David A. Potts

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondents general damages of $75,000 and punitive damages of $75,000 for defamation.

The trial judge found that the appellant, a City manager, made defamatory statements about the respondents' business during a meeting with a supplier representative, acted maliciously in response to complaints the respondent had made about him, and abused his position as a public officer.

The Court of Appeal upheld the findings of defamation, malice, and abuse of position, but set aside the punitive damages award, finding that the trial judge failed to analyze whether the compensatory damages were adequate to achieve the objectives of retribution, deterrence, and condemnation.

The appeal was allowed in part.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment in a defamation action against the defendants, a newspaper publisher and its writers.

The defendants published numerous articles and online posts referring to the plaintiff as a bully, fraudster, and habitual liar.

The court found the statements were defamatory and that the defendants could not rely on the defences of justification, qualified privilege, responsible communication, or fair comment.

The court also found the defendants were motivated by express malice.

Summary judgment was granted, awarding the plaintiff $300,000 in general and aggravated damages, $110,000 in punitive damages, and a permanent injunction.

In a libel action arising from statements in a book concerning alleged misconduct at a media corporation, the plaintiff moved under Rule 21 to strike numerous paragraphs of the defendants’ amended statement of defence.

The defendants relied on the “Pizza Pizza” defence, asserting they were entitled to plead contextual meanings and justification for the allegedly defamatory passages.

The court reviewed limits on libel pleadings, including prohibitions on pleading new libels, repeating defamatory statements of others, alleging worse conduct than that pleaded in the claim, or drafting pleadings designed to provoke oppressive discovery.

Applying these principles, the court struck multiple paragraphs that introduced new libels, repeated defamatory allegations, attacked non-parties, or would lead to disproportionate discovery.

Leave was granted to the defendants to further amend their pleading in accordance with the governing principles.

The appellant, a city councilor, appealed a trial judgment finding him liable for defamation arising from an email exchange with the respondent, a community activist.

The trial judge had found that the appellant's email was defamatory and that the defence of qualified privilege was defeated by malice.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge failed to state and apply the correct legal tests for qualified privilege and malice.

Specifically, the trial judge erred by conflating the objective and subjective standards for honest belief and by failing to determine whether an improper purpose was the appellant's dominant motive.

The appellant sought an adjournment of his appeal to raise a new ground of ineffective assistance of counsel, conceding that the original grounds lacked merit.

The Court of Appeal refused the adjournment and dismissed the appeal, finding no merit to the proposed ground and noting the case did not fall within the exceptional circumstances required for such a claim in civil proceedings.

In a defamation appeal arising from newspaper reports about an incident at a municipal sewage treatment plant, the court upheld the trial judge’s findings that several individual defendants defamed the plaintiffs by falsely implying criminal threats or assault.

The court also upheld the striking of the jury notice, given the statutory bar to jury trials on factual issues and damages in claims against a municipality and the inextricable overlap of issues.

However, the court allowed the municipality’s appeal, holding that s. 5(1) of the Libel and Slander Act required independent written notice to all defendants, including a non-media municipal defendant alleged to be vicariously liable.

Because no timely notice was given and the limitation period had expired, the claim against the municipality was barred.