J. Lester Davies

This is a ruling on an application for a stay of proceedings brought by the accused, Jeffrey Lawrence, pursuant to section 11(b) of the Charter, alleging a violation of the right to trial within a reasonable time.

The total delay from the swearing of the Information to the anticipated completion of the trial was 576 days, exceeding the 547-day presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The Crown argued for two periods of defence delay: 1) 23 days for failing to timely advance a trial scheduling conference, and 2) 78 days (split equally) for defence counsel's unavailability for multiple re-offered trial dates after the initial dates were lost due to court congestion.

The court dismissed the first period of alleged defence delay, finding the overall intake phase reasonable.

For the second period, the court found the Crown's proposal to attribute 38 days of delay to the defence (half of 76 days) to be fair, given the defence counsel's repeated unavailability for Jordan-compliant dates and failure to provide reasons or alternative availability on the record.

Subtracting 38 days of defence delay brought the total delay below the Jordan ceiling, leading to the dismissal of the stay application.

The appellant claimed an interest in the increase in equity in the respondent's home during their cohabitation, seeking a share of a $410,000 increase.

The trial judge dismissed the action and awarded costs to the respondent.

On appeal, the court allowed the appeal in part, awarding the appellant $5,000 plus interest, representing a one-time mortgage contribution.

The appeal addressed primarily a constructive trust claim, on which the respondent was successful on the main issue.

The appellant appealed from the dismissal of her application for an interest in the increase in equity of a home owned by the respondent during their six-year common law relationship.

The appellant claimed unjust enrichment based on contributions to living expenses, home maintenance and repairs, and a $5,000 lump sum payment toward the mortgage.

The application judge found no joint family venture and held that the shared expense arrangement provided a juristic reason for retaining the $5,000 payment.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the proprietary claim but allowed the appeal regarding the $5,000 payment, finding the application judge erred in characterizing it as part of the shared expense arrangement and ordering its return with interest.

Following a trial where the plaintiffs were unsuccessful in setting aside a conveyance of the family home, the successful defendants sought costs.

The plaintiffs argued no costs should be awarded or that the Estate should pay.

The court awarded the successful defendant grandson $15,000 in partial indemnity costs, noting the plaintiffs chose to proceed to trial after discovery.

The self-represented defendant was awarded no costs due to lack of documentation.

The request for a non-party costs order against the Estate was dismissed.

The plaintiffs sought to set aside the conveyance of their deceased father's family home to himself and his grandson as joint tenants, arguing resulting trust and undue influence.

The court found that the presumption of resulting trust applied to the transfer to the adult grandson, but it was rebutted by evidence showing the grandfather intended the transfer as a gift to reward the grandson for financially saving the house from power of sale proceedings.

The court also found no express undue influence and that any presumption of undue influence was rebutted by the grandfather's clear, independent intentions.

The action was dismissed.

A former cohabiting partner sought half of the $410,000 increase in equity in the respondent’s home on the basis of unjust enrichment and an alleged joint family venture.

The court applied the framework from Kerr v. Baranow and assessed mutual effort, economic integration, actual intent, and priority of the family.

It found the parties maintained largely separate finances, had no children, and did not integrate their economic lives or demonstrate an intention to share property.

Most of the increase in equity was attributable to market forces rather than joint effort, and the applicant’s limited contributions, including a $5,000 payment toward the mortgage, were found to fall within the parties’ arrangement to share living expenses.

The court concluded that neither a joint family venture nor unjust enrichment was established.

A contested bankruptcy discharge hearing concerned a second-time bankrupt whose estate largely involved a single creditor landlord claim for unpaid rent.

The creditor actively challenged the administration of the estate and pursued extensive document production and motions, while the trustee recommended a surplus income payment of approximately $10,000 as a condition of discharge.

The court reviewed the surplus income framework under s. 68 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and considered the bankrupt’s personal circumstances, including significant health issues and financial hardship.

Exercising its discretion in the discharge process, the court declined to impose the full recommended surplus income obligation.

Instead, the discharge was made conditional upon payment of a reduced amount reflecting proportionality and fairness.

The defendants sought leave under Rule 48.04(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to bring a summary judgment motion after the action had been set down for trial, seeking dismissal of claims alleging negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of trust by a former solicitor.

The plaintiff alleged that the solicitor negligently advised against a lucrative media interview, mishandled negotiations for a lucrative rematch race, failed to ensure race earnings were deposited into an athletic reserve fund, and improperly received legal fees from that fund.

The court granted leave and held that the claims disclosed no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The evidence showed the allegations were unsupported, many were contradicted by documentary records, and the plaintiff failed to provide direct affidavit evidence from witnesses with personal knowledge.

The court further found the claims were statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002 and barred by laches due to significant delay and prejudice to the defendants, including the death of key witnesses.