Agribrands Purina Canada Inc. v. Kasamekas et al. Kasamekas et al. v. Agribrands Purina Canada Inc. et al. [Indexed as: Agribrands Purina Canada Inc. v. Kasamekas]
106 O.R. (3d) 427
2011 ONCA 460
Court of Appeal for Ontario,
Goudge, Gillese and Juriansz JJ.A.
June 20, 2011
Civil procedure -- Prejudgment interest -- Action commenced in last quarter of 1992 -- Trial judge erring in awarding prejudgment interest based on average rate applicable for entire 1992 calendar year rather than applying rate specified by Rules of Civil Procedure for proceedings commenced in last quarter of 1992.
Contracts -- Damages -- Where contract sets out several modes of performance, damages for breach of contract generally assessed on basis of mode that is least profitable to plaintiff and least burdensome to defendant -- Trial judge erring in finding that that principle applies only where parties acted honestly and in good faith -- Agreement giving either party unconditional right to cancel contract at any time on 60 days' notice -- Trial judge erring in not calculating damages on that basis -- Trial judge erring in finding that defendant could not rely on 60-day notice clause as it had breached implied duty of good faith and in basing quantification on finding that contract would have continued indefinitely had defendant not breached its contractual obligation.
Damages -- Punitive damages -- Defendant entering into feed dealership agreement with plaintiffs and then undermining plaintiffs' business by surreptitiously supplying another dealer in plaintiffs' territory -- Plaintiffs' business failing -- Trial judge finding that defendant breached dealership agreement and breached implied duty of good faith toward plaintiffs -- Trial judge not erring in awarding punitive damages -- Breach of implied duty of good faith constituting separate actionable wrong -- Defendant's conduct constituting marked departure from ordinary standards of decency.
Torts -- Conspiracy -- Unlawful conduct conspiracy -- "Unlawful conduct" element of unlawful conduct conspiracy not encompassing conduct that defendant is "not at liberty" or "not authorized" to engage in as result of convention or understanding -- Conduct "unlawful" only if it is wrong in law.
The appellant Purina terminated the appellant Ren's feed dealership in July 1990 and entered into a dealership agreement for Ren's former territory with the respondent Raywalt in February 1991. Ren's arranged to have the appellant M, the Purina dealer in a neighbouring territory, supply it with Purina feed at dealer prices, which enabled Ren's to continue to sell Purina feed in Raywalt's territory. Purina approved of that arrangement and provided M with feed for resale to Ren's. As a result, Raywalt's business was not as profitable as projected and it ceased business at the end of January 1992. The trial judge found the appellants liable to the respondents for the tort of unlawful conduct conspiracy and found Purina liable for breach of its contract with Raywalt. The dealership agreement was for two years, with automatic renewal if neither party gave notice of cancellation. Either party had the right to cancel the contract at any time by giving [page428] 60 days' notice. The trial judge found that, had it not been for Purina's breach, the contract would have continued indefinitely and based his quantification of damages for breach of contract on that finding. He awarded general damages and prejudgment interest in the amount of $2,096,406 and punitive damages against Purina in the amount of $30,000. The appellants appealed the finding of unlawful conduct conspiracy. Purina appealed the method used to calculate damages for breach of contract and the award of punitive damages.
Held, the appeal should be allowed in part.
The trial judge erred in finding that "unlawful conduct" includes conduct that the defendants were "not at liberty" or "not authorized" to engage in, not only as a result of law or a contract, but also as a result of a convention or an understanding. What is required is that the defendants engage, in concert, in acts that are wrong in law, whether actionable at private law or not. In the commercial world, even highly competitive activity, provided it is otherwise lawful, does not qualify as "unlawful conduct" for the purposes of this tort. While Purina's breach of its contract with Raywalt was sufficient to qualify as "unlawful conduct", neither Ren's nor M did anything that would do so. The finding of unlawful conduct conspiracy and the damages flowing from it should be set aside.
Where there are several ways in which a contract might be performed, for the purposes of assessing damages, the mode that is the least profitable to the plaintiff and the least burdensome to the defendant should be adopted. The trial judge erred in finding that that principle applies only where the parties acted honestly and in good faith and that Purina had not done so. The contract provided that Purina had the unconditional right to cancel the contract at any time on 60 days' notice. That was the least burdensome mode of performance for Purina and should have been used as the basis for calculating the damages for breach of contract. Moreover, by finding an implied duty of good faith on Purina not to act in a way that defeated the very purpose of the contract and then finding that Purina could not rely on the 60-day notice clause because it breached that implied duty, the trial judge erred by using the implied duty of good faith to alter the express terms of the contract, including the right to terminate on notice. Finally, the trial judge erred in suggesting that it would be unconscionable to allow Purina to rely on the 60-day notice clause in calculating damages for breach of contract. The doctrine of unconscionability is applicable to determine whether the contract itself is unconscionable, and is not applicable to determine how damages should be assessed in light of the circumstances of a particular breach.
The action was commenced in the last quarter of 1992. The trial judge erred in applying a prejudgment interest rate of 6.65 per cent, the average rate applicable for the entire 1992 calendar year, to his assessment of damages for breach of contract and unlawful conduct conspiracy. The prejudgment rate specified in the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194 for proceedings commenced in the last quarter of 1992 was 5.1 per cent. The trial judge offered no special circumstances for exercising his discretion to deviate from that rate.
