Solomon Chaim Friedman

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault, sexual interference, and breach of probation involving a 13-year-old complainant.

The appeal focused on whether the trial judge erred in applying the "mistaken belief in age" defence under s. 150.1(4) of the Criminal Code, specifically whether the appellant took "all reasonable steps" to ascertain the complainant's age.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the appellant failed to take all reasonable steps, considering various contextual factors such as the age difference, complainant's appearance, living situation, and the appellant's suspicions about her online profile.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused was charged with escaping lawful custody, various firearm offences, and possession of cocaine.

The court excluded evidence of the accused's identity and the cocaine found, due to Charter breaches by police, specifically the failure to provide s. 10(a) and (b) rights immediately upon detention and the unreliable basis for arrest (purported "odour of marijuana").

However, evidence of discarded earbuds, which contained the accused's DNA and linked him to a loaded handgun found nearby, was admitted.

The court reasoned that the accused's flight and abandonment of the earbuds broke the chain of causation between the initial Charter breaches and the discovery of this evidence, and that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in abandoned items.

Consequently, the accused was acquitted of escaping lawful custody and cocaine possession but found guilty of the firearm-related charges.

The judge also emphasized the critical need for updated police training on detention powers and Charter rights.

The offender was convicted of manslaughter for his role in facilitating a home invasion that resulted in the shooting death of the victim.

The Crown sought an eight-year sentence, arguing the four-year mandatory minimum for manslaughter with a firearm applied.

The court found the mandatory minimum did not apply because the offender did not know firearms would be used.

After weighing the aggravating factors of the violent home invasion against significant mitigating factors, including the offender's youth, lack of record, and extensive rehabilitation over ten years on bail, the court imposed a total sentence of five years.

With credit for pre-sentence custody and time spent on strict bail conditions, the remaining sentence to serve was two years and five months.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a charge of driving 'over 80'.

The trial judge had excluded breathalyzer evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter after finding breaches of the respondent's s. 10(a) and s. 10(b) rights.

The summary conviction appeal court upheld the findings of a s. 10(a) breach and an informational s. 10(b) breach, but found the trial judge erred in finding an implementational s. 10(b) breach.

Conducting a fresh s. 24(2) analysis, the appeal court concluded the admission of the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute, allowed the appeal, and entered a conviction.

This consolidated appeal addressed the admissibility of evidence obtained through a wiretap authorization granted in 2016 for a 2009 murder investigation.

The Court of Appeal found that the authorization was improperly granted due to a lack of reasonable and probable grounds, as the affidavit failed to establish a credible-based probability that interceptions would yield evidence of the long-dormant homicide or that other investigative procedures were unlikely to succeed.

The court emphasized that a generic investigative plan and unsupported inferences of continued association among targets after several years were insufficient.

Consequently, the interceptions constituted a serious breach of Charter s. 8 rights.

Applying the Grant framework, the court upheld the exclusion of the evidence under Charter s. 24(2) due to the seriousness of the state conduct and the significant impact on privacy interests.

The appeals from conviction were allowed, and acquittals were entered, while the appeals from acquittal were dismissed.

The Court initiated a motion for reconsideration of its 2018 order dismissing the applicant's Wilson application to quash a Canadian Security Intelligence Service warrant, after the Attorney General of Canada brought new evidence to the Court's attention.

The applicant requested disclosure of this new evidence.

The Attorney General opposed disclosure, arguing the applicant was not an accused in this Court and citing national security concerns.

The Federal Court granted the disclosure request, finding that the new evidence was highly relevant to the potential quashing of the warrant and that the Attorney General had not properly applied under the Canada Evidence Act to protect the information on national security grounds.

The Crown applied to revoke Sam Tsega's bail pending sentencing after he was found guilty of manslaughter.

Tsega was initially charged with murder but tried for manslaughter, meaning his bail was not automatically revoked post-conviction under s. 523(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown sought revocation based on the tertiary ground (maintaining public confidence in the administration of justice) under s. 515(10) of the Code.

The court reviewed five principles for post-conviction bail revocation, emphasizing that the Crown must generally present new facts.

The court found that the circumstances relied upon by the Crown were known when Tsega was initially granted bail by the Court of Appeal in 2017, and no new facts or breaches of conditions were alleged.

