John Collins

Ertug Direk pleaded guilty to dangerous driving causing death and fail to stop at the scene of an accident causing death.

The court considered a joint submission of 4.5 years imprisonment.

Aggravating factors included the high speed, the offender's extensive criminal and driving record (including prior dangerous driving convictions), and the moral blameworthiness of fleeing the scene.

Mitigating factors included the guilty plea and surrender to police.

The court also considered harsh pre-sentence custody conditions and restrictive bail conditions for credit.

The judge accepted the joint submission for imprisonment but imposed a longer driving prohibition than sought by the defence.

The defendant was found guilty of two counts of possession of controlled substances (cocaine and fentanyl) for the purpose of trafficking and one count of possessing proceeds of crime.

The Crown sought a sentence of 6 years, while the defence sought 3 years.

The court weighed the significant aggravating factors of trafficking highly toxic fentanyl in a public area while accompanied by a child against the mitigating factors of the defendant's good prospects for rehabilitation and lack of a serious related criminal record.

The court sentenced the defendant to a total of 5 years in prison.

The accused was charged with drug trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime after police responded to a 911 call about a man with a firearm.

Upon arriving at the scene, police observed the accused briefly interacting with the firearm suspect and placed the accused under investigative detention, which quickly escalated to an arrest on the order of another officer.

A pat-down search of the accused's satchel revealed cocaine and marijuana.

At trial, the accused argued his Charter rights under ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) were violated.

The court found that while the initial investigative detention was lawful, the subsequent arrest lacked reasonable grounds, rendering the arrest and search unlawful, and there was a minor delay in providing the right to counsel.

However, applying the Grant framework, the court concluded the breaches were not serious, had limited impact, and society's interest favoured adjudication on the merits, thus dismissing the application to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2).

The accused was charged with two bank robberies, disguise with intent, and assault resist arrest.

The Crown relied on video surveillance and a statement made by the accused upon arrest.

The court excluded the statement under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding a systemic breach of the accused's s. 10(b) right to counsel when police asked if he had anything to say immediately after he requested a lawyer.

On the robbery charges, the court found the video evidence insufficient to prove identity beyond a reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused.

However, the court found the accused guilty of assault resist arrest for struggling and striking an officer during his lawful arrest.

The appellant sought judicial review of the Minister's decision ordering his unconditional surrender to the requesting state, arguing that a four-year delay between the arrest of his co-conspirators and the extradition request constituted an abuse of process.

The Minister concluded the delay was adequately explained by the requesting state and did not offend notions of fair play.

The Court of Appeal held that the Minister was entitled to accept the requesting state's representations and found her decision reasonable.

The appeal from the committal order was abandoned and dismissed, and the application for judicial review was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for dangerous driving causing bodily harm and failing to stop at the scene of an accident, as well as a stayed charge of criminal negligence causing bodily harm.

The charges arose from the appellant's deliberate use of his vehicle to dislodge a person hanging from the passenger side door.

The Court of Appeal upheld all convictions, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of witness credibility, his inferences regarding vehicle speed and the appellant's knowledge of running over the victim, or his rejection of necessity and self-defence arguments.

The court also upheld the sentencing decision regarding the driving suspension.

The three accused were charged with aggravated assault and assault with a weapon following an altercation outside a bar.

The victim had spilled beer on one of the accused, who then followed the victim outside and struck him over the head with a beer bottle.

The Crown alleged a second accused struck the victim with a glass, and the third accused facilitated the assault by confronting the victim.

Relying on surveillance footage and witness testimony, the court found the first accused guilty of all charges.

However, the court found the evidence insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the second accused struck the victim, and found the third accused lacked the requisite intent to be a party to the offence.

The second and third accused were acquitted.

The appellant was convicted of arson after setting fire to his neighbour's truck.

The primary evidence was a low-quality surveillance video, from which the neighbour identified the appellant based on distinctive features and movements.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing the video evidence, the neighbour's credibility, and the appellant's police statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly relied on the recognition evidence, supported by his own observations of the video, and made reasonable credibility findings.

The accused were tried for offences arising from a home invasion armed robbery where the victim was shot.

The Crown alleged one accused was one of the three armed robbers and another was the getaway driver.

The court found the first accused guilty of armed robbery, aggravated assault, and firearms offences based on circumstantial DNA and cell phone evidence, but acquitted him of attempted murder.

The getaway driver was acquitted of being an accessory after the fact and failing to remain at the scene of an accident, as his evidence raised a reasonable doubt regarding his intent and knowledge, but he was convicted of dangerous driving for turning his vehicle into the path of a bus.

The appellant pled guilty to impaired driving causing death and was sentenced to three years' imprisonment and a ten-year driving prohibition.

He appealed only the length of the driving prohibition.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by adopting the Crown's recommendation for a ten-year prohibition without providing reasons or considering its appropriateness.