Purina's breach of the implied duty of good faith amounted to an independent actionable wrong, one of the requirements for an award of punitive damages for breach of contract. The trial judge erred in awarding punitive damages solely on that basis without considering the other requirement, that the impugned conduct must depart markedly from ordinary standards of decency. However, in the circumstances of this case, that requirement was also met. Purina's conduct was reprehensible and deserving of sanction. The punitive damages award was affirmed. [page429]
APPEAL from the judgment of M.G. Quigley J., [2010] O.J. No. 84, 2010 ONSC 166 for the plaintiffs. [page430]
Cases referred to Fidler v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 3, [2006] S.C.J. No. 30, 2006 SCC 30, 271 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 350 N.R. 40, [2006] 8 W.W.R. 1, J.E. 2006-1316, 227 B.C.A.C. 39, 57 B.C.L.R. (4th) 1, [2006] R.R.A. 525, 53 C.C.E.L. (3d) 1, 39 C.C.L.I. (4th) 1, [2007] CLLC Â210-015, [2006] I.L.R. 4521, 148 A.C.W.S. (3d) 902, EYB 2006-107056; Hamilton v. Open Window Bakery Ltd., [2004] 1 S.C.R. 303, [2003] S.C.J. No. 72, 2004 SCC 9, 235 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 316 N.R. 265, J.E. 2004-470, 184 O.A.C. 209, 40 B.L.R. (3d) 1, [2004] CLLC Â210-025, 128 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1111; Whiten v. Pilot Insurance Co., [2002] 1 S.C.R. 595, [2002] S.C.J. No. 19, 2002 SCC 18, 209 D.L.R. (4th) 257, 283 N.R. 1, J.E. 2002-405, 156 O.A.C. 201, 20 B.L.R. (3d) 165, 35 C.C.L.I. (3d) 1, [2002] I.L.R. I- 4048, REJB 2002-28036, 111 A.C.W.S. (3d) 935, apld Canada Cement Lafarge Ltd. v. British Columbia Lightweight Aggregate Ltd., [1983] 1 S.C.R. 452, [1983] S.C.J. No. 33, 145 D.L.R. (3d) 385, 47 N.R. 191, [1983] 6 W.W.R. 385, 21 B.L.R. 254, 24 C.C.L.T. 111, 72 C.P.R. (2d) 1, 19 A.C.W.S. (2d) 352; Reach M.D. Inc. v. Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of Canada (2003), 65 O.R. (3d) 30, [2003] O.J. No. 2062, 227 D.L.R. (4th) 458, 172 O.A.C. 202, 17 C.C.L.T. (3d) 149, 25 C.P.R. (4th) 417, 123 A.C.W.S. (3d) 411 (C.A.), consd Other cases referred to Agribrands Purina Canada v. Kasamekas, [2010] O.J. No. 1796, 2010 ONSC 2597; Alleslev-Krofchak v. Valcom Ltd., [2010] O.J. No. 3548, 2010 ONCA 557, 266 O.A.C. 356, 322 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 76 C.C.L.T. (3d) 163; Bank of Montreal v. Tortora, [2010] B.C.J. No. 466, 2010 BCCA 139, 287 B.C.A.C. 14, 3 B.C.L.R. (5th) 39, 80 C.C.E.L. (3d) 161; Cockburn v. Alexander (1848), 6 C.B. 791; Correia v. Canac Kitchens, a division of Kohler Ltd. (2008), 91 O.R. (3d) 353, [2008] O.J. No. 2497, 2008 ONCA 506, 294 D.L.R. (4th) 525, 58 C.C.L.T. (3d) 29, 167 A.C.W.S. (3d) 422, 67 C.C.E.L. (3d) 1, 240 O.A.C. 153, [2009] CLLC Â210-001; Drouillard v. Cogeco Cable Inc. (2007), 86 O.R. (3d) 431, [2007] O.J. No. 1664, 2007 ONCA 322, 282 D.L.R. (4th) 644, 223 O.A.C. 350, 57 C.C.E.L. (3d) 14, 48 C.C.L.T. (3d) 119, [2007] CLLC Â210-034, 157 A.C.W.S. (3d) 213; OBG Ltd. v. Allen; Douglas v. Hello! Ltd.; Mainstream Properties Ltd. v. Young, [2008] A.C. 1, [2007] UKHL 21 (H.L.); Revenue and Customs Commissioners v. Total Network S.L., [2008] 2 W.L.R. 711, [2008] UKHL 19 (H.L.); Torquay Hotel Co. Ltd. v. Cousins, [1969] 2 Ch. 106, [1969] 1 All E.R. 522, [1969] 2 W.L.R. 289, 6 K.I.R. 15 (C.A.); Transamerica Life Canada Inc. v. ING Canada Inc. (2003), 68 O.R. (3d) 457, [2003] O.J. No. 4656, 234 D.L.R. (4th) 367, 41 B.L.R. (3d) 1, [2004] I.L.R. I-4258, 127 A.C.W.S. (3d) 235 (C.A.) Statutes referred to Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 130(2) Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 [as am.] Rules and regulations referred to Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194 Authorities referred to Burns, Peter T., and Joost Blom, Economic Interests in Canadian Tort Law (Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis, 2009)
Kirk F. Stevens and Gerard V. Thompson, for appellants. W. Graydon Sheppard and Marc Munro, for respondents.
The judgment of the court was delivered by
GOUDGE J.A.: -- Introduction
[1] After an 11-day trial, the respondents, Walter Kasamekas ("Kasamekas"), Raymond Jackson ("Jackson") and Raywalt Feed Sales Ltd. ("Raywalt"), recovered judgment for general damages and prejudgment interest in the amount of $2,096,406 against the appellants Agribrands Purina Canada Inc. ("Purina"), Ren's Feed and Supplies Ltd. ("Ren's"), Walter Rendell Job ("Job") and the estate of Edwards James McGrath ("McGrath"). The respondents also recovered punitive damages of $30,000 against Purina. Finally, they were awarded costs of $175,000.
[2] The trial judge found the appellants liable to the respondents for the tort of unlawful conduct conspiracy. He also found Purina in breach of its contract with Raywalt. He assessed damages on the same basis for both causes of action.
[3] The appellants appeal the finding of unlawful conduct conspiracy. They also say that the trial judge made errors in calculating damages for that tort and in the rate he applied for prejudgment interest. While Purina does not contest the breach of contract finding against it, it does contest the method the trial judge used to calculate the damages for that breach. Finally, Purina appeals the finding of punitive damages against it.
[4] For the reasons that follow, I would allow the appeal on each of these issues except punitive damages and the alleged errors in calculating the tort damages. I would therefore amend the trial judgment to provide that Raywalt recover damages for breach of contract by Purina on the basis described below, with prejudgment interest calculated on the basis described below. The respondents' claims for conspiracy must be dismissed.
The Trial Judgment
[5] The basic facts are not in dispute. Ren's was a well- established dealer of Purina livestock feed and pet food. However, in 1990 Purina discovered that Ren's was also purchasing feed from one of its competitors and selling it as feed for laboratory animals in breach of its dealership agreement with Purina. As a consequence, Purina terminated Ren's dealership in July 1990.
[6] Walter Kasamekas, who was a Purina employee, and his brother Raymond Jackson saw an opportunity to set up Raywalt [page431] as a Purina dealership to take over Ren's territory. Raywalt and Purina concluded a dealership agreement in February 1991, pursuant to which Purina agreed not to appoint any other dealer in Raywalt's territory, previously Ren's territory.
[7] Raywalt opened for business in mid-March 1991. However, despite giving Raywalt territorial exclusivity, Purina continued to supply feed to Ren's until the end of April 1991. This enabled Ren's to sell to its former customers in what was now Raywalt's territory. When Purina finally ended this practice, Ren's got McGrath, who was a friend and the Purina dealer in a neighbouring territory, to supply Ren's with Purina feed at dealer prices. This allowed Ren's to continue to sell Purina feed in Raywalt's territory. Purina knew of, condoned and indeed approved of this arrangement. Purina provided McGrath with feed for resale to Ren's. As a result, Raywalt's business was not nearly as profitable as projected and its cash flow problems caused it to cease business at the end of January 1992.