Considering the relatively short delay until sentencing and potential difficulties for Tsega to prepare while incarcerated due to the pandemic, the court concluded that the Crown had not shown that immediate incarceration was required to maintain public confidence.

The application to revoke bail was denied.

In a judge-alone retrial arising from a fatal home invasion drug robbery, the Crown alleged the accused was liable for manslaughter as a party under s. 21(2) of the Criminal Code.

The court found the accused intentionally assisted the robbers by showing them the victim's house, knew or was willfully blind to the robbery plan, and that a reasonable person in his circumstances would have foreseen a serious risk of non-transient harm from a home invasion drug robbery.

The court rejected the defence theory that the accused merely thought the visitors intended a drug purchase or non-confrontational theft, and also rejected duress as a fabricated excuse lacking an air of reality.

A finding of guilt for manslaughter was entered.

Constable Daniel Montsion was tried on charges of manslaughter, aggravated assault, and assault with a weapon arising from his role in the arrest of Abdirahman Abdi on July 24, 2016, in Ottawa.

Mr. Abdi died in cardiac arrest shortly after the arrest.

The Crown alleged that Constable Montsion unlawfully assaulted Mr. Abdi by punching him multiple times in the face and head while wearing hard-knuckled gloves, and that this assault was a significant contributing cause of Mr. Abdi's death.

The defence argued that Constable Montsion's use of force was legally justified under section 25(1) of the Criminal Code and that he did not cause Mr. Abdi's injuries or death.

After a 72-day trial, Justice Kelly found Constable Montsion not guilty on all charges, concluding that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his conduct was unlawful or criminally negligent, that he caused Mr. Abdi's nasal injuries, or that he caused Mr. Abdi's death.

The appellant was convicted of producing marijuana and possession for the purpose of trafficking after police discovered a large grow operation on his leased farmland.

The police had unintentionally trespassed on the leased land while investigating, which the trial judge found breached s. 8 of the Charter.

The trial judge admitted the evidence under s. 24(2).

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge misapplied the Grant framework.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred by not considering the impact of the subsequent searches of the outbuildings and residence.

Conducting a fresh s. 24(2) analysis, the Court excluded the evidence found in the residence due to the high expectation of privacy, but admitted the evidence from the fields and outbuildings.

As the remaining evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions, the appeal was dismissed.

The applicant, Awso Peshdary, facing terrorism charges, brought applications under s. 7 of the Charter and s. 38.14 of the Canada Evidence Act, seeking a stay of proceedings or exclusion of evidence due to the destruction of notes by a key Crown witness (A.M.), a former CSIS human source.

As part of these applications, Peshdary sought disclosure of various CSIS documents, including policies on human source handling, drafts of an affidavit from a CSIS employee ('John'), and materials related to A.M.'s handler.

The court granted disclosure for CSIS policies related to human source safety and note-taking, finding them relevant to the Charter application concerning the right to make full answer and defence.

However, it denied disclosure for draft affidavits and handler-related materials, citing litigation privilege and lack of likely relevance, or prior Federal Court rulings on privilege.

The accused was tried on historical sexual offence allegations arising from an alleged pattern of abuse involving a child complainant in a family caregiving setting.

The court undertook a detailed credibility and reliability assessment, focusing on inconsistencies, deliberate falsehoods on collateral matters, delayed reporting, and the risk that the complainant's narrative had incorporated adult suggestion following an initial disclosure made in a crisis about pornography use.

Applying the reasonable doubt standard and the W.(D.) framework, the court held that the complainant's evidence could not safely be accepted at face value.

The court found both credibility and reliability impediments and concluded the foundation for conviction was unstable.

The charges were dismissed.

The applicants, charged with robbery, assault, and weapons offences, brought a pre-trial application to exclude evidence obtained through intercepted communications.

The court previously found that the wiretap authorization was issued without reasonable and probable grounds, violating the applicants' s. 8 Charter rights.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2) of the Charter, the court found the state conduct to be at the more serious end of the spectrum and the impact on the applicants' privacy rights to be significant.

The court concluded that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute and ordered the intercepted communications excluded.

The applicants brought a pre-trial application challenging a wiretap authorization, alleging a breach of their s. 8 Charter rights.

The authorization was sought in the investigation of a homicide that occurred 7.5 years prior.

