James K. Stewart

The appellant challenged an order for a new trial after exclusion of a co-accused’s prior inconsistent Agreed Statement of Facts tendered for its truth in a murder prosecution.

The majority held threshold reliability was not established because available safeguards did not adequately permit testing of truth and accuracy, particularly given curtailed cross-examination following assertions of solicitor-client privilege.

The Court emphasized deference to trial-level reliability determinations absent error in principle and rejected a request for a new trial based on how the prosecution conducted the voir dire.

It concluded the statement’s surrounding circumstances did not provide sufficient substantive reliability where the declarant had incentives to shift blame during plea negotiations.

The appeal was allowed and the acquittal restored, with dissenting reasons favouring a new trial.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder and attempted murder following a drug transaction where the victims were shot.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by denying an adjournment to retain new counsel, forcing him to self-represent, failing to put an alternative suspect theory to the jury, and leaving speculative evidence of planning and deliberation with the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly exercised his discretion to deny the adjournment due to the appellant's manipulative delay tactics, and that the jury instructions on the alternative suspect and planning and deliberation were correct.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault causing bodily harm against his former partner, with whom he was engaged in a custody dispute.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding a note written by the complainant, the nature of her injuries, and her motive to fabricate the allegations to gain an advantage in family court.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it was open to the trial judge to accept the complainant's explanations and reject the defence's hypotheses.

A fresh evidence application regarding post-trial custody proceedings was also dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for attempted murder and his designation as a dangerous offender.

He argued the trial judge failed to adequately scrutinize a police officer's testimony regarding the sound of a dry-fired handgun and reversed the onus of proof regarding his intent to kill.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly assessed the evidence and did not reverse the burden of proof.

The sentence appeal regarding the dangerous offender designation was also dismissed.

The Crown appealed an order granting a stay of proceedings on charges of armed robbery due to a breach of the accused's right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

It took 52.5 months to bring the case to trial, with significant delay occurring in the provincial court.

The Crown argued the application judge erred in attributing defence counsel's dilatory conduct to the Crown's failure to be proactive.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the Crown is not responsible for defence counsel's failings, but ultimately dismissed the appeal because the delay was unconscionable and prejudice could be inferred.

The appellant appealed his convictions for unauthorized possession of a firearm, careless handling of a firearm, and failure to comply with a recognizance.

During the execution of a search warrant at his residence, police observed a firearm being thrown out the window into an adjacent yard.

The trial judge declined to determine the validity of the search warrant, finding instead that the appellant had abandoned the firearm and had no reasonable expectation of privacy in it.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing that because the firearm was abandoned, section 8 of the Charter was not engaged, and the trial judge was not required to determine the legality of the search.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and assault with a weapon against his former wife.

Mid-trial, it was discovered that defence counsel had previously consulted with the complainant about the incidents.

After receiving independent legal advice, the appellant waived the conflict and requested the trial continue.

The trial judge allowed the trial to proceed and later dismissed a post-conviction mistrial application.

The appellant appealed his convictions and his five-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's handling of the conflict of interest, as the appellant made an informed waiver and suffered no prejudice.

The court also upheld the sentence, declining to reduce it to avoid immigration consequences.

The appellant appealed from his conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle and concluding that the sentence was within the fit range given the trial judge's finding of a pattern of ongoing misconduct.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent, arguing it was manifestly inadequate given the nature of the offences and the respondent's record for violence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the sentence was extremely lenient, the trial judge had the benefit of a compelling Gladue report and was entitled to give considerable weight to restorative justice principles.

The appellant appealed his convictions, arguing that the verdicts were unreasonable, that the trial judge erred in allowing cross-examination regarding another file involving abuse allegations, and that he suffered prejudice because the complainant's doctor did not testify.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the verdicts were reasonable and well-founded, the trial judge properly assessed credibility, the cross-examination issue was first raised by the defence and not relied upon by the trial judge, and the defence had waived the need for the doctor's testimony.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of a police officer charged with breach of trust for allegedly providing confidential police documents to a criminal organization.