[8] After setting this factual scene, the trial judge turned first to Purina's liability for breach of its contract with Raywalt. He concluded that, by supplying McGrath with feed knowing that McGrath would sell it to Ren's at dealer prices for sale in Raywalt's territory and by approving this arrangement, Purina breached its contract with Raywalt. Purina does not appeal this finding.
[9] He then addressed the method of calculating damages for that breach, in particular whether the damages were time limited by the terms of the contract. Two of its provisions were relevant. The first provided that the dealership agreement was for two years but would automatically renew unless either party gave notice of cancellation. The second allowed either party to cancel the contract at any time by giving 60 days' notice.
[10] The trial judge concluded that there was an implied duty of good faith on Purina in its contract with Raywalt, that Purina had acted in bad faith and that it could therefore not rely on the provision allowing it to terminate the contract on 60 days' notice. On this basis, the trial judge distinguished Hamilton v. Open Window Bakery Ltd., 2004 SCC 9, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 303, [2003] S.C.J. No. 72. In considering Hamilton, he said, at para. 100, "[T]he trial judge specifically found that the defendant had acted in good faith at all material times" (emphasis in original). At para. 108, he concluded, "The case has no application here because the foundation of good faith that was present in that case is evidently absent in this case."
[11] Instead of applying Hamilton, the trial judge engaged in an inquiry into what would have happened if Purina had not [page432] breached its contractual obligation. He found that the only reasonable conclusion available on the evidence was that the contract would have continued indefinitely. He found that Purina dealerships were typically of long duration. In this case, it would have been because no steps would have been taken to terminate it. By its terms, the dealership agreement would therefore have continued automatically.
[12] In addition, he concluded that, because of Purina's conduct, the doctrine of unconscionability applied to prevent Purina from relying on the time limiting provisions in the dealership agreement.
[13] For these reasons, the trial judge based his quantification of damages for breach of contract on the premise that Purina's contract with Raywalt would have continued indefinitely.
[14] He then moved to the civil conspiracy issue. The respondents did not advance the branch of this tort that requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendants' primary purpose was to cause injury to the plaintiff, whether by lawful or unlawful means. Rather, the respondents' argument was that the appellants engaged in the tort of unlawful conduct conspiracy, that is, their conduct, done in concert, was unlawful and they knew or should have known that injury to the respondents was likely to result.
[15] The trial judge found that the appellants acted in concert, and while their predominant purpose was not to injure the respondents, their conduct was directed at the respondents, and it was reasonably foreseeable that serious economic injury to the respondents would and did result.
[16] The central issue was whether their conduct was "unlawful". The trial judge found that the appellants did not appear to have committed a crime, or any other tort than unlawful conduct conspiracy. Nor had they infringed a guaranteed constitutional right. Relying primarily on Reach M.D. Inc. v. Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of Canada (2003), 65 O.R. (3d) 30, [2003] O.J. No. 2062 (C.A.), he found that the ambit of unlawful conduct required by this tort extends beyond strict illegality. He put it this way, at para. 127:
The newer decisions confirm that the ambit of "illegal conduct" extends beyond strict illegality for the purposes of proving the existence of tortious conduct. It includes conduct that the defendant "is not at liberty" or "not authorized" to engage in, whether as a result of law, a contract, a convention or an understanding.
[17] His assessment of the appellants' conduct against this standard was as follows, at paras. 132-34: [page433]
It was unlawful and unauthorized conduct from Purina's perspective because Purina had a commercial obligation of good faith and was contractually bound to support Raywalt as its dealer. More importantly, Purina had no authority or entitlement to permit Purina feed products to continue to be sold by Ren's at dealer pricing just to ensure that its decision to terminate the Ren's dealership would not result in a reduction of its market share. It effectively licensed Ren's through McGrath to sell products in a geographic area that was reserved to another dealer, both as de facto dealers of Purina horse feeds.
It was unlawful and unauthorized conduct from McGrath's perspective because he had no authority under his Dealership Agreement with Purina to establish a sub-dealership and to receive dealer rebates that reduced the product cost to dealer level "white list" pricing where his sub-dealer was selling Purina feed products in territory that had been assigned to another dealer.
It was unlawful and unauthorized conduct from Walter Rendell Job's and Ren's Feeds perspective because Ren's was not entitled to be able to obtain Purina feed products for resale at the advantageous pricing available only to authorized Purina dealers. The illegality lies in Purina and McGrath effectively licensing Ren's to deal in the Raywalt territory.
[18] The next issue was the assessment of damages. The trial judge concluded that there was no material difference in the damages to which the respondents were entitled, whether assessed for Purina's breach of contract or for the tort of unlawful conduct conspiracy. He said this, at para. 158:
To my mind, as will be evident from the foregoing, in the absence of effective contractual language limiting liability, the assessment of damages in both tort and contract in this case should be and is essentially the same. Any loss suffered by the plaintiffs that was reasonably foreseeable at the time of the breach is properly compensable.
[19] The trial judge found that the appellants' actions caused the respondents to lose their business. He determined that damages should reflect the going concern value of Raywalt at the time, which he calculated by assessing what the net profit of the business would have been in its second year of operation had it continued beyond January 1992. He then applied a three times earnings multiple. The result was a damage award of $954,213 for Purina's breach of contract and the appellants' conspiracy.
[20] The trial judge applied a prejudgment interest rate of 6.65 per cent to this amount. Because 18 years had passed since the cause of action arose in 1992, this added an additional $1,142,193. In supplementary reasons released on May 3, 2010 [[2010] O.J. No. 1796, 2010 ONSC 2597], the trial judge noted [at para. 8] that he selected that rate because it was "the average rate applicable for the entire 1992 calendar year". He declined to use the rate of 5.1 per cent, which was the bank rate [page434] at the start of the third quarter of 1992, the quarter in which the respondents filed their claim.
[21] Finally, the trial judge dealt with punitive damages. He reiterated that Purina's breach of its exclusivity contract with Raywalt was also answerable in the tort of conspiracy. He found that, if Purina's participation in that tort was not enough to justify the imposition of punitive damages, the breach of its implied duty of good faith to Raywalt was the second respect in which its conduct constituted an actionable wrong. Having found this precondition to be met, the trial judge based his justification for punitive damages on Purina's conduct. He found [at para. 237] it was "the very antithesis of acting in good faith".
