OCA 2011

The applicant was convicted of several traffic and by-law offences after failing to appear for trial because he was out of the country.

He applied to the Ontario Court of Justice for an extension of time to appeal the convictions, which was denied.

He then sought leave to appeal that denial to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, holding that the Provincial Offences Act does not provide a right of appeal from an unsuccessful application for an extension of time under section 85(1), and therefore the court lacked jurisdiction.

L'appelant a plaidé coupable à de multiples chefs d'accusation de conduite en état d'ébriété et de conduite dangereuse causant la mort et des lésions corporelles après avoir causé un accident de la route mortel.

Le juge de première instance a imposé une peine d'emprisonnement de 8 ans.

L'appelant a interjeté appel, soutenant que la peine se situait en dehors de l'échelle établie par la jurisprudence.

La Cour d'appel a rejeté l'appel, concluant que la peine n'était pas manifestement inappropriée compte tenu des circonstances aggravantes extrêmes, notamment le taux d'alcoolémie élevé, la vitesse excessive et le dossier de conduite antérieur de l'appelant.

The Canadian Civil Liberties Association and the Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network sought leave to intervene as friends of the court in an appeal concerning whether the common law recognizes a tort of invasion of privacy.

The appellant supported the motions, while the respondent opposed them.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motions, finding that the proposed intervenors would not offer a significantly different perspective from the appellant and that permitting the interventions would cause injustice to the respondent by delaying the scheduled appeal and requiring new factums.

The appellants appealed the decisions of the Superior Court of Justice.

The appeal was not technically perfected but was listed and heard with related appeals.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault and assault with a weapon, as well as his designation as a dangerous offender and indeterminate sentence.

He argued the trial judge failed to address inconsistencies in the complainants' evidence and that the predicate offences did not form a pattern with his prior sexual assault convictions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons adequate.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the court found a clear pattern of the appellant using violence to achieve sexual objectives and an inability to control his impulses.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter and robbery with a firearm.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by admitting hearsay evidence of a witness's prior testimony identifying him from a photo array, and by misdirecting the jury on the use of evidence regarding a black man fleeing the scene.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the hearsay evidence lacked threshold reliability because the witness's professed memory loss prevented meaningful cross-examination.

The court also held the jury instruction on flight was misleading.

The curative proviso could not be applied, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant parent appealed an order dismissing his appeal to the Superior Court from a decision granting the Children's Aid Society permanent wardship of his two children.

The Superior Court had dismissed the appeal for delay because the appellant failed to perfect the appeal by obtaining transcripts.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, noting the paramount concern for the children's need for stability and permanency.

The Court also found the appeal had virtually no prospect of success, as the trial judge's findings of inadequate parenting skills were fatal and there was no evidence of bias or inadequate assistance of counsel.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions, arguing that the verdicts were unreasonable, that the trial judge erred in allowing cross-examination regarding another file involving abuse allegations, and that he suffered prejudice because the complainant's doctor did not testify.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the verdicts were reasonable and well-founded, the trial judge properly assessed credibility, the cross-examination issue was first raised by the defence and not relied upon by the trial judge, and the defence had waived the need for the doctor's testimony.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment awarding spousal support to the respondent, challenging the trial judge's credibility findings and factual determinations regarding the respondent's immigration status and employment prospects.

The trial judge had found the appellant to be untruthful and accepted the respondent's evidence that she would suffer reduced career opportunities in South Korea due to the cultural stigma of a failed interracial marriage.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's credibility assessments and concluding that the trial judge fully explained why the severe economic disadvantage suffered by the respondent justified a support award outside the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines.

The young person appealed their conviction and sentence.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing the identification evidence of a teller and in admitting time and date stamps on school photographs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge was alive to the frailties of the identification evidence and that defence counsel had agreed to the admission of the photographs.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was reasonable and revealed no error in principle.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in his treatment of a witness's evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge allowing the witness to use a document to refresh her memory and giving the evidence the weight he deemed appropriate.

The parties sought costs following an appeal where the appellant's appeal on the merits was dismissed, but her appeal on costs was allowed.

