Norman D. Boxall

This is a ruling on an application for a stay of proceedings brought by the accused, Jeffrey Lawrence, pursuant to section 11(b) of the Charter, alleging a violation of the right to trial within a reasonable time.

The total delay from the swearing of the Information to the anticipated completion of the trial was 576 days, exceeding the 547-day presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The Crown argued for two periods of defence delay: 1) 23 days for failing to timely advance a trial scheduling conference, and 2) 78 days (split equally) for defence counsel's unavailability for multiple re-offered trial dates after the initial dates were lost due to court congestion.

The court dismissed the first period of alleged defence delay, finding the overall intake phase reasonable.

For the second period, the court found the Crown's proposal to attribute 38 days of delay to the defence (half of 76 days) to be fair, given the defence counsel's repeated unavailability for Jordan-compliant dates and failure to provide reasons or alternative availability on the record.

Subtracting 38 days of defence delay brought the total delay below the Jordan ceiling, leading to the dismissal of the stay application.

The applicant, charged with impaired driving, brought a motion seeking permission for his counsel to conduct the trial without a mask and for witnesses to testify unmasked.

Counsel argued that masks impeded his ability to effectively cross-examine witnesses by obscuring non-verbal cues, muffling his voice, and causing distraction.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that counsel's effectiveness would not be meaningfully reduced and that public health concerns, supported by existing regulations and guidelines, justified the masking requirement.

The judge emphasized judicial discretion in balancing fair trial rights against public health measures and the importance of consistency in court procedures.

The accused, Ahmed Ahmed, pleaded guilty to multiple offences including trafficking in crack cocaine, possession of proceeds of crime, possession of a loaded restricted weapon, possession of a firearm in violation of a prohibition order, and breach of recognizance.

The court considered aggravating factors such as a significant related criminal record, unlawful possession of a loaded handgun in violation of prior orders, and the harmful nature of crack cocaine.

Mitigating factors included an early guilty plea and compliance with restrictive house arrest bail conditions during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The judge applied principles of deterrence, denunciation, and totality, giving credit for pre-sentence custody (with additional credit for COVID-19 conditions) and restrictive bail.

The final sentence imposed was 1,006 days (approximately 2 years and 9 months) of incarceration, a lifetime firearm prohibition, a DNA order, and forfeiture of money and items.

The Crown brought an application for a publication ban and sealing order on a victim impact statement.

The victim, who was the subject of threatening and harassing communications, indicated she would only file a victim impact statement if its contents were protected from publication.

The court declined to grant the publication ban, finding that while the victim's concerns were understandable, the open court principle and the public's right to know outweighed the interests in protecting the statement's contents.

The court noted that victim impact statements are not compellable and that courts regularly proceed without them.

The accused, charged with sexual assault and criminal harassment, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay.

The total delay from the laying of charges to the anticipated end of trial was approximately 23 months, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial courts.

The court found only 28 days of defence delay and rejected the Crown's arguments that the defence implicitly waived delay or engaged in illegitimate conduct regarding disclosure and scheduling.

The court also rejected the Crown's argument that the case was complex.

Finding no exceptional circumstances to justify the net delay of nearly 22 months, the court ordered a stay of proceedings.

The accused pleaded guilty to ten offences committed between January and April 2016, including four counts of driving while prohibited, three counts of breach of recognizance, possession of stolen property, obstruction of a peace officer, and possession of marijuana.

The accused had an extensive criminal history with prior convictions for driving while disqualified, flight from police, dangerous driving, and numerous breaches of probation.

A Gladue report was prepared and a sentencing circle was held.

The court imposed an 18-month conditional sentence with strict conditions including home confinement for the first 12 months, recognizing the accused's Aboriginal background, systemic disadvantages, and demonstrated prospect of rehabilitation through his relationship and commitment to a rehabilitation plan.

The accused was charged with firearm offences, possession for the purposes of trafficking in crack cocaine, and breach of a recognizance.

The Crown sought detention on secondary and tertiary grounds, arguing the accused presented a substantial likelihood of re-offending and that public confidence in the administration of justice required detention.

The accused proposed release on a recognizance with a live-in surety (his mother), house arrest, and electronic monitoring.

The court found the accused met the reverse onus by demonstrating the proposed conditions would adequately reduce the risk of re-offending on the secondary ground and would maintain public confidence on the tertiary ground, despite the serious nature of the allegations and the accused's extensive criminal record.

The accused pleaded guilty to possession for the purpose of trafficking in cannabis in an amount less than 3 kg.

She was an employee at a marijuana dispensary that was subject to a police search warrant.

Both the Crown and Defence agreed that a discharge was appropriate, but disagreed on whether it should be conditional or absolute.

The court granted an absolute discharge, finding that the accused was a young first offender with no criminal record, strong remorse, low risk of reoffending, and significant rehabilitative potential.

The court found that conditions were unnecessary and would be disproportionately harsh given the accused's future employment and travel prospects.