[22] In the result, the trial judge ordered that the respondents recover $2,096,406 jointly and severally from the appellants, inclusive of prejudgment interest, that Purina pay punitive damages of $30,000 and that the respondents receive trial costs fixed at $175,000.
Analysis
First issue -- The unlawful conduct conspiracy
[23] The seminal case in Canada on the tort of civil conspiracy is Canada Cement Lafarge Ltd. v. British Columbia Lightweight Aggregate Ltd., [1983] 1 S.C.R. 452, [1983] S.C.J. No. 33. Speaking for the court, Estey J. described, at pp. 471-72 S.C.R., two categories of conspiracy recognized by Canadian law:
Although the law concerning the scope of the tort of conspiracy is far from clear, I am of the opinion that whereas the law of tort does not permit an action against an individual defendant who has caused injury to the plaintiff, the law of torts does recognize a claim against them in combination as the tort of conspiracy if: (1) whether the means used by the defendants are lawful or unlawful, the predominant purpose of the defendants' conduct is to cause injury to the plaintiff; or, (2) where the conduct of the defendants is unlawful, the conduct is directed towards the plaintiff (alone or together with others), and the defendants should know in the circumstances that injury to the plaintiff is likely to and does result.
In situation (2) it is not necessary that the predominant purpose of the defendants' conduct be to cause injury to the plaintiff but, in the prevailing circumstances, it must be a constructive intent derived from the fact that the defendants should have known that injury to the plaintiff would ensue. In both situations, however, there must be actual damage suffered by the plaintiff. [page435]
[24] This case deals with the second category, namely, unlawful conduct conspiracy. The first does not apply because there was no finding that the predominant purpose of the appellants' conduct was to cause injury to the respondents. The respondents did not advance that proposition at trial.
[25] For the appellants to be liable for the tort of unlawful conduct conspiracy, the following elements must therefore be present: (a) they act in combination, that is, in concert, by agreement or with a common design; (b) their conduct is unlawful; (c) their conduct is directed towards the respondents; (d) the appellants should know that, in the circumstances, injury to the respondents is likely to result; and (e) their conduct causes injury to the respondents.
[26] In this court, the appellants challenge only the finding that their conduct was unlawful. In particular, while they acknowledge that Purina's breach of its contract with Raywalt was unlawful, they say that the conduct of Ren's and McGrath was in no sense unlawful, and that therefore this element of the tort was not made out. Civil conspiracy cannot be established if only one conspirator acts unlawfully.
[27] What, then, are the requirements for unlawful conduct for the purposes of this tort? Most obviously, it must be unlawful conduct by each conspirator: see Bank of Montreal v. Tortora, 2010 BCCA 139, [2010] B.C.J. No. 466, 3 B.C.L.R. (5th) 39 (C.A.). There is no basis for finding an individual liable for unlawful conduct conspiracy if his or her conduct is lawful or, alternatively, if he or she is the only one of those acting in concert to act unlawfully. The tort is designed to catch unlawful conduct done in concert, not to turn lawful conduct into tortious conduct. The trial judge applied this requirement and found that each of the appellants had committed an unlawful act.
[28] To determine what sort of conduct qualifies as "unlawful" the trial judge looked to the jurisprudence dealing with the tort of intentional interference with economic relations.
[29] The trial judge concluded from the intentional interference cases that "unlawful conduct" includes conduct that the defendant "is not at liberty" or "not authorized" to engage in, whether as a result of law, a contract, a convention or an understanding. [page436]
[30] With respect, I do not think the jurisprudence goes that far. In Reach, this court found the tort of intentional interference with economic relations to be made out because actions by the defendant, a voluntary association, that caused its members to stop advertising with the plaintiff, constituted unlawful means directed at third parties, which then caused them to injure the plaintiff. The court was clear that these actions were beyond the lawful authority that the defendant had under its constitution, and were therefore actions beyond the defendants powers and done without jurisdiction. They could be set aside by the court at the behest of the third parties, its members. While the court made reference to the judgment of Lord Denning in Torquay Hotel Co. Ltd. v. Cousins, [1969] 2 Ch. 106, [1969] 1 All E.R. 522 (C.A.), it explicitly declined to decide how far Lord Denning's concept of "unlawful conduct" as "an act which [the defendant] is not at liberty to commit" might extend. Reach was a case of conduct that was wrong in law. I do not think that it provides a basis for the expansive interpretation used by the trial judge [at para. 127] as any "conduct that the defendant 'is not at liberty' or 'not authorized' to engage in, whether as a result of law, a contract, a convention or an understanding".
[31] Since Reach, this court's jurisprudence on the tort of intentional interference with economic relations has, if anything, tightened the scope of conduct considered unlawful. In Drouillard v. Cogeco Cable Inc. (2007), 2007 ONCA 322, 86 O.R. (3d) 431, [2007] O.J. No. 1664 (C.A.), the defendant's conduct in not following its internal corporate policy but instead acting in bad faith did not amount to unlawful means. In Correia v. Canac Kitchens, a division of Kohler Ltd. (2008), 2008 ONCA 506, 91 O.R. (3d) 353, [2008] O.J. No. 2497 (C.A.), this court approved of Lord Hoffman's majority reasons in OBG Ltd. v. Allen; Douglas v. Hello! Ltd.; Mainstream Properties Ltd. v. Young, [2008] A.C. 1, [2007] UKHL 21 (H.L.), in which he required unlawful conduct against a third party to be conduct that is actionable by the third party for the purposes of the tort of intentional interference with economic relations. This court reiterated this principle in Alleslev-Krofchak v. Valcom Ltd., [2010] O.J. No. 3548, 2010 ONCA 557, while recognizing that the delineation of actionability remained to be fully defined. It was unnecessary to do so in that case because the unlawful conduct relied on was clearly actionable as a matter of private law.
[32] What is clear from this jurisprudence is that, to constitute unlawful conduct for the purposes of the tort of intentional interference, the conduct must be actionable. It must be wrong in law. Conduct that is merely not authorized by a convention or an [page437] understanding is not enough. On this standard, the approach used by the trial judge was simply too broad.
[33] Moreover, reliance on the tort of intentional interference to supply the definition of "unlawful conduct" for the tort of civil conspiracy does not recognize that these two economic torts have evolved separately, and thus each have developed their own concept of unlawful conduct.
[34] The court should therefore be cautious of turning away from the history of this separate evolution simply to achieve a unified theory for the economic torts. Indeed, in Revenue and Customs Commissioners v. Total Network S.L., [2008] 2 W.L.R. 711, [2008] UKHL 19 (H.L.), the House of Lords went further, and said explicitly that, as the torts of intentional interference with economic relations and unlawful conduct conspiracy have developed over time, the concept of unlawful conduct has a different meaning in one tort than in the other: see, for example, the speech of Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, at para. 100.