The respondent sought full or substantial indemnity costs for the appeal on the merits, arguing the appeal was a continuation of a meritless will challenge.

The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, finding the appeal raised a narrow question of law, and awarded the respondent partial indemnity costs of $32,866.

The appellant was awarded partial indemnity costs of $9,273.30 for her success on the costs appeal.

The amounts were set off, resulting in a net payment of $23,592.70 to the respondent.

The appellant appealed sentences imposed by three different Superior Court judges, with the primary focus on the sentence imposed by Ducharme J. The Court of Appeal found no error in principle, noting that protection of the public was the paramount consideration given the appellant's record and psychiatric evidence.

The court agreed that the totality principle was entitled to little weight because rehabilitation was not a factor in this case.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent employee was laid off for a cumulative duration of 35 weeks within a 52-week period.

Upon reaching this statutory maximum under the Employment Standards Act, 2000, the employee brought a claim for common law damages for wrongful dismissal.

The employer appealed the trial judge's award of damages, arguing that the ESA and common law operate independently and that a statutory termination does not constitute a common law dismissal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a statutory termination under s. 56(1) of the ESA is a termination for all purposes, displacing the common law and entitling the employee to claim common law wrongful dismissal damages.

The applicants, Shoppers Drug Mart and Katz Group, successfully challenged provincial regulations banning pharmacies from selling private label generic drugs at the Divisional Court.

The Minister of Health appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the regulations were intra vires the Ontario Drug Benefit Act and the Drug Interchangeability and Dispensing Fee Act.

The Court held that the regulations validly imposed conditions on the drug supply chain to control prescription drug costs, rather than constituting an unauthorized prohibition, interference with commercial rights, or illegal discrimination.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's decision ordering his surrender to the United States to face fraud charges.

The applicant argued that the Minister failed to properly weigh the Cotroni factors and his section 6 Charter rights, given that he was on the verge of pleading guilty to Canadian charges before they were stayed due to the extradition request.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the Minister properly considered the unusual factual history and reasonably concluded that the United States had a significantly greater interest in prosecuting the case.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearms offences, arguing that the search warrant for his residence violated s. 8 of the Charter.

He contended that the Information to Obtain (ITO) relied on an uncorroborated tip from a confidential informant and lacked a sufficient nexus to his residence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that a sufficient nexus existed, as police observed the appellant engage in drug transactions immediately after leaving his apartment.

The court also agreed that the ITO was not misleading and the informant's tip was sufficiently compelling.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his counterclaim for defamation and mental distress against his former employer, and his third-party claim against an insurer.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's refusal to grant an adjournment, noting the age of the case.

The Court found no error in the dismissal of the counterclaim, as the employer's actions were justified by its investigation into the appellant's business practices.

The third-party claim was properly dismissed because the appellant failed to comply with the notice requirements of the 'claims made and reported' insurance policy.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed his concurrent life sentences for two counts of counselling to commit murder.

While incarcerated for offences against his ex-wife, the appellant attempted to hire an undercover police officer to kill his ex-wife and her boyfriend.

The trial judge imposed a life sentence based on the appellant's future dangerousness, despite the Crown not bringing a dangerous offender application.

The Court of Appeal found the life sentence disproportionate and outside the range for similar offences, citing R. v. Goyette.

The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the life sentence, designated the appellant a long-term offender, and imposed a 16-year determinate sentence less pre-sentence custody, followed by a 10-year long-term supervision order.

The Court also varied a non-communication order to allow contact with the appellant's adult daughter upon her written consent.

The appellant appealed his convictions for two counts of counselling to commit murder against his ex-wife and her boyfriend.

While incarcerated, the appellant agreed to pay an undercover police officer to kill the intended victims.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in admitting an audiotape of a telephone conversation under s. 24(2) of the Charter, admitting his police interview under ss. 10(a) and (b), instructing the jury, and dismissing his entrapment motion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's Charter rulings, jury instructions, or conclusion that the police acted on reasonable suspicion without inducing the offence.