Brian MacLeod Rogers

The plaintiff, Steven Bresnark, and the defendant, Thomson Reuters Canada Limited (TR), brought cross-motions for summary judgment in a libel and breach of privacy action concerning an article published by TR.

TR also sought to strike the privacy claim.

The court granted TR's motion for summary judgment and to strike the privacy claim, dismissing the action.

The court found the action statute-barred due to the plaintiff's awareness of the article in 2012, the article was protected by qualified privilege for fair and accurate reporting of judicial proceedings, and no common law or Charter privacy right was engaged.

The plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was dismissed.

The applicants, Dellen Millard and Mark Smich, sought an order prohibiting or delaying the publication of all evidence, submissions, and rulings made during their ongoing first-degree murder trial (Bosma case) and in the absence of the jury, until the completion of their separate trial for the murder of Laura Babcock.

The Crown and a Media Coalition opposed the broad scope of the requested ban, arguing that open court principles should apply and that jury safeguards provide adequate protection.

The court applied the Dagenais/Mentuck test, requiring a convincing evidentiary basis for a serious risk of prejudice that cannot be addressed by alternative measures.

The court granted the publication ban in part, extending it to specific mid-trial voir dire rulings and objections deemed to have a direct impact on the Babcock case and the applicants' fair trial rights, particularly concerning the "Eliminator" device and the transmission of letters from jail, as well as matters potentially affecting Ms. Noudga's fair trial rights.

Media organizations applied to vary a publication ban in a second degree murder prosecution involving the death of a child.

The Crown and defence sought to maintain broader anonymity for the accused, the deceased, and family members, while the applicants proposed a narrower ban limited to the surviving siblings.

Applying the Dagenais-Mentuck framework, the court held the evidentiary record did not establish that a broader ban was necessary to prevent a serious risk to the proper administration of justice.

The ban was varied to prohibit only publication of the names of the surviving children.

The appellant, a lawyer, sued the Law Society of Upper Canada and its investigator for defamation based on emails sent to victim institutions during an investigation into mortgage fraud.

The motion judge dismissed the action on summary judgment, finding the communications were protected by absolute privilege.

On appeal, the appellant argued that section 9 of the Law Society Act superseded the common law defence of absolute privilege and that the privilege did not apply in the circumstances.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that section 9 supplements rather than ousts the common law, and that the investigator's communications were protected by absolute privilege as they were made in connection with a disciplinary proceeding.

In a libel action arising from statements in a book concerning alleged misconduct at a media corporation, the plaintiff moved under Rule 21 to strike numerous paragraphs of the defendants’ amended statement of defence.

The defendants relied on the “Pizza Pizza” defence, asserting they were entitled to plead contextual meanings and justification for the allegedly defamatory passages.

The court reviewed limits on libel pleadings, including prohibitions on pleading new libels, repeating defamatory statements of others, alleging worse conduct than that pleaded in the claim, or drafting pleadings designed to provoke oppressive discovery.

Applying these principles, the court struck multiple paragraphs that introduced new libels, repeated defamatory allegations, attacked non-parties, or would lead to disproportionate discovery.

Leave was granted to the defendants to further amend their pleading in accordance with the governing principles.

A media outlet sought an exemption from complying with a production order requiring disclosure of email communications between a journalist and a corporate spokesperson regarding price-fixing charges.

The court considered whether the communications were privileged or otherwise protected by law, and whether compliance would be unreasonable.

The court held that the communications did not originate in confidence, the spokesperson's identity was publicly disclosed in the article, and no case-by-case privilege attached.

The court also found no evidence that compliance would impose an unreasonable burden.

The application for exemption was dismissed.

In a defamation action arising from letters published in a newspaper criticizing veterinary services, the defendants brought a motion seeking production of additional documents before examinations for discovery.

The court considered the relevance and proportionality of the requested records under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

It ordered production of appointment records for the key date, client files relating to 33 clients allegedly lost due to the publication, and financial and client records underlying the plaintiffs’ damages expert report.

Requests for predecessor financial records and a mailing list were denied as premature or irrelevant.

The court rejected claims of confidentiality over client records due to lack of evidence establishing privilege and ordered the plaintiffs to serve a fresh affidavit of documents and proceed under a litigation timetable.

The Hamilton Spectator applied to unseal production orders and Informations to Obtain (ITOs) that had been sealed in connection with a fraud investigation involving allegations that the accused defrauded Citizenship and Immigration Canada of over four million dollars.

The court dismissed the application on jurisdictional grounds, finding that because one accused was awaiting trial in Superior Court and the mode of trial for the other two accused had not been determined, the application should be brought before a Superior Court judge rather than the Ontario Court of Justice.

The City of Waterloo applied for judicial review of two orders made by delegates of the Information and Privacy Commissioner, which required the City to disclose the total dollar amount of its legal bills.

The City argued the adjudicators exceeded their jurisdiction by failing to find the records were protected by solicitor-client privilege under s. 12 of the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applications, finding the adjudicators correctly decided the cases on their facts rather than on inapplicable hypothetical scenarios.

The respondents sought substantial indemnity costs of $18,939.18 from the media coalition regarding its motion to intervene on the appeal.

The media coalition had been granted leave to intervene on conditions, including paying costs incurred due to late intervention, but subsequently elected not to participate in the appeal to avoid costs exposure.

The Court of Appeal held that because the intervener did not participate, there was no relevant costs order on the appeal to trigger the payment of full motion costs.

However, the court awarded the respondents $3,500 for costs fairly attributable to the late intervention.

The appellant appealed a judgment dismissing his claim.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge that the claim did not disclose a reasonable cause of action, failed to plead the essential elements of any cause of action, and constituted an abuse of process as an attempt to relitigate previous court proceedings.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

A journalist was subpoenaed to testify in a civil action and refused to reveal the identity of a confidential source.

The trial judge cited the journalist for contempt and, after the source voluntarily came forward, found the journalist in civil contempt and ordered him to pay $31,600 in costs.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal set aside the contempt finding and costs order.

The Court held that the trial judge erred by failing to apply the Wigmore criteria to the privilege claim before citing for contempt, and by failing to use the contempt power cautiously and as a last resort in accordance with the Dagenais/Mentuck test to minimize the impact on Charter rights.

The plaintiffs sued the defendants for libel.

The defendants pleaded alternative defamatory meanings and sought to justify them.

The motions judge struck out the defendants' particulars on the basis that they were oppressive to the plaintiffs, relying on the Polly Peck approach adopted in Pizza Pizza.

The defendants appealed.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the court cannot strike a pleading or particulars in a libel action that are relevant, necessary, and of reasonable probative value solely on the ground of oppression.

The court must balance the probative value against the prejudicial effect under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appellant appealed an order striking portions of a defamation claim for failure to comply with the notice provisions of the Libel and Slander Act.

The court held that multiple newspaper articles cannot be treated as a single libel for notice purposes unless their defamatory meaning depends on other publications.

It further held that the candidate-for-public-office provision in s. 5(3) does not exempt a plaintiff from giving notice under s. 5(1), but only affects the retraction-related consequences in s. 5(2).

The appeal was dismissed and the motion judge’s order was upheld.