Graham Smith Bebbington

The applicant, Tamara Lich, sought to review a bail review decision, alleging errors of law in the imposed release conditions.

The Crown argued the Superior Court of Justice lacked jurisdiction to review a decision of another SCJ judge.

The court examined the interpretation of sections 520 and 521 of the Criminal Code, distinguishing between reviews based on material change in circumstances and those based on errors of law.

Relying on Ontario precedent (R. v. Saracino and R. v. Durrani) over Saskatchewan precedent (R. v. Smith), the court found that the Superior Court of Justice does have jurisdiction to review a bail decision made by another judge of the same court, regardless of whether the previous decision affirmed or vacated the justice's order, and whether the grounds for review are a change in circumstances or an error of law.

The accused, Ahmed Ahmed, pleaded guilty to multiple offences including trafficking in crack cocaine, possession of proceeds of crime, possession of a loaded restricted weapon, possession of a firearm in violation of a prohibition order, and breach of recognizance.

The court considered aggravating factors such as a significant related criminal record, unlawful possession of a loaded handgun in violation of prior orders, and the harmful nature of crack cocaine.

Mitigating factors included an early guilty plea and compliance with restrictive house arrest bail conditions during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The judge applied principles of deterrence, denunciation, and totality, giving credit for pre-sentence custody (with additional credit for COVID-19 conditions) and restrictive bail.

The final sentence imposed was 1,006 days (approximately 2 years and 9 months) of incarceration, a lifetime firearm prohibition, a DNA order, and forfeiture of money and items.

The accused, A.J., brought an application under section 276 of the Criminal Code to admit evidence of the complainant's prior sexual activity with the accused in a sexual assault trial.

The Crown and counsel for the complainant opposed the admission, arguing it was not relevant or significantly probative.

The court found the evidence admissible, determining it was not adduced to support "twin myths," was relevant to the issue of consent and credibility given the differing accounts of the parties' relationship, consisted of specific instances of sexual activity, and had significant probative value not substantially outweighed by prejudice.

The court emphasized the accused's right to make full answer and defence and the need for a complete factual picture.