Steven W. Pettipiere

In 1931, the respondent's predecessor conveyed land to the appellant's predecessors solely for gravel extraction, with an agreement granting a 'first option to purchase' the land for $1.00 once all gravel was removed.

The appellant brought an application to declare the agreement void under the rule against perpetuities.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding the agreement created a right of first refusal rather than an interest in land.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the true intent of the parties was to create an option to repurchase, which gave rise to an immediate equitable interest in the land.

Because the option was not exercised within the perpetuity period, it was declared void.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by AgriCorp awarding it compensation under the AgriStability program, arguing that the participation of AgriCorp staff at multiple stages of the decision-making process created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that AgriCorp is essentially a delegate of the Minister exercising executive functions, and the required level of impartiality is that of an 'open mind'.

The court concluded that AgriCorp maintained an open mind and that the staff's involvement did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

Following the respondent's complete success on the application, the court determined the quantum of costs payable by the applicant.

The respondent sought costs but failed to deliver a Bill of Costs, and the applicant argued the respondent's Costs Outline showed exorbitant and duplicated time logged by multiple professionals.

Applying the principle that costs must be within the reasonable expectation of the losing party, the court agreed with the applicant's complaints regarding excessive time charges and fixed the respondent's partial indemnity costs at $15,000 all inclusive.

The applicant brought an application to enforce a settlement agreement for the transfer of shares in a company holding Tim Hortons franchise licenses.

The respondent estate trustee refused to sign the closing documents, arguing her former solicitor lacked authority to agree to the $10,000 purchase price and that essential terms were missing.

The court found that the solicitor had apparent authority to negotiate the agreement and that a binding contract was formed.

The court declined to set aside the agreement, noting the $10,000 price was commercially reasonable given the franchisor's valuation of the business and outstanding debts.

The application was granted and the respondent was ordered to execute the transfer.

The applicant sought declarations that a 1931 registered agreement affecting gravel pit lands was void and unenforceable, removal of the instrument from title, and confirmation of sole ownership.

The court held the application was vulnerable because the applicant's ownership was uncertain on the record and, in any event, the claimed relief was premature because the contractual trigger had not occurred.

On the central issue, the court found the agreement did not create a specifically enforceable option to purchase but was instead akin to a right of first refusal creating only personal rights.

As a result, the Rule against Perpetuities had no application and the application was dismissed.

Residential subdivision developers commenced an action alleging that a municipality overcharged development charges between 2004 and 2008 and sought damages.

The municipality brought a Rule 21 motion seeking determination of a preliminary question of law concerning the legality of development charges imposed under the Development Charges Act, 1997, a municipal by-law, and subdivision agreements.

The court held the motion was not brought promptly within the meaning of Rule 21.02, as it was filed years after the pleadings and after the trial record had been set down.

In any event, the court found the legality of the municipality’s “top up” charge based on indexed development charges was not plain and obvious and required determination at trial after full evidence and argument.

The appellant, a city councilor, appealed a trial judgment finding him liable for defamation arising from an email exchange with the respondent, a community activist.

The trial judge had found that the appellant's email was defamatory and that the defence of qualified privilege was defeated by malice.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge failed to state and apply the correct legal tests for qualified privilege and malice.

Specifically, the trial judge erred by conflating the objective and subjective standards for honest belief and by failing to determine whether an improper purpose was the appellant's dominant motive.

Following the release of the main appeal judgment, the respondents CB Richard Ellis Limited, John Lafontaine, Karen Pickernell, and Carl Lavoie requested costs of the appeal.

They had filed a factum but made no oral submissions.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the appellant that awarding a full counsel fee would be duplicative, and instead awarded these respondents one half of the costs awarded to the other respondents, fixed at $3,750 inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The plaintiff appealed an order dismissing its action for delay at a status hearing.

The action had not progressed beyond the pleadings stage five years after it was commenced.

The plaintiff failed to comply with a timetable agreed upon at a previous status hearing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the status hearing judge did not err in considering the entire history of the delay, inferring the defendants' belief that the action was abandoned, and dismissing the action without evidence of actual prejudice to the defendants.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding a construction dispute, arguing the trial judge erred in calculating delays caused by the lack of a building permit and wiring changes, as well as compensation for office overhead and interest.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusions were amply supported by the record and expert evidence.

The unrepresented appellant appealed an order made after the motion judge refused a short adjournment and immediately gave judgment without allowing submissions on the merits.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the proceedings fatally flawed and the refusal of the adjournment unreasonable, as the appellant had been served with voluminous materials only days prior and was deprived of legal representation.

The order was set aside.

The appellant transported contaminated soil to the respondent's transfer station.

The motion judge concluded that these stand-alone transportation services were not lienable under the Construction Lien Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, finding no error and relying on established case law.

The appellant, Royalmar Farms Ltd., appealed a decision by Agricorp regarding the adjustment of its 2005 canola crop insurance claim.

The appellant sought an additional $11,080.33, arguing that the claim should account for the poor quality of the crop caused by drought, which rendered it largely unmarketable.

The Tribunal dismissed the appeal, finding that the contract of insurance provided coverage for production shortfalls, not quality shortfalls.

Although other producers may have received payments for both production shortfalls and market sales due to the timing of adjustments, the Tribunal held that claims must be adjusted strictly according to the terms of the contract.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their action under Rule 24.01(1)(c).

The parties agreed the rule could not be invoked because the respondents had not served their affidavit of documents.

However, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal on the alternative ground that the action was an abuse of process, citing inordinate unexplained delay since 1996, conduct in prior related litigation, and failure to comply with a previous court order.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants appealed a motions judge's finding that the respondent was forced to withdraw from their partnership, constituting a de facto expulsion.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motions judge's interpretation of the partnership agreement, finding that Articles 3.5 and 8.1 required payment of the Schedule 'A' price to the departing partner upon involuntary withdrawal or expulsion.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellant management consulting firm appealed a trial judge's assessment of damages against three former employees who breached their fiduciary duties by secretly soliciting the appellant's clients before resigning.

The trial judge had awarded $30,324 based on a twelve-month grace period, past profit margins, and a 25% contingency deduction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in his approach.

The Court held that the former employees misappropriated specific contracts, and the appellant was entitled to its expected net profit from the expected gross revenues without deductions for general overhead or arbitrary contingencies.

Damages were varied to $260,000.