Given the appellant's youth, lack of prior record, deep remorse, rehabilitation efforts, and employment needs, the Court allowed the appeal and reduced the driving prohibition to five years.

The offender was convicted of counselling a murder after attempting to hire an undercover police officer to kill her husband.

The sentencing court considered principles of denunciation and deterrence applicable to murder-for-hire schemes, noting that such conduct is treated similarly to attempted murder for sentencing purposes.

The offender had no criminal record and had a difficult personal history involving early arranged marriage, illiteracy, and cultural subjugation, which the court treated as mitigating factors.

However, the offence was deliberate, planned, and involved prior attempts to hire others to commit the killing, which were aggravating factors.

After reviewing comparable authorities and the applicable sentencing range of approximately three to eight years, the court imposed a sentence of three and one-half years’ imprisonment.

The Crown appealed a conditional sentence of two years less a day imposed on the respondent for historical sexual offences against his foster daughter.

The offences occurred over 35 years prior, resulting in the complainant's pregnancy at age 15.

The Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge made several errors in principle, including improperly relying on an unproven finding about when the respondent learned of the pregnancy, misapplying the framework for conditional sentences, and inappropriately treating health issues and social stigma as mitigating factors.

The Court held the sentence was manifestly unfit given the profound breach of trust and the need for denunciation and general deterrence.

The appeal was allowed and a three-year custodial sentence was imposed, with one year of credit given for time served under the conditional sentence.

The accused was charged with hiring someone to commit murder.

The intended target was her husband, and the hit man she hired was an undercover police officer.

The court found the undercover officer's evidence credible and reliable, despite the lack of an audio recording of their conversations.

The accused provided the officer with details about her husband, a photograph, and a deposit.

The court found the accused guilty of the crime charged.

The accused pleaded guilty to historical offences of having sexual intercourse with his 15-year-old foster daughter in 1978, resulting in a pregnancy.

The Crown sought a penitentiary sentence of 2 to 2.5 years, while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court considered the accused's guilty plea, deep remorse, lack of criminal record, and good character over the intervening 35 years.

Finding this to be a rare case where a conditional sentence would adequately address denunciation and deterrence, the court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day, followed by three years of probation.

After being found guilty of multiple counts of possession of narcotics for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime, the accused applied for a stay of proceedings on the basis of entrapment.

The court considered the entrapment framework from R. v. Mack and subsequent appellate authority, including R. v. Imoro, which distinguishes between legitimate investigative steps and providing an opportunity to commit an offence without reasonable suspicion.

The court held that the officer’s initial question during a phone call did not provide an opportunity to commit a crime but was merely an investigative step.

Reasonable suspicion crystallized when the accused willingly engaged in drug-related conversation using recognized slang for cocaine quantities.

The subsequent offences were independently committed by the accused and were not the product of police inducement.

The accused was charged with impaired care or control of a motor vehicle and driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

The Crown alleged that on May 9, 2010, the accused was found in a parked vehicle with the engine running in a parking lot near a licensed establishment.

A police sergeant observed signs of impairment and made an approved instrument demand.

The accused challenged the lawfulness of the arrest and the admissibility of the breath samples on Charter grounds, alleging violations of sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b).

The court found no Charter breaches and admitted the breath samples.

However, the court found reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest but insufficient evidence to prove impairment beyond a reasonable doubt, resulting in acquittal on the impaired charge but conviction on the over 80 charge.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and assault with a weapon against his former wife.

Mid-trial, it was discovered that defence counsel had previously consulted with the complainant about the incidents.

After receiving independent legal advice, the appellant waived the conflict and requested the trial continue.

The trial judge allowed the trial to proceed and later dismissed a post-conviction mistrial application.

The appellant appealed his convictions and his five-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's handling of the conflict of interest, as the appellant made an informed waiver and suffered no prejudice.

The court also upheld the sentence, declining to reduce it to avoid immigration consequences.

During a second trial for drug trafficking, the accused challenged the admissibility of 255 kilograms of cocaine found in his tractor-trailer and certain utterances he made to police.

The court found that the search of the trailer was a warrantless search for criminal evidence, not a valid regulatory inspection under the Highway Traffic Act, and thus violated s. 8 of the Charter.

However, applying the Grant framework, the court admitted the cocaine, finding the police acted in good faith, the accused had minimal privacy interest in the trailer, and society had a high interest in adjudicating the serious charge.

The court also ruled the accused's utterances were voluntary and admissible.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction, arguing that the trial judge failed to consider evidence corroborating his claim that he could not communicate in English.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge expressly referred to the evidence but accepted the police officers' evidence as equally credible, concluding the appellant had not met his burden.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on a charge of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The trial judge had excluded the evidence of 205 kg of cocaine found in the accused's tractor-trailer, finding a breach of s. 8 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge erred by placing the onus on the Crown under s. 24(2), by finding that a concurrent criminal law purpose invalidated a regulatory search under the Highway Traffic Act, and by failing to meaningfully balance the Grant factors.