W. Graydon Sheppard

The appellant appealed a judgment determining that a real estate partnership between the parties was never dissolved and that the respondent was entitled to an accounting.

The trial judge found that the respondent held legal title to the property in trust for the partnership and that the appellant's entitlement to a transfer was subject to an accounting.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable or overriding error in the trial judge's findings.

The court also rejected the appellant's arguments that the respondent's claim was not properly before the court and that the equitable doctrine of laches applied, noting that the parties remained fiduciaries with an ongoing obligation to account.

Following an appeal where the appellants achieved divided success, the Court of Appeal determined the appropriate costs awards for both the appeal and the trial.

The appellants were awarded reduced partial indemnity costs for the appeal to reflect their divided success.

For the trial costs, the respondents were awarded their agreed costs against the unsuccessful appellant, and a Sanderson order was made allowing the respondents to recover the trial costs they owed to the successful co-appellants from the unsuccessful appellant.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for unlawful conduct conspiracy and Purina liable for breach of contract, resulting in a $2 million damages award.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, dismissing the conspiracy claim because only Purina's conduct was unlawful.

The Court also reduced the breach of contract damages, holding that damages should be calculated based on the contract's 60-day termination clause, which was the least burdensome mode of performance.

The prejudgment interest rate was reduced to the statutory rate of 5.1 percent.

However, the $30,000 punitive damages award against Purina was affirmed due to its deceitful and reprehensible conduct in surreptitiously supplying a competitor in the respondents' exclusive territory.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her claims against her former solicitor and a charitable foundation regarding the transfer of her home with a retained life estate.

At trial, she argued non est factum and breach of fiduciary duty, both of which were dismissed based on credibility findings.

On appeal, she raised a new argument of solicitor negligence regarding ongoing property expenses, which the court declined to hear as it was not pleaded at trial.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings and the award of substantial indemnity costs, dismissing the appeal.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding they breached a fiduciary duty to a joint venture corporation.

The appellants managed a real estate development for the joint venture and allowed the property to go into power of sale, subsequently purchasing it for themselves.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that a fiduciary relationship existed and that the appellants breached their duty to avoid conflicts of interest.

The appeal was dismissed and the imposition of a constructive trust was affirmed.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment that limited its damages for lost parking spaces to the value of 20 spaces ($40,650) and dismissed its claim for injurious affection.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge relied on acceptable expert evidence and made no palpable and overriding error in his assessment of damages.

In a defamation appeal arising from newspaper reports about an incident at a municipal sewage treatment plant, the court upheld the trial judge’s findings that several individual defendants defamed the plaintiffs by falsely implying criminal threats or assault.

The court also upheld the striking of the jury notice, given the statutory bar to jury trials on factual issues and damages in claims against a municipality and the inextricable overlap of issues.

However, the court allowed the municipality’s appeal, holding that s. 5(1) of the Libel and Slander Act required independent written notice to all defendants, including a non-media municipal defendant alleged to be vicariously liable.

Because no timely notice was given and the limitation period had expired, the claim against the municipality was barred.

The Ontario Nurses Association brought an application alleging the Regional Municipality of Haldimand-Norfolk violated the Pay Equity Act, 1987.

As a preliminary issue, the Tribunal had to determine whether the Regional Municipality was the employer of the Haldimand-Norfolk Regional Police, such that the police force would be included in the Municipality's establishment for pay equity comparisons.

The Tribunal developed a four-part test to determine the employer for pay equity purposes, focusing on overall financial responsibility, responsibility for compensation practices, the nature of the service, and consistency with the Act's purpose.

Applying this test, the majority found that the Regional Municipality was the employer of the police force, as it bore the ultimate financial burden and responsibility for policing as a municipal function.

The police force was therefore part of the Municipality's establishment.

The Applicant union moved to stay a Review Services order and to strike portions of the Respondent's Response.

The Tribunal dismissed the motion to stay, finding no statutory basis to stay a review officer's order when no enforcement was sought and the issues were already before the Tribunal.

The Tribunal granted the motion to strike portions of the Response that contained new allegations of bad faith bargaining not raised during the Review Services process, while allowing the Respondent to amend its remedy to seek confirmation of the review officer's order.

The appellant police officer appealed his conviction and sentence for discreditable conduct relating to the improper discharge of a firearm.

During a high-speed chase, the officer set up a roadblock and fired a single shot into the radiator of a vehicle speeding directly toward him.

The Ontario Civilian Police Commission allowed the appeal, finding that the officer acted on reasonable and probable grounds in fear for his life.

The Commission emphasized that the officer's conduct must be assessed based on the split-second circumstances he faced, rather than in hindsight.

The conviction and punishment were quashed.

The appellant, a police constable, appealed a decision of the regional board of commissioners of police upholding his dismissal from the force.

The appellant argued that the Chief of Police's conduct during the initial hearing raised a reasonable apprehension of bias, citing the Chief's acquaintance with the appellant's mother-in-law, the handling of a missing notebook, and an alleged statement in the transcript that there would be 'no use of appeal.' The Commission found no evidence of bias, accepted an affidavit correcting the transcript error, and held that the missing notebook was not crucial evidence.

The Commission also granted a motion to amend an incorrect date on the charge sheet, finding no prejudice to the appellant.

The appeal was dismissed.