Tasha Anne Bobrovitz

The Crown sought to call Dr. Saumil Dholakia, a treating psychiatrist, as a participant expert to provide opinion evidence regarding his assessment, diagnosis, and treatment of the accused Hue Lam during the period from February 8 to September 30, 2022.

The defence opposed the admission of Dr. Dholakia's opinion evidence, arguing that if qualified as an expert, the jury would improperly compare his opinions with those of Dr. Zeynep Selaman, a litigation expert retained by the defence.

The court ruled that Dr. Dholakia could testify as a participant expert and provide opinion evidence within defined parameters, finding that the probative value of the evidence was not outweighed by prejudicial effects and that appropriate jury instructions could address defence concerns.

The court ruled on the admissibility of expert psychiatric evidence and hospital records in a first-degree murder trial involving two sisters charged with killing their mother.

The accused sought to introduce seven hospital records as business records and expert opinion evidence from a forensic psychiatrist regarding the accused's mental health condition, the effects of chronic abuse, and related psychiatric concepts.

The Crown opposed both applications on grounds of hearsay, prejudicial effect, and necessity.

The court admitted the hospital records as business records and qualified the expert to provide opinion evidence on psychiatric assessment, diagnosis, causes, and impacts of mental disorders, while restricting the expert from opining on the specific conduct of the accused.

This is a ruling on the admissibility of defence expert opinion evidence in a criminal trial involving two sisters charged with killing their mother.

The defence sought to call Dr. Danièle Bélanger, an expert in Vietnamese society, gender, family, and migration, to provide cultural context evidence.

The Crown opposed the admission of this evidence.

The trial judge conducted a voir dire and ruled that the expert evidence was admissible, finding that it met all threshold requirements under the Mohan framework and that the probative value outweighed any prejudicial effects.

The evidence was found to be logically relevant to issues of credibility, motive, intent, and self-defence, and necessary to assist the jury in understanding the accused's state of mind and the cultural context in which they operated.

The court ruled on whether the defences of self-defence and provocation should be put to the jury in a case where two sisters admitted to killing their elderly mother.

The accused claimed they acted in self-defence based on a lifetime of physical and verbal abuse, which escalated in the week preceding the killing.

The court found an air of reality to the self-defence defence for both accused, considering the chronic abuse, the accused's cultural background, their mental health conditions, and the modified objective test applicable to self-defence.

The court rejected the provocation defence due to insufficient specificity regarding the triggering act and the lack of evidence that the accused acted "on the sudden."

The accused, A.M., pleaded guilty to one count of sexual interference contrary to s. 151 of the Criminal Code involving an 11-year-old victim.

The assaults occurred multiple times over five months, were penetrative, and caused the victim pain and significant emotional and psychological harm, including self-harm and suicidal thoughts.

The accused was in a position of trust.

The Crown sought a four-year penitentiary sentence, while the defence sought two years.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, considering aggravating factors such as the victim's age, abuse of trust, and severe impact, and mitigating factors including the accused's lack of prior criminal record and guilty plea.

The court imposed a sentence of three years imprisonment, along with various ancillary orders including a DNA order, weapons prohibition, Section 161 order, non-communication order, and SOIRA order.

This is a ruling on an application for a stay of proceedings brought by the accused, Jeffrey Lawrence, pursuant to section 11(b) of the Charter, alleging a violation of the right to trial within a reasonable time.

The total delay from the swearing of the Information to the anticipated completion of the trial was 576 days, exceeding the 547-day presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The Crown argued for two periods of defence delay: 1) 23 days for failing to timely advance a trial scheduling conference, and 2) 78 days (split equally) for defence counsel's unavailability for multiple re-offered trial dates after the initial dates were lost due to court congestion.

The court dismissed the first period of alleged defence delay, finding the overall intake phase reasonable.

For the second period, the court found the Crown's proposal to attribute 38 days of delay to the defence (half of 76 days) to be fair, given the defence counsel's repeated unavailability for Jordan-compliant dates and failure to provide reasons or alternative availability on the record.

Subtracting 38 days of defence delay brought the total delay below the Jordan ceiling, leading to the dismissal of the stay application.

The accused, Anthony Ifill, was found guilty of sexual assault against an 11-year-old victim.

The court considered sentencing principles, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence as paramount for child sexual offences, as per R. v. Friesen.

Despite the passage of 30 years since the offence, the court found this was not a mitigating factor due to the lack of remorse and acceptance of responsibility.

Aggravating factors included multiple incidents, escalation of seriousness, lack of insight, and profound victim impact.

Mitigating factors included no prior criminal record and pro-social conduct.

The defence sought a conditional sentence, while the Crown sought 18-24 months custody.

The court determined that no exceptional circumstances existed to justify a conditional sentence and imposed a 16-month custodial sentence, followed by 2 years of probation, a DNA order, a 10-year weapons prohibition, a victim fine surcharge, SOIRA designation for 20 years, and a 10-year prohibition from certain activities involving persons under 16.

Katrina Gilmour, found guilty of fraudulent conduct, applied to re-open her case, alleging that TD Bank records used in her trial were unreliable and required full discovery.

The Crown brought a motion to summarily dismiss this application, arguing it was manifestly frivolous.

The court granted the Crown's motion, dismissing Gilmour's application to re-open.

The judge found that Gilmour failed to articulate a sufficient basis for how the records were unreliable or how re-opening the case would change the trial outcome, emphasizing the rigorous standard for re-opening a case post-conviction and the need to protect trial efficiency and finality.

The accused, Katrina Gilmour, was charged with multiple offenses including fraud and identity theft against Christopher Lariviere.

The Crown alleged Gilmour defrauded Lariviere of significant funds by fabricating medical conditions (brain tumour, need for surgery/medication) and false property arrears, and used his identity to obtain propane accounts and a loan.

Gilmour denied the allegations, claiming Lariviere offered money and that she had genuine medical issues.

The court found the complainant credible and the accused's testimony unbelievable, inconsistent, and illogical.

The court found Gilmour guilty on counts of fraud over $5,000 (medical and property arrears), forgery of a Superior Court document, fraud on Stinson, fraud on Lend Direct, and making a false document for Superior Propane.

The Crown applied to revoke Sam Tsega's bail pending sentencing after he was found guilty of manslaughter.

Tsega was initially charged with murder but tried for manslaughter, meaning his bail was not automatically revoked post-conviction under s. 523(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown sought revocation based on the tertiary ground (maintaining public confidence in the administration of justice) under s. 515(10) of the Code.

The court reviewed five principles for post-conviction bail revocation, emphasizing that the Crown must generally present new facts.

The court found that the circumstances relied upon by the Crown were known when Tsega was initially granted bail by the Court of Appeal in 2017, and no new facts or breaches of conditions were alleged.

Considering the relatively short delay until sentencing and potential difficulties for Tsega to prepare while incarcerated due to the pandemic, the court concluded that the Crown had not shown that immediate incarceration was required to maintain public confidence.

The application to revoke bail was denied.