Stephen Joseph Donoghue

The accused, Paul Needham, was charged with one count of sexual assault on his former spouse.

The case involved diametrically opposed accounts of a sexual encounter on January 10, 2019, while the parties were co-habiting post-separation.

The Crown argued the complainant said "no" and "don't," while the accused claimed consensual oral sex initiated by the complainant.

The court assessed credibility and reliability under the W.(D.) framework, finding the accused's testimony credible and reliable.

The court concluded that the accused's actions, based on his accepted account, did not constitute sexual assault, as there was communicated consent through gestures and verbal requests, and he stopped when consent was clearly withdrawn.

The applicant sought a review of a detention order on charges of robbery and failing to comply with a release order.

The court found a material change in circumstances based on the proposed surety's reduced work hours and the applicant's experience in custody during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Applying the Palmer criteria flexibly, the court admitted the fresh evidence and conducted a hearing de novo.

The court concluded that with two strong sureties and a GPS monitoring bracelet, the risk of re-offending or interfering with the administration of justice was sufficiently mitigated.

The applicant was granted bail on strict house arrest conditions.

The accused was charged with 15 counts of violent offences, including assault, assault with a weapon, aggravated assault, and uttering threats, against his former intimate partner.

The trial focused on the credibility and reliability of the complainant and the accused, who provided contradictory accounts.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court rejected the accused's evidence, finding it inconsistent and contradicted by text messages and photographic evidence.

The court accepted the complainant's evidence, finding that the accused exerted financial control and committed numerous acts of violence, including grinding the complainant's legs into broken glass.

The accused was found guilty on all remaining counts.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault with a weapon and assault causing bodily harm arising from a stabbing at a wedding reception.

The appellant argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence and erred in applying the law of self-defence.

The Superior Court of Justice found the trial judge correctly applied the three-part test for self-defence under section 34 of the Criminal Code and reasonably concluded the appellant's response was disproportionate and not a justified act of self-defence.

The appeal against conviction was dismissed, though the victim fine surcharge was set aside.

The defendant applied for a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code after being denied bail on the tertiary ground for charges related to an armed home invasion.

The reviewing judge found that new evidence, including an enhanced bail plan and the arrest of another suspect, met the Palmer criteria for admission.

The judge also found that the original bail judge erred by failing to consider the defendant's Charter right to reasonable bail and by overstating the gravity of the offence and the strength of the Crown's case.

Concluding that detention was not necessary to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice, the court granted the bail review and ordered the defendant's release on strict conditions.

The accused was charged with aggravated assault and sexual assault against his former partner, as well as assault against their infant son.

The Crown's case relied primarily on the testimony of the complainant.

The trial judge found numerous significant inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence, particularly regarding her motivations for wanting the accused out of the house, the timing of her seeking legal advice for custody, and her explanation for the lack of visible facial injuries.

Due to these credibility and reliability concerns, the court found a reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused of all charges.

The defendant was charged with aggravated assault following a road rage incident on Ogilvie Road in Ottawa.

The defendant cut off the complainant's vehicle, stopped abruptly, and exited her car to confront the complainant.

After an aggressive verbal altercation, the defendant pushed the complainant, causing her to fall to the roadway and sustain serious injuries including a fractured pelvis and broken pubic bone.

The defendant argued the charge should be dismissed on grounds that her action was reflexive rather than voluntary, or alternatively that she acted in self-defence.

The court found the defendant's actions were voluntary and rejected the self-defence claim, finding the force used was not reasonable in the circumstances.

The defendant was convicted of aggravated assault.

The accused, JS, was found guilty of eight offences, including assault, sexual assault, assault with a weapon, and uttering threats against his common-law partner, AG, and her dog.

The offences included two distinct sexual assaults, one involving a knife and threats of death.

The court considered mitigating factors such as no prior criminal record, pro-social history, and attempts at anger management, alongside aggravating factors including abuse of a common-law partner, the domestic setting of the crimes, forced vaginal intercourse, and use of a weapon.

The victim suffered significant psychological harm.

The court imposed a total sentence of five years and thirty days imprisonment, to be served partly concurrently and partly consecutively, rejecting the defence's request for a stay on the Kienapple principle for the second sexual assault.

Ancillary orders included a mandatory DNA order, a lifetime weapons prohibition, lifetime registration under the Sex Offender Information Registration Act, and a non-communication order with the victim.

The accused, A.J., brought an application under section 276 of the Criminal Code to admit evidence of the complainant's prior sexual activity with the accused in a sexual assault trial.

The Crown and counsel for the complainant opposed the admission, arguing it was not relevant or significantly probative.

The court found the evidence admissible, determining it was not adduced to support "twin myths," was relevant to the issue of consent and credibility given the differing accounts of the parties' relationship, consisted of specific instances of sexual activity, and had significant probative value not substantially outweighed by prejudice.

The court emphasized the accused's right to make full answer and defence and the need for a complete factual picture.

The accused, Maurice Landriault, faced charges of criminal negligence causing bodily harm and dangerous driving causing bodily harm.

In pre-trial applications, the court addressed the classification and disclosure of first and third-party records related to a Crown witness's criminal record, the voluntariness of the accused's statement to police, and alleged Charter breaches (ss. 7, 8, 10(a), 10(b)).

The court found that records related to the Crown witness's criminal history were first-party records requiring Crown disclosure.

It also determined that the accused's statements to police were involuntary due to a significant change in jeopardy and the failure to re-caution and re-advise of the right to counsel.

Consequently, the accused's Charter rights under ss. 7, 10(a), 10(b) were breached, and the search of his recording device breached s. 8.