The court conducted a facial inquiry of the supporting affidavit and found that it failed to establish reasonable and probable grounds that the wiretap would afford evidence of the homicide.

Specifically, there was no credible evidence or reasonable inference that the targets maintained contact or would communicate about the homicide after such a significant passage of time.

The court rejected the Crown's argument that judicial notice could be taken of ongoing communication, distinguishing the facts from cases involving active criminal organizations.

The sub-facial inquiry, which examined the Project Proposal, did not undermine the affidavit's veracity regarding the primary purpose of the investigation.

Consequently, the court found that the evidence obtained through intercepted communications was obtained in violation of the applicants' s. 8 Charter rights.

The application was scheduled to continue for argument on the exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

Malcolm Valade was convicted of intentionally discharging a firearm while reckless as to life or safety, an offence carrying a four-year mandatory minimum sentence.

The defence challenged this mandatory minimum as cruel and unusual punishment under s. 12 of the Charter, arguing it was grossly disproportionate to a fit sentence of twenty months.

The Crown argued for its constitutionality.

The court found the mandatory minimum grossly disproportionate for the offender, infringing s. 12, and not justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

Consequently, the mandatory minimum was declared of no force or effect.

The accused, Malcolm Valade, was sentenced for intentionally discharging a firearm.

The court previously found the mandatory minimum sentence of four years unconstitutional and determined a fit sentence of twenty months.

This decision addresses the calculation of enhanced credit for 192 days of pre-sentence custody under notoriously harsh conditions at the Ottawa-Carleton Detention Centre (OCDC) and 827 days under strict house arrest bail conditions.

The court granted enhanced credit for both quantitative and qualitative reasons, recognizing the severe impact of OCDC conditions on the accused's mental health and the punitive nature of house arrest.

Ultimately, the accused received 18 months of credit against the 20-month sentence, resulting in a final sentence of 60 days imprisonment to be served intermittently, along with three years of probation and ancillary orders.

The accused, Melissa Jeaurond, pleaded guilty to careless storage of firearms, unauthorized possession of firearms, and possession of psilocybin for the purpose of trafficking.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the large quantity of psilocybin and its proximity to firearms, and mitigating factors such as her first-time offender status, remorse, guilty plea, and strong community support.

The court applied credit for stringent pre-sentence bail conditions (Downes credit).

The judge imposed a period of imprisonment for the drug and firearms offences, with sentences running concurrently, and a mandatory firearms prohibition.

The court denied the Crown's request for a discretionary DNA order, balancing the public interest against the offender's privacy interests given her low risk of recidivism and lack of prior record.

The applicant sought an order to excise information obtained through a Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) Act authorization, which was subsequently used by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) to secure a Criminal Code authorization for intercepting private communications.

The applicant alleged infringements of Charter s. 8 rights and the right to full answer and defence.

The court determined that the CSIS Act warrant met the minimum criteria for a lawful search, and the information derived from it did not violate s. 8.

Furthermore, the applicant's right to full answer and defence was not denied, as substantial disclosure of source documents related to the CSIS Act warrant had been obtained through prior third-party records applications.

Consequently, the application to excise the information was denied.

The applicant, Awso Peshdary, sought disclosure of source documents from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) related to a 2012 CSIS Act warrant, renewing a previous request based on an alleged material change in circumstances following a Federal Court decision upholding the warrant.

CSIS and the Federal Crown opposed, arguing that the validity of the warrant had been decided by the Federal Court, precluding further challenge, and that no material change justified revisiting the prior disclosure denial.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the renewed request constituted a collateral attack and an abuse of process, as it sought to relitigate the warrant's validity in a different forum after a final determination by the Federal Court.

Malcolm Valade was charged with threatening death and discharge of a firearm while reckless.

He pled guilty to the firearm charge, and the threatening charge was dismissed.

This decision provides reasons on sentencing for the firearm offence.

The court considered aggravating and mitigating factors, including a toxic family relationship and the offender's mental health issues.

The Crown sought a five-year sentence, while the defence sought twelve months.

The court determined that if the mandatory minimum of four years for the firearm offence is constitutional, the sentence would be four years imprisonment, as the offender qualified as a "best offender." If the mandatory minimum were not constitutional, the court would have imposed a twenty-month prison term.