[35] It is not necessary that we go that far in this case. However, rather than automatically adopting the meaning of unlawful conduct given in the intentional interference tort cases, I think the better course is to use those cases as a guide, but also consider the kind of conduct that the jurisprudence has found to be unlawful conduct for the purposes of the conspiracy tort.
[36] It is clear from that jurisprudence that quasi-criminal conduct, when undertaken in concert, is sufficient to constitute unlawful conduct for the purposes of the conspiracy tort, even though that conduct is not actionable in a private law sense by a third party. The seminal case of Canada Cement LaFarge is an example. So too is conduct that is in breach of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. These examples of "unlawful conduct" are not actionable in themselves, but they have been held to constitute conduct that is wrongful in law and therefore sufficient to be considered "unlawful conduct" within the meaning of civil conspiracy. There are also many examples of conduct found to be unlawful for the purposes of this tort simply because the conduct is actionable as a matter of private law. In Peter T. Burns and Joost Blom, Economic Interests in Canadian Tort Law (Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis, 2009), the authors say this, at pp. 167-68:
There are two distinct categories of conduct that can be described as comprising "unlawful means": conduct amounting to an independent tort or other actionable wrong, and conduct not actionable in itself. . . . . .
Examples of conspiracies involving tortious conduct include inducing breach of contract, wrongful interference with contractual rights, nuisance, intimidation, [page438] and defamation. Of course, a breach of contract itself will support an action in civil conspiracy and, as one Australian court has held, the categories of "unlawful means" are not closed.
The second category of unlawful means is conduct comprising unlawful means not actionable in itself. . . . . .
The first class of unlawful means not actionable in themselves, but which nevertheless supports a conspiracy action, is breach of a statute which does not grant a private right of action, the very instance rejected in Lonrho (1981) by the House of Lords. A common case is a breach of labour relations legislation, and another is the breach of a criminal statute such as the Canadian Criminal Code.
[37] What is required, therefore, to meet the "unlawful conduct" element of the conspiracy tort is that the defendants engage, in concert, in acts that are wrong in law, whether actionable at private law or not. In the commercial world, even highly competitive activity, provided it is otherwise lawful, does not qualify as "unlawful conduct" for the purposes of this tort.
[38] The appellants submit that while Purina's breach of its contract with Raywalt was sufficient to qualify as "unlawful conduct", neither Ren's nor McGrath did anything that would do so. I agree. In my view, the trial judge used an approach that is too broad. Assessed against the correct test, their conduct was not unlawful.
[39] Dealing with Ren's conduct, at the time it purchased feed from McGrath, it had no contract with either Purina or Raywalt. Ren's was free to purchase Purina feed from McGrath at the best price it could obtain and sell it wherever it could. I disagree with the trial judge's conclusion that Ren's was not entitled to be able to obtain Purina feed for resale at advantageous pricing available only to Purina dealers. Ren's conduct in doing so breached no contract. Nor was this conduct tortious or in breach of any statute. Indeed, the trial judge explicitly found that Ren's committed no crime or tort apart from the conspiracy. Ren's required no authorization from Purina to act as it did.
[40] On appeal, the respondent advanced for the first time the proposition that Ren's induced Purina to breach its contract with Raywalt and induced McGrath to breach its contract with Purina. Neither of these allegations was advanced at trial. They are belied by the trial judge's finding that, other than conspiracy, Ren's committed no tort. Moreover, the trial judge's finding that Purina knew of, and approved of the arrangement between Ren's and McGrath, leaves little room for the conclusion required by the inducing breach of contract tort, namely, that Ren's caused Purina to breach its contract with Raywalt or induced McGrath [page439] to breach its contract with Purina, assuming such a breach could be found. There was nothing in Ren's conduct that was wrong in law. It was not "unlawful conduct" for the purposes of the tort of conspiracy.
[41] Turning to McGrath's conduct, the trial judge found it to be "unlawful" because McGrath had no authority to effectively establish a sub-dealership for Ren's to obtain Purina feed at advantageous prices and then sell it into Raywalt's territory. The trial judge characterized McGrath's conduct as a violation of Purina's standard operating procedures. He therefore did not find McGrath's conduct to constitute a breach of his contract with Purina. Indeed, the standard dealership agreement that Raywalt and Ren's had with Purina did not prohibit such an arrangement. Moreover, the trial judge could not have found McGrath to be in breach of his dealership contract with Purina. His finding that Purina knew and approved of what McGrath was doing precluded that possibility, even if such a prohibition had been a term of McGrath's contract. There is no suggestion that McGrath's actions were tortious or in violation of any statute or in other way wrong in law. In my opinion, McGrath's actions cannot be said to be "unlawful conduct" for the purposes of the tort of conspiracy.
[42] In summary, I conclude that only Purina engaged in any unlawful conduct. The other two appellants did not. As a consequence, the finding of unlawful conduct conspiracy and the damages flowing from it must be set aside. The respondents' claim based on civil conspiracy must be dismissed.
Second issue -- The method of calculating breach of contract damages
[43] In Hamilton, Ms. Hamilton entered into a contract with Open Window Bakery Ltd. ("Open Window") for a term of 36 months to serve as its exclusive agent in Japan. The contract gave Open Window the unconditional right to terminate the contract on three months' notice, effective after the commencement of the 19th month of the contract. In the 16th month, Open Window wrongfully terminated the contract. The trial judge determined Ms. Hamilton's damages by inquiring into how Open Window would likely have performed its obligations under the contract hypothetically, but for its repudiation. This resulted in an award reflecting the payments that would have been made over the full 36-month term less a 25 per cent reduction for contingencies.
[44] The Supreme Court held that this was the wrong approach and substituted a damage award based on early termination at [page440] the 19th month mark together with three months' notice, reflecting Open Window's maximum exposure to damages. The court based this on the principle articulated in Cockburn v. Alexander (1848), 6 C.B. 791 that, generally speaking, where there are several ways in which the contract might be performed, the mode that is adopted is the least profitable to the plaintiff and the least burdensome to the defendant, for the purposes of assessing damages. The court described the rationale for this principle and the error in the approach used by the trial judge in the following language [at paras. 15-18]:
This tort-like analysis proposed by Hamilton is not an established part of Canadian law. There are compelling reasons for this. Contractual obligations are voluntarily assumed by parties and given effect to by the courts. The failure to perform certain promised positive contractual obligations in contract law is conceptually distinct from the breach of unpromised negative obligations to not harm another's interests in tort law: see G. H. L. Fridman, The Law of Torts in Canada (2nd ed. 2002), at p. 11.
