James D. Sutton

The Crown appealed a sentence, specifically challenging the trial judge's finding that fine in lieu of forfeiture provisions were unconstitutional.

This decision addresses two issues: the Court of Appeal's jurisdiction to remit a sentence to the trial court and the terms of a fine in lieu of forfeiture.

The court confirmed it lacks jurisdiction to remit sentencing to the trial court on a sentence appeal under s. 687 of the Criminal Code, and, based on joint submissions, imposed a fine in lieu of forfeiture of $74,560 with a default imprisonment term of 18 months and a ten-year payment period.

This is a Crown appeal from the respondent's acquittals on charges of possession for the purpose of trafficking and possession of various controlled substances, as well as possession of property obtained by crime.

The Crown's case was circumstantial, and the appeal grounds related to the trial judge's assessment of this evidence.

The appellant argued the trial judge considered the circumstantial evidence in a piecemeal fashion rather than cumulatively.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge correctly instructed herself on the law regarding circumstantial evidence and applied it properly, considering the evidence as a whole and identifying limitations without assessing individual pieces in isolation against the reasonable doubt standard.

The court dismissed the appeal, concluding that no legal error was committed by the trial judge.

The court also clarified that misapprehension of evidence is a question of mixed fact and law, not appealable by the Crown on a question of law alone, and affirmed the trial judge's correct application of law regarding constructive and joint possession.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision that sections 462.37(3) and (4) of the Criminal Code, concerning fines in lieu of forfeiture and default imprisonment, were unconstitutional under s. 12 of the Charter in certain foreseeable circumstances.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge was bound by a prior ONCA decision (R. v. Chung) and, in the alternative, that the provisions do not violate s. 12 as they serve a different purpose than victim surcharges and offer judicial discretion and flexibility.

The appellant was convicted of possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after a judge-alone trial.

He appealed, claiming the verdict was unreasonable, arguing he may have unwittingly sat on the cocaine.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it was open to the trial judge to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant had physical possession and knowledge of the crack cocaine.

The court noted the appellant's failure to testify and the implausibility of the "unknowingly sitting" explanation, which was not raised by trial counsel.

The appellants were convicted of agreeing to bribe a foreign public official, the Indian Minister of Civil Aviation, contrary to the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act.

They appealed their convictions on several grounds, including unreasonable delay, lack of territorial jurisdiction, and the trial judge's refusal to declare a mistrial following late Crown disclosure.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the jurisdictional and delay arguments but allowed the appeal on the basis of the mistrial application.

The Court found that the Crown's late disclosure of communications with a key witness and information regarding a central defence exhibit impaired the overall fairness of the trial process.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was acquitted of conspiracy to commit human smuggling but convicted of two counts of manslaughter by criminal negligence arising from an incident where he transported three Indian nationals on a Sea-Doo across the St. Lawrence River without life jackets, resulting in the capsizing of the vessel and the deaths of two passengers.

The Federal Crown appealed the acquittal on the conspiracy charge, arguing the trial judge erred in excluding the accused's statement and the surviving passenger's hearsay statements.

The accused appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge misstated the mens rea test and failed to consider all relevant circumstances.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals.

The appellant was convicted after a judge-alone trial of possession of cocaine and crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of proceeds of crime, and breach of probation.

He appealed his convictions on grounds of Charter delay under s. 11(b), arguing the trial judge erred in applying the law of reasonable doubt, and contending his conviction for drug possession was inconsistent with his acquittal on firearm possession charges.

The Crown cross-appealed the sentence of two years less a day plus three years probation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeal and the Crown's sentence appeal, finding the delay was reasonable in the transitional post-Jordan context, the convictions were supported by evidence, and the sentence, though lenient, was not demonstrably unfit given the appellant's secondary role in the drug enterprise and rehabilitative efforts.

The appellant was convicted of 21 offences including possession of cannabis, possession for the purpose of trafficking in cannabis, cocaine and ecstasy, possession of proceeds of crime, possession of a prohibited weapon, money laundering, and related offences.

He was sentenced to nine and one-half years imprisonment.

The appellant appealed his convictions on three grounds: the trial judge's refusal to grant an adjournment when counsel was removed on the morning of trial, the trial judge's failure to provide adequate assistance to a self-represented litigant, and the appellant's exclusion from trial in violation of s. 650(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown conceded the appeal and the Court of Appeal allowed it, setting aside the convictions and ordering a new trial based on the trial judge's failure to provide sufficient assistance to the self-represented appellant.

The appellant was convicted after a jury trial of two counts of possessing narcotics for the purpose of trafficking and one count of possessing proceeds of crime.

The evidence was obtained through a general warrant under s. 487.01 of the Criminal Code, which authorized covert entry into a leased unit to locate and observe narcotics.

The appellant appealed on grounds relating to the jury charge and the validity of the general warrant.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the general warrant was improperly issued as it was used to circumvent the more stringent requirements of a Controlled Drugs and Substances Act s. 11 warrant.

The court set aside the convictions and ordered a new trial.

A media outlet sought an exemption from complying with a production order requiring disclosure of email communications between a journalist and a corporate spokesperson regarding price-fixing charges.

The court considered whether the communications were privileged or otherwise protected by law, and whether compliance would be unreasonable.

The court held that the communications did not originate in confidence, the spokesperson's identity was publicly disclosed in the article, and no case-by-case privilege attached.

The court also found no evidence that compliance would impose an unreasonable burden.

The application for exemption was dismissed.