Allyson Ratsoy

The appellant was charged with offences under the Taxation Act, 2007 and brought a certiorari application that was dismissed.

After filing a notice of appeal from that dismissal, the appellant entered guilty pleas and was sentenced.

The Court of Appeal held that the appeal was moot, as any decision on the certiorari ruling would have no impact on the guilty pleas, convictions, and sentence.

The appeal was dismissed without adjudication on the merits.

The appellant's application for a publication ban on his full name was also dismissed, as he failed to establish that court openness posed a serious risk to an important public interest.

The appellant was acquitted of possession of proceeds of crime after over $1.2 million in cash was excluded from his criminal trial under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Crown subsequently applied for forfeiture of the cash under s. 490(9) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge conducted a fresh s. 24(2) analysis, admitted the evidence, and ordered forfeiture.

On appeal, the appellant argued that his acquittal created an issue estoppel preventing the trial judge from finding his possession was unlawful or conducting a fresh s. 24(2) analysis.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the acquittal did not logically necessitate a finding of lawful possession, and that a s. 24(2) analysis in a forfeiture proceeding involves different considerations than in a criminal trial.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the conviction appeals of Khalid Yousuf and Adrian Myles Puentes-Reed, who were convicted of multiple offences related to drug trafficking, proceeds of crime, and possession of firearms after being found in a "safe house" in Thunder Bay.

The court found that the trial judge did not misapprehend the evidence or err in law, and that the verdicts were reasonable based on the circumstantial and direct evidence connecting both appellants to the contraband and the operation of the safe house.

The appellant sought to strike his guilty plea for tax evasion, arguing the sentencing judge failed to adequately inform him he was waiving his right to a trial where the Crown bore the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal found that a different judge had already provided this information four days prior to the plea, and the appellant was fully aware of the implications of his plea.

Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

The court also noted that by pleading guilty, the appellant waived his right to challenge a prior Charter application decision.

The appellant, Benjamin MacAdam, appealed his conviction for possession for the purpose of trafficking and his sentence.

The appeal centered on the trial judge's handling of expert evidence regarding the quantity of drugs seized (112 grams of cocaine) and whether it was consistent with trafficking or personal use.

The Court of Appeal found that while the police officer expert was properly qualified, the trial judge erred by misapprehending the expert's testimony.

Specifically, the trial judge failed to adequately consider the expert's concession that the seized quantity could be consistent with personal use for a heavy user in a remote area, and improperly required the defence to establish hypothetical scenarios with proven facts to raise reasonable doubt.

The court concluded that the Crown had not discharged its burden of proving trafficking beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Crown appealed the conditional sentences imposed on the respondent for trafficking in cocaine and crystal methamphetamine, and possession of proceeds of crime, arguing errors in principle.

The Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge erred by imposing a conditional sentence after determining a three-year penitentiary term was fit, and by using pre-trial custody credits to make a conditional sentence available, contrary to R. v. Fice.

While upholding the three-year global sentence as fit due to mitigating Gladue factors, plea, remorse, and rehabilitation, the Court substituted a 16-month prison sentence but stayed its operation, allowing the probation order to remain.

The appellant, Patrick Schlaepfer, appealed his 14-month sentence for production of marijuana, arguing the sentencing judge erred in denying "Downes credit" for onerous interim judicial release conditions.

The Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge made legal and palpable errors by attributing delay to the appellant, misapprehending evidence of his medical issues, and faulting him for not seeking bail variations.

The Court allowed the appeal, finding the appellant's untreated complex medical condition during two years of release was punitive, warranting mitigation.

The sentence was reduced by an additional 5 months, resulting in a net sentence of 4.8 months.

The appellant was convicted of drug and weapon offences.

At trial, his application to exclude evidence based on Charter breaches (ss. 7, 8, 9, 10(b)) was dismissed.

On appeal, the Crown conceded breaches of the appellant's s. 8 (unreasonable search or seizure) and s. 10(b) (right to counsel) Charter rights.

The Court applied the R. v. Grant test to determine if the evidence (crack cocaine) should be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Court found the police conduct, including continued questioning after the right to counsel was invoked and using the appellant's silence as a basis for a strip search, constituted serious breaches with significant impact on the appellant's Charter-protected interests.

Balancing the Grant factors, the Court concluded that the admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal was allowed, and acquittals were entered on all charges.

The appellant, Salim Richard Glasner, appealed convictions for six drug-related charges, including possession for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds.

The appeal was based on the trial judge's alleged failure to provide sufficient reasons and to properly apply the law of possession.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's reasons sufficient and that the evidence supported the finding of possession and control for most counts.