The trial judge had acquitted the accused, finding a reasonable doubt based on the accused's explanations for his cellphone contact with a gang member's spouse and the possibility of third-party theft of the documents.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge erred in law by assessing the evidence in a piecemeal fashion rather than considering the totality of the evidence, and by failing to account for key evidence that undermined the defence's theory.

The respondents were convicted of second degree murder after shooting the victim, who died a month later from a blood clot.

The victim had ingested cocaine shortly before death, raising a causation issue.

The trial judge failed to instruct the jury on the included offence of attempted murder.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that this was an error of law and declined to apply the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, as the error could not be confidently dismissed as harmless.

The Crown's appeal was dismissed, upholding the Court of Appeal's order for a new trial.

The Crown appealed a directed verdict of acquittal on a charge of first degree murder.

The trial judge had refused to admit an agreed statement of facts from a youth's guilty plea for the truth of its contents after the youth recanted portions implicating the respondent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in concluding the opportunity to cross-examine the youth was illusory due to solicitor-client privilege and in failing to properly assess circumstantial indications of the statement's reliability.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery, attempted murder, and firearm offences arising from a shootout with police.

At trial, he advanced an alibi defence that was not disclosed prior to his testimony.

He argued on appeal that the trial judge erred in her jury instructions regarding the late disclosure of his alibi, the failure to call his mother as an alibi witness, and the lack of an unsavory witness caution for a key Crown witness.

He also alleged ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to serve a notice of alibi.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's instructions and concluding that defence counsel's decision not to serve a notice of alibi was a competent tactical choice.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, assault, forcible confinement, and uttering threats against his common law partner, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal found that trial counsel failed to properly execute an effective cross-examination, failed to cross-examine the complainant on prior inconsistent statements, and effectively abandoned the defence in closing submissions.

Concluding that these failures undermined the reliability of the verdict and the appearance of a fair trial, the Court allowed the appeal, quashed the convictions, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder for the death of his friend, and acquitted of second degree murder for the death of his estranged wife in a separate trial.

He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in instructions regarding intoxication, propensity evidence, Vetrovec warnings, and an 'honest witness' presumption.

The Crown appealed the acquittal, arguing the trial judge erred in excluding evidence of the friend's subsequent murder as after-the-fact conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding the jury instructions in the first trial were adequate overall despite minor errors, and the trial judge in the second trial made no reversible error in balancing the probative value and prejudicial effect of the excluded evidence.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder for the death of his friend, and acquitted of second degree murder for the death of his estranged wife in a separate trial.

He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in instructions regarding intoxication, propensity evidence, Vetrovec warnings, and an 'honest witness' presumption.

The Crown appealed the acquittal, arguing the trial judge erred in excluding evidence of the friend's subsequent murder as after-the-fact conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding the jury instructions in the first trial were adequate overall despite minor errors, and the trial judge in the second trial made no reversible error in balancing the probative value and prejudicial effect of the excluded evidence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and uttering threats against his ex-wife.

The trial judge had convicted the appellant based primarily on credibility findings, rejecting the appellant's testimony.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by relying on inappropriate considerations to assess the appellant's credibility, including the conduct of defense counsel, evidence from a voir dire that was not part of the trial record, and the appellant's proficiency in French.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellants appealed their convictions for second degree murder, and one appellant appealed his sentence.

The victim was killed by a group of assailants who mistakenly believed he was their intended target.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's instructions on reasonable doubt, the right to disagree, mistaken identity, or the defence of abandonment.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, upholding the 17-year parole ineligibility period due to the brutal nature of the murder.

The appellants were convicted of second degree murder after the victim, whom they had shot, died a month later from a pulmonary embolism.

At trial, the defence argued that the embolism was caused by the victim's ingestion of cocaine shortly before his death, not the gunshot wounds.

The trial judge instructed the jury to acquit if they had a reasonable doubt about causation, declining to leave attempted murder as a possible verdict.

The Court of Appeal held that section 660 of the Criminal Code applies to murder charges, meaning attempted murder is an available verdict if the full offence is not proved.

The majority concluded that the failure to instruct the jury on attempted murder was a reversible error and declined to apply the curative proviso, ordering a new trial.