The court excluded the entirety of the accused's interview and the replaying of his recording from evidence at trial under both the common law confessions rule and s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The applicant, Lachlan MacGregor, sought a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging a breach of his s. 7 and s. 12 Charter rights.

The breach arose from police administering a taser in drive stun mode to his thigh after he was arrested, handcuffed, and not demonstrating violence, while exhibiting signs of impairment.

The court found that the force used was unreasonable and excessive, constituting a breach of s. 7 and s. 12 of the Charter.

However, the court declined to grant a stay of proceedings, determining that the case did not meet the 'clearest of cases' threshold required for such a drastic remedy, as there was no prejudice to the accused's right to a fair trial and alternative remedies existed.

The accused, JS, was charged with eight counts including assault, sexual assault, assault with a weapon, and uttering threats against the complainant, AG.

The defence conceded guilt on six counts but disputed the sexual assault charges.

The court assessed the credibility and reliability of both AG and JS's testimonies, along with corroborating physical and witness evidence.

The court rejected JS's version of events regarding the sexual activity, finding AG's testimony credible and corroborated.

The defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent was also rejected.

JS was found guilty on all eight counts.

During a criminal trial, a Crown witness failed to appear despite being served with a subpoena.

The Crown requested a material witness warrant under s. 705 of the Criminal Code.

The defence opposed, arguing the subpoena was invalidly issued by a court clerk without any inquiry into whether the witness had material evidence to give, as required by s. 698.

The court agreed with the defence, applying the framework from Dykstra v. Greensword, and held that issuing a subpoena without any case-specific inquiry exceeds the issuer's jurisdiction.

The subpoena was quashed and the request for a warrant was denied.

Following a judge-alone criminal trial arising from allegations within a deteriorating marriage, the court applied the W.(D.) framework to competing accounts by the accused and the complainant.

The court rejected the accused's denials as implausible and internally inconsistent, accepted the complainant's evidence as credible and reliable, and relied in part on text and email communications as corroborative evidence, including silence treated as adoption of accusations.

The Crown proved four counts of sexual assault beyond a reasonable doubt, but failed to prove the mens rea and other elements necessary for possession of a weapon for the purpose of committing an offence, assault with a weapon, and unlawful confinement.

The accused was acquitted on counts 1, 2, 3 and 8 and convicted on counts 4, 5, 6 and 7.

A young person pleaded guilty to sexual interference with an 11-year-old victim and breach of probation.

The offence constituted an attempted rape occurring only three months after the offender had been placed on probation for a prior sexual interference conviction involving a 13-year-old victim.

The court determined that a deferred custody and supervision order was unavailable because the offence caused serious bodily harm to the victim.

The court imposed a custodial sentence of 4 weeks secure custody followed by 2 weeks community supervision and 2 years probation with extensive conditions, including counselling, community service, and participation in culturally-appropriate programming.

The sentence balanced the seriousness of the offence against the offender's Inuit background, tragic personal circumstances, and rehabilitative potential.

The appellant appealed his conviction for refusing to comply with a demand to provide a breath sample.

He argued that the police had no lawful basis to ask for a sample, that he was not asked in a way he could understand, and that he had a reasonable excuse due to fear of the police.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's credibility assessments were reasonable, the officer had a reasonable suspicion to make the demand, and the appellant's claimed excuse lacked an air of reality.

The appellant appealed his conviction for failing to comply with a breath demand.

At trial, where he was self-represented, the trial judge found the breath demand was lawful but provided no analysis or findings of fact regarding the arresting officer's grounds.

The Superior Court of Justice applied the principles from Sheppard, holding that the trial judge was required to provide clear reasons explaining why the officer had reasonable and probable grounds on both a subjective and objective basis.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving while disqualified, arguing that the trial judge's verdict was unreasonable due to frailties in the police officer's identification evidence.

The summary conviction appeal judge reviewed the trial judge's reasons, noting that the trial judge had properly considered the weaknesses in the Crown's case and the principles of identification evidence.

Finding that the trial judge's conclusion was supported by the evidence and not unreasonable, the appeal was dismissed.

The accused brought a renewed motion for disclosure of Ottawa Police occurrence reports relating to prior police contacts within 90 days prior to the alleged offence.

The Crown initially opposed disclosure under the Mills regime for third party records in sexual offence prosecutions.

Following the Ontario Court of Appeal's decision in R. v. Quesnelle, which held that police occurrence reports prepared by the investigating police force are not "records" under section 278.1 and are therefore governed by the Stinchcombe disclosure regime rather than the Mills regime, the court reconsidered its initial ruling.

The court found that Quesnelle could be reconciled with prior authority from R. v. McNeil and R. v. Thompson and determined that the Crown must apply the Stinchcombe disclosure obligation to produce occurrence reports relating to the complainant that are in the possession of the investigating police force.

The offender was convicted of aggravated assault after striking a taxi driver with a metal rod while acting jointly with a co‑accused who punched the victim and knocked him to the ground.

The victim suffered a fractured skull, a coma lasting several days, lengthy hospitalization, rehabilitation, and permanent loss of smell.

The court considered aggravating factors including the unprovoked group attack, use of a weapon, severe and lasting injuries, the vulnerability of taxi drivers, and the offender’s lengthy criminal record and lack of remorse.

The court addressed parity with the co‑accused’s lesser sentence but held that mitigating factors available to the co‑accused did not apply.

Applying principles of denunciation and deterrence, the offender was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment with credit for pre‑trial custody on a one‑for‑one basis.