In a successful tort claim for damages, unliquidated damages are awarded to a plaintiff on the basis that the plaintiff has suffered a loss through some wrongful interference by the defendant. The plaintiff in such cases has legally protected interests that have been found by a court to be unduly compromised. In tort cases, it is widely recognized that the inquiry into what would have been but for the tort is appropriate, since the plaintiff's interest is in being restored to (or at least awarded compensation in respect of) the position the plaintiff would otherwise be in. See Fridman, supra, at p. 2; A. M. Linden, Canadian Tort Law (7th ed. 2001), at p. 4, ("[f]irst and foremost, tort law is a compensator"); J. G. Fleming, The Law of Torts (9th ed. 1998), at p. 5; and R. F. V. Heuston and R. A. Buckley, Salmond and Heuston on the Law of Torts (21st ed. 1996), at pp. 8-9.
However, under the general principle applicable in breach of contracts with alternative performances enunciated above, it is not necessary that the non-breaching party be restored to the position they would likely, as a matter of fact, have been in but for the repudiation. Rather, the non-breaching party is entitled to be restored to the position they would have been in had the contract been performed.
In this case, the relevant contractual duties have been expressly set out by the parties in the agreement. Hamilton is entitled to OWB's performance of these voluntarily assumed duties. Hamilton has no compensable interest in the advantages she might have expected under any particular performance of the contract, since the contract itself provided for alternative methods of performance at the election of the defendant. If Hamilton wanted to secure herself the benefits associated with a given particular method of performance, she should have contracted for only that method of performance. (Emphasis in original)
[45] The trial judge distinguished Hamilton [at para. 106], finding that it applied only where the parties acted honestly and in good faith, and that Purina had not done so, having [page441] "conducted itself in a manner that 'defeated or eviscerated the very purpose and objective' of its agreement with Raywalt".
[46] With respect, I do not agree. The trial judge erred in finding Hamilton to be premised on good faith conduct by the breaching party. Contrary to his view, there was no finding by the trial judge in Hamilton that Open Window had acted in good faith at all material times. Nor is there any suggestion in the Supreme Court's decision that good faith conduct is a pre- requisite for the least burdensome principle to apply. Indeed, Open Window had wrongfully terminated Ms. Hamilton by repudiating the entire contract, thereby defeating its very purpose, yet the least burdensome principle of calculating damages was applicable.
[47] In my view, Hamilton cannot be distinguished as the trial judge did, and should have been followed in assessing the breach of contract damages in this case, even if Purina did not act in good faith in breaching the contract.
[48] Had that been done, the trial judge would not have embarked on a hypothetical inquiry into how Purina would likely have performed its obligations under the contract if it had not breached the contract. That is the very sort of inquiry that Hamilton says should not be done in approaching breach of contract damages where there are alternate modes of performing the contract.
[49] The contract provided that Purina had the unconditional right to cancel the contract at any time on 60 days' notice. Article V(B) of the contract reads, "Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this article, either of the parties may cancel this Agreement at any time by giving sixty (60) days advance notice to the other party." There is no doubt that this is the least burdensome mode of performance for Purina. It should have been used as the basis for calculating the damages for breach of contract.
[50] Moreover, by finding an implied duty of good faith on Purina not to act in a way that defeats the very purpose of the contract and then finding that Purina could not rely on Article V(B) because it breached that implied duty, the trial judge erred by using the implied duty of good faith to alter the express terms of the contract, including the right to terminate on notice. In Transamerica Life Canada Inc. v. ING Canada Inc. (2003), 68 O.R. (3d) 457, [2003] O.J. No. 4656 (C.A.), at para. 53, this court made clear that Canadian courts have not accorded this power to an implied duty of good faith.
[51] The trial judge also suggested that it would be unconscionable in these circumstances to allow Purina to rely on a [page442] clause like V(B) in the calculation of breach of contract damages. I do not agree that unconscionability can be used in this way. In my view, that doctrine is applicable to determine whether the contract itself is unconscionable, given, for example, the circumstances in which it was made. The doctrine is not applicable to determine how damages should be assessed in light of the circumstances of a particular breach.
[52] In summary, I conclude that the trial judge erred in failing to apply the approach in Hamilton to calculate the damages owed by Purina for its breach of contract. His task should have been to calculate the breach of contract damages needed to restore Raywalt to the position it would have been in had the contract been performed, adopting the mode of performance provided by the contract that is least burdensome to Purina.
[53] The trial judge found that had Purina performed the contract, there is no doubt that Raywalt would still have been in business at the end of January 1992, when it in fact closed its doors. At that point, the contract gave Purina the unconditional right of cancelling the agreement on 60 days' notice. This was the mode of performance least burdensome to Purina and therefore constituted its maximum exposure for damages for breach of the contract with Raywalt.
[54] Using this approach, the quantification of the damages owed by Purina for breach of contract requires the determination of the amount Raywalt lost because of Purina's breach from the time Raywalt opened for business in March 1991 until the end of March 1992, two months after it actually closed its doors.
[55] In my view, the trial judge made findings of fact sufficient for this court to do that calculation, recognizing that this exercise is more of an art than a science. He calculated that, had Purina performed its contractual obligations, Raywalt would have had a profit of $145,654 at the end of January 1992, instead of being insolvent.
[56] He arrived at this amount after considering the expert evidence, together with evidence of additional pet food sales that Raywalt would have been able to make in the last two months of that first year of operation. The appellants attack this figure on two bases.
[57] First, they say that the expert opinion relied on already included the additional pet food sales and that it was an error to count them a second time. I do not agree. The expert's evidence makes only cryptic reference to the pet food sales and it was entirely open to the trial judge to find that they were not included in the expert's opinion of Raywalt's first-year profits [page443] and could therefore properly be added to the expert's calculation of loss in the first year.
[58] Second, they say that the trial judge did not add to Raywalt's costs the additional costs that would have been required in achieving these additional sales. Again, I disagree. There was an ample evidentiary basis for the trial judge to reach the conclusion he did for both Raywalt's gross sales and its expenses had Purina honoured its contract.
[59] I see no basis for interfering with the trial judge's valuation of first-year profits lost to Raywalt.
[60] The trial judge also calculated the net profits that Raywalt would have achieved in its second year of operation had the appellants acted lawfully, as part of his calculation of tort damages. He quantified that loss at $318,071. The appellants raise a number of challenges to this calculation, all of which I reject, as explained in the next section of these reasons. I am therefore prepared to accept that figure as the profits Raywalt would have made in its second year of operation had Purina not breached its contract. This provides a good basis for determining the profits lost to Raywalt through February and March 1992, representing the 60 days' notice Purina was required to give, which I would assess at one-sixth of this number, namely, $53,011.83.