However, the Crown conceded one count (possession of oxycodone) due to lack of evidence of the appellant's knowledge and control over the specific drugs.

The appeal was allowed for that single count, and dismissed for all other convictions and the sentence appeal.

The appellants were convicted of agreeing to bribe a foreign public official, the Indian Minister of Civil Aviation, contrary to the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act.

They appealed their convictions on several grounds, including unreasonable delay, lack of territorial jurisdiction, and the trial judge's refusal to declare a mistrial following late Crown disclosure.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the jurisdictional and delay arguments but allowed the appeal on the basis of the mistrial application.

The Court found that the Crown's late disclosure of communications with a key witness and information regarding a central defence exhibit impaired the overall fairness of the trial process.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant, convicted of offences under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, applied to adduce fresh evidence on his summary conviction appeal.

The proposed evidence included various documents and correspondence related to his bankruptcy proceedings.

The court applied the Palmer test and dismissed the application, finding that the proposed evidence either did not meet the criteria for admission, was not fresh, or raised new Charter issues that should have been litigated at trial.

Robert Barra and Shailesh Govindia were convicted of agreeing to bribe the Indian Minister of Civil Aviation under the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act.

Barra, CEO of Cryptometrics US, retained Govindia to facilitate a $500,000 bribe for a facial recognition software contract with Air India, with potential for an additional $1.5 million.

Govindia, however, misappropriated the bribe funds, leading to the scheme's failure and no contract award.

The Crown sought 4 years for Barra and 3 years for Govindia, while the defence proposed 2 years for both.

Considering mitigating factors such as no prior criminal records, the unsuccessful nature of the bribe, and economic hardship, alongside aggravating factors like financial motivation and the seriousness of the offence, the court imposed a sentence of 2.5 years imprisonment for each offender.

The accused applied for a mistrial due to the Crown's late disclosure of information, including an agreement not to use a witness's statements against him and email exchanges questioning the authenticity of an exhibit.

The court applied the Stinchcombe and Dixon principles on disclosure and the right to make full answer and defence.

The court found that while disclosure was late, the accused failed to demonstrate a reasonable possibility that the late disclosure affected the trial's outcome or fairness, or impaired their ability to make full answer and defence.

The remedy granted was to prevent the Crown from calling reply evidence, including recalling the witness to change his testimony, thereby preserving the accused's tactical position.

Crown appeal from a trial judge's stay of proceedings against three respondents charged with conspiracy to smuggle Polish nationals from Canada into the United States, and related offences.

The trial judge granted a s. 11(b) Charter application, finding that the respondents' rights to trial within a reasonable time had been violated due to unreasonable delay of 39.75 months.

The trial judge characterized delays arising from defence counsel unavailability as institutional delay.

The appellate court allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in mischaracterizing defence counsel unavailability as institutional delay under the Jordan framework.

The court held that when the Crown and court were ready to proceed but defence counsel were not available on multiple offered dates, the delay should be attributed to the defence.

After properly attributing defence delay, the remaining delay of 29 months fell within the Jordan presumptive ceiling of 30 months, and the respondents failed to demonstrate unreasonable delay.

The charges were ordered to proceed to trial.

The applicant, charged with drug trafficking, brought a second application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The net delay of 37.5 months exceeded the 30-month Jordan ceiling.

The court applied the transitional exception and the Morin framework to assess whether the delay was justified.

Weighing the serious nature of the charges against the prejudice suffered by the applicant, the court found the delay was justified and dismissed the application.

The Crown brought an application under s. 653.1 of the Criminal Code to preserve a prior ruling dismissing the accused's s. 11(b) Charter application.

The original judge had recused himself due to a reasonable apprehension of bias arising from his post-decision comments regarding a factual error he made in the ruling.

The court held that s. 653.1 applies purposively to pre-trial rulings even if no formal mistrial was declared.

However, the court found that it was in the interests of justice to allow the accused to relitigate the prejudice aspect of the s. 11(b) application with fresh evidence, while preserving the original judge's findings on the allocation of delay.

Crown appeal against sentence imposed on a long-time cocaine distributor for a criminal organization.

The respondent was sentenced to seven years and 69 days imprisonment following guilty pleas to conspiracy to traffic cocaine, trafficking in cocaine, committing an indictable offence for the benefit of a criminal organization, possession of oxycodone, and multiple breaches of recognizance.

The Crown challenged three aspects of the sentencing: the application of pre-sentence custody credit to the criminal organization offence, the concurrent sentencing of breach and possession offences, and the fitness of the five-year sentence for the trafficking offences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal while granting leave to appeal.