murder.

Weighing the statutory factors including character, conduct during incarceration, the nature of the offence, and the victim impact evidence, the court found the threshold test met.

The application was permitted to proceed to a jury hearing.

The appellant appealed a conviction for refusing to provide breath samples under s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal argued that the trial judge failed to adequately address significant inconsistencies in the evidence of police witnesses concerning signs of impairment and the suitability of a breath sample accepted by the breathalyser machine.

The court held that the trial judge’s reasons did not explain how credibility conflicts among the officers were resolved, particularly regarding the arresting officer’s observations and the breath technician’s rejection of an accepted sample.

Applying the functional approach to adequacy of reasons articulated in Supreme Court jurisprudence, the court concluded that the reasons did not permit meaningful appellate review.

A new trial was ordered.

The accused was charged with aggravated assault after striking a taxi driver with a metal rod and kicking him while he lay unconscious after being punched by a co‑accused.

The defence claimed the taxi driver attacked first with a baton and that the accused neither struck nor kicked the victim.

The court rejected the accused’s testimony and that of the co‑accused, finding it inconsistent with physical evidence and the credible testimony of three independent eyewitnesses.

The court held that hitting the victim on the head with a metal rod and kicking him while unconscious created objectively foreseeable bodily harm and formed part of a joint assault with the co‑accused.

Although the permanent loss of smell was attributed to the co‑accused’s punch, the accused’s participation made him a party to the aggravated assault under s. 21(2) of the Criminal Code.