[61] Thus calculated, I would fix the damages to which Raywalt is entitled for Purina's breach of contract at $145,654 plus $53,011.83, for a total of $198,665.83.
Third issue -- The calculation of damages
[62] As I have indicated, the trial judge concluded that damages for the unlawful conduct conspiracy should reflect the ongoing concern value of Raywalt at the time it was harmed. He calculated this by assessing what the net profit of the business would have been in its second year of operation and then applying a three times earnings multiple to that figure.
[63] The appellants raise a number of challenges to his assessment of Raywalt's net profit for that second year. Although I have found that the finding of unlawful conduct conspiracy cannot stand, it is necessary to address these challenges since I have used the calculation of Raywalt's net profits for the second year to calculate Raywalt's contract damages for February and March 1992.
[64] First, the appellants say that the trial judge made several errors, resulting in an overvaluation of the contribution that additional pet food sales would have made. They say that the trial judge double counted that contribution by adding it to the expert evidence he relied on. I disagree with this, as I have [page444] explained above. They also say that the trial judge impermissibly relied on hearsay evidence in making his finding. I disagree. In my view, it was open to him to rely on the evidence he did hear, which was completely unobjected to at trial by the appellants. Lastly, they say that the trial judge insufficiently discounted for the possibility that these additional sales might not take place. However, the discount to be applied was an assessment that the trial judge was entitled to make on the evidence before him. That is what he did. There is no basis for this court to interfere with it.
[65] Second, the appellants argue that the trial judge erred in the discount he applied in using Ren's earnings for the same period as input to calculate what Raywalt would have earned but for the harm inflicted on it. However, the trial judge was fully aware that some discount was appropriate because Ren's sold some products that Raywalt did not. He based the discount he selected on evidence of the percentage of Ren's business that these additional products represented, measured by tonnage. That was a conclusion he was entitled to draw. There is no basis for this court to second guess it and apply a higher discount rate.
[66] Third, the appellants quarrel with the trial judge's calculation of the value of Ren's feed sales that Raywalt would have taken over but for the conspiracy. They say that there was evidence of this value that the trial judge should have preferred to the evidence he accepted. In my opinion, that too was up to him. His calculation was based on evidence that he was entitled to act upon. There is no basis for this court to interfere.
[67] Fourth, the appellants say that the trial judge committed a palpable and overriding error in assessing the administrative expenses that Raywalt would have incurred in its second year of operation. Again, I disagree. His assessment was well founded on evidence of what those expenses would have been. The trial judge accepted this evidence and made no reversible error in doing so.
[68] In summary, I conclude that all of the appellant's challenges to the trial judge's calculation of the profit that Raywalt would have made in its second year of operation must fail.
Fourth issue -- Prejudgment interest
[69] In his original reasons for judgment, the trial judge applied a prejudgment interest rate of 6.65 per cent to his assessment of damages for breach of contract and unlawful conduct conspiracy. He did so without the parties having an opportunity to make submissions on the issue. He set out his basis for selecting this rate, at para. 219 of his original reasons: [page445]
The average rate of interest established for pre-judgment interest by section 128 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, for 1992, the year in which I find that the cause of action of the plaintiffs arose, is 6.65%.
[70] Following the release of these reasons, the trial judge agreed to receive written submissions on the issue. In subsequent reasons, he declined to change the rate he had selected. He gave this explanation, at para. 8 of his supplementary reasons [[2010] O.J. No. 1796, 2010 ONSC 2597]:
More importantly, section 128(1) of the Courts of Justice Act shows that the appropriate starting point for the calculation is not the date on which the claim was actually filed, but rather the date on which the cause of action arose: see also Sedigh v. Lange, [2000] O.J. No. 3606 (S.C.J.) at para. 11. I focused on when the cause of action arose as the relevant time and found as a fact that the plaintiffs' cause of action arose at some point in 1992 at or about the time that the business failed owing to the actions of the defendants, rather than focusing on the date upon which the plaintiffs filed their claim. As such, I continue to regard it as appropriate to average the quarterly rates for 1992 in the manner that I did at paragraph 219 of my Reasons for Judgment.
[71] The appellants also argued at trial that the trial judge ought to have adjusted the rate down to reflect the factors listed on s. 130(2) of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43. The trial judge concluded his supplementary reasons by rejecting that submission, at para. 11:
Here, the defendants have advanced a range of reasons for their claim that a lower rate should be applicable, but I find that they have done nothing to discharge the onus that rests upon them of persuading me that it is appropriate that I should exercise discretion in this case to deviate from what would otherwise be the applicable interest rate specified by the Courts of Justice Act.
[72] In this court, the appellants argue that the trial judge erred in this approach.
[73] I agree. The prejudgment rate specified in the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194 pursuant to the Courts of Justice Act for proceedings commenced in the last quarter of 1992, that is, when the respondents' claim was commenced, was 5.1 per cent. That is the applicable rate unless the court finds special circumstances to justify departing from it. In my view, the trial judge erred by taking as his starting point the average prejudgment interest rate for 1992, the year in which the respondents' cause of action arose, rather than the starting point as specified under the Courts of Justice Act. Moreover, he offered no special circumstances for exercising his discretion to deviate from the applicable rate specified by the Courts of Justice Act. His error was in using 6.65 per cent as the applicable rate. The proper applicable rate to be used is 5.1 per cent. [page446]
Fifth issue -- Punitive damages
[74] Finally, the appellant Purina attacks the award of punitive damages made against it. It argues that the trial judge's basis for doing so did not reach the threshold required by the jurisprudence.
[75] In Fidler v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 2006 SCC 30, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 3, [2006] S.C.J. No. 30 ("Sun Life"), the Supreme Court of Canada made clear that, in breach of contract cases, conduct warranting punitive damages must be an independently actionable wrong in addition to a breach of contract. As well, it must also reach the threshold warranting punitive damages. The court described that threshold, at para. 62:
By their nature, contract breaches will sometimes give rise to censure. But to attract punitive damages, the impugned conduct must depart markedly from ordinary standards of decency -- the exceptional case that can be described as malicious, oppressive or high-handed and that offends the court's sense of decency: Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130, at para. 196; Whiten, at para. 36. The misconduct must be of a nature as to take it beyond the usual opprobrium that surrounds breaking a contract. As stated in Whiten, at para. 36, "punitive damages straddle the frontier between civil law (compensation) and criminal law (punishment)". Criminal law and quasi-criminal regulatory schemes are recognized as the primary vehicles for punishment. It is important that punitive damages be resorted to only in exceptional cases, and with restraint.
[76] In coming to his conclusion, the trial judge was clearly influenced by his finding that Purina's conduct was both a breach of contract and part of the unlawful conduct conspiracy. Alternatively, he found that Purina's conduct constituted a second actionable wrong in that it was also a breach of its implied duty of good faith towards Raywalt. Beyond that, he justified the punitive damages award this way, at para. 238:
Here, I find that an award of punitive damages ought to be made against Purina to serve the rational purpose of delivering the simple message that good faith, promises of good faith, and an underlying foundation of business efficacy continue to be what our law relies upon as the cornerstone of upholding and enforcing contractual promises.
[77] In my view, this sets too low a bar. It would make every breach of contract that is also a breach of an implied duty of good faith a sufficient basis for the award of punitive damages. I think that would pay insufficient regard to the caution in Sun Life that punitive damages are confined to exceptional cases in which the misconduct is of a nature that takes it beyond the usual opprobrium surrounding breaking a contract. It seems to me that breaches of an implied duty of good faith can come in so many possible different shapes and sizes that it cannot be said [page447] that generically, the breach of such a duty is per se enough to justify punitive damages. It falls, therefore, to this court to determine whether, on the facts as found below, such an award is warranted.
[78] In Sun Life, the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed that the principles set out in Whiten v. Pilot Insurance Co., 2002 SCC 18, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 595, [2002] S.C.J. No. 19, at para. 63, continue to govern the award of punitive damages. It reiterated that in breach of contract cases, in addition to the requirement that the conduct constitute a marked departure from ordinary standards of decency, there is the requirement that the acts be "independently actionable". Breach of an implied duty of good faith can satisfy the requirement of an independent actionable wrong: see Whiten, at para. 79. The trial judge found that Purina had breached its implied duty of good faith. That was not contested before us and since we received no argument on it we must proceed on that basis. Coupled with breach of the exclusivity contract, the requirement of an independently actionable wrong is therefore met in this case.
[79] Thus, the question becomes: did Purina's conduct constitute such a marked departure from the ordinary standards of decency that it warrants censure through the imposition of an award of punitive damages? In answering this question, a careful analysis of Purina's conduct is warranted. In doing so, it is useful to call to mind the factors for consideration set out by the Supreme Court in Whiten, at para. 94:
(1) Punitive damages are very much the exception rather than the rule, (2) imposed only if there has been high-handed, malicious, arbitrary or highly reprehensible misconduct that departs to a marked degree from ordinary standards of decent behaviour. (3) Where they are awarded, punitive damages should be assessed in an amount reasonably proportionate to such factors as the harm caused, the degree of the misconduct, the relative vulnerability of the plaintiff and any advantage or profit gained by the defendant, (4) having regard to any other fines or penalties suffered by the defendant for the misconduct in question. (5) Punitive damages are generally given only where the misconduct would otherwise be unpunished or where other penalties are or are likely to be inadequate to achieve the objectives of retribution, deterrence and denunciation. (6) Their purpose is not to compensate the plaintiff, but (7) to give a defendant his or her just desert (retribution), to deter the defendant and others from similar misconduct in the future (deterrence), and to mark the community's collective condemnation (denunciation) of what has happened. (8) Punitive damages are awarded only where compensatory damages, which to some extent are punitive, are insufficient to accomplish these objectives, and (9) they are given in an amount that is no greater than necessary to rationally accomplish their purpose. (10) While normally the state would be the recipient of any fine or penalty for misconduct, the plaintiff will keep punitive damages as a "windfall" in addition to compensatory damages. (11) Judges and juries in our system have usually found that [page448] moderate awards of punitive damages, which inevitably carry a stigma in the broader community, are generally sufficient.
[80] From the outset, Purina knew that in order for Raywalt to succeed, it had to take over Ren's sales of Purina products. As the trial judge found, the volume of Purina sales to Raywalt taken from the Ren's dealership was "critically important" to the success of the new dealership. While the exclusive right to market and sell Purina feed products within defined geographical territories is an important feature of all distributorships, to Purina's knowledge, it was crucial to Raywalt. Further, Purina was aware of the financial risks and vulnerability of Kasamekas and Jackson. As part of the start-up financing, Kasamekas gave Purina a mortgage against his home and the company's credit line was secured by personal guarantees by Kasamekas, Jackson and their spouses. The personal guarantees were secured against their homes.
[81] It is within this context that Purina's actions must be considered. Within weeks of Raywalt starting up, it learned that Purina was permitting Ren's to continue to supply Ren with feed. When challenged, Purina assured Raywalt that it would stop supplying Ren with feed. While Purina did in fact stop supplying Ren directly, it then embarked on the arrangements with McGrath to ensure that Ren continued to receive feed and sell within the Raywalt territory. That is, in essence, Purina did precisely what it told Raywalt it would not do. It did so repeatedly, over a lengthy period of time and with a complete disregard for the consequences to Raywalt. At para. 49 of the reasons for decision, the trial judge quotes from correspondence authored by Tom Robinson, a manager at Purina, which shows that he had a "clear financial and business interest in McGrath succeeding over Raywalt" and at the relevant times, took an "aggressive stance" against Raywalt. Because of the surreptitious way in which Purina supplied Ren, Raywalk had no knowledge of what was going on and therefore had no ability to take steps to address the problem or mitigate the financial harm that ensued.
[82] Purina's actions in supplying McGrath so that he, in turn, could supply Ren are deceitful. As such, they are reprehensible and deserving of sanction.
[83] As the preceding reasons explain, the damages award does not otherwise punish this behaviour. There is no "double recovery" aspect to making an award of punitive damages in this case. Moreover, the damages award is insufficient to accomplish the objectives of denunciation and deterrence of others from acting similarly. The amount of $30,000, set by the [page449] trial judge, is sufficient to do so. Accordingly, I would affirm the punitive damages award, albeit for different reasons than those of the trial judge.
Conclusion
[84] In summary, except for punitive damages, I would allow the appeal. I would dismiss the claim of unlawful conduct conspiracy. I would substitute for the damage award for breach of contract an award of $198,665.83, to which I would apply a prejudgment interest rate of 5.1 per cent. The trial judgment must be amended accordingly, in light of these reasons.
[85] This result may be of relevance to the costs awarded at trial and is as well the context for an award of costs of the appeal. The parties may file written submissions of no more than ten pages on both of these questions within 30 days of the release of these reasons.
Appeal allowed in part.