Aston J. Hall

A young person, age 15 at the time of the offence, pleaded guilty to robbery and aggravated assault arising from a home invasion on June 25, 2015.

The accused was part of a group of six individuals (including two adults) who invaded a residence in east Toronto armed with two handguns and a crowbar.

While the accused did not directly inflict violence, he participated in the criminal enterprise.

One victim was shot twice in the abdomen and pelvis, sustaining serious injuries including permanent nerve damage.

The court imposed a sentence of 15 months custody (3 months 25 days closed, 4 months open, 4 months community supervision) followed by 12 months probation, with credit for 18 months of restrictive bail conditions and 3 days pre-trial custody.

A DNA order and 10-year weapons prohibition were also imposed.

At a preliminary inquiry, the accused bus driver was charged with dangerous driving causing death and failing to stop after an accident with intent to escape civil or criminal liability, following the death of a 14-year-old passenger struck by his bus at the intersection of Finch Avenue East and Neilson Road in Toronto on December 19, 2014.

The Crown sought committal to trial.

The court found that the evidence did not establish a marked departure from the standard of care required for dangerous driving, and there was no evidence the accused was aware of the accident.

The accused was discharged and not committed to trial.

The accused brought a section 276 application seeking permission to cross-examine the complainant regarding her prior sexual history, specifically allegations of sexual assault by a third party ("Uncle M.") disclosed in a videotaped police statement.

The accused argued that evidence of the complainant's prior sexual history was relevant to the issue of identity, contending that the complainant may have confused or transferred the conduct of Uncle M. to the accused.

The Crown opposed the application, arguing that the strictures of section 276 precluded such cross-examination.

The court denied the application, finding that while the evidence did not engage the "twin myths," the allegations were sufficiently distinct in time, location, and nature that identity was not a real issue at trial, and therefore the evidence lacked the requisite relevance under section 276(2)(b).

The accused was convicted of two counts of assault, one count of threatening death, and one count of assault causing bodily harm arising from domestic violence incidents against his former wife.

The Crown sought a 90-day custodial sentence to be served intermittently, while the defence sought a suspended sentence or, alternatively, a conditional sentence of 3-4 months.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of four months to be served in the community, followed by 12 months of probation, finding that while a custodial sentence was appropriate given the domestic violence context, the accused's lack of criminal record, successful completion of anger management programming, and lengthy bail period with curfew conditions without breach supported a conditional sentence that could satisfy principles of denunciation and deterrence.

The accused pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated assault after attacking his mother by pouring boiling water on her face and chest while she slept.

The offender had been in custody since October 17, 2013.

The court imposed a sentence of 3½ years (42 months) with enhanced credit of 1.5:1 for 20 months of pretrial custody, resulting in an additional 12 months to be served.

The sentence was followed by two years of probation with conditions including no contact with the victim, no weapons, and a 10-year weapons prohibition order.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence while considering the offender's youth, mental health challenges, and rehabilitative potential.

The accused was charged with over 80 care or control and impaired care or control.

Police arrested the accused for possession of stolen property and subsequently made a breathalyzer demand based on observations of an odour of alcohol and allegedly slurred speech.

The defence brought a Charter application to exclude the breath sample results, arguing the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds for the demand.

The court found that the observations of alcohol odour and slurred speech were insufficient to establish reasonable and probable grounds for arrest and the breathalyzer demand, constituting a section 8 Charter breach.

Applying the Grant analysis, the court excluded the breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding the seriousness of the breach and deprivation of liberty outweighed society's interest in adjudicating the case on its merits.

The accused was charged with assault arising from an incident in the holding cells at Scarborough courthouse.

The Crown's case relied entirely on surveillance video footage showing the accused and a co-accused striking and kicking the complainant.

The accused claimed self-defence, testifying that the complainant was armed with a shank and had threatened him.

The court reviewed the surveillance video and found it was of sufficient quality to clearly show the complainant's hands were empty and he possessed no weapon.

The court rejected the accused's credibility and found no basis for a self-defence claim.

The accused was convicted of assault.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood following a R.I.D.E. stop.

The Crown relied on breathalyzer readings of 150 mg and 140 mg respectively.

The defence challenged both charges: first, arguing insufficient evidence of impairment, and second, arguing the breath samples were not taken as soon as practicable because the police officer contacted duty counsel after the accused had clearly and unequivocally waived her right to counsel, causing an 18-minute delay.

The court found the Crown had not proven impairment beyond a reasonable doubt and that the delay in administering breath tests was unreasonable and unexplained, rendering the presumption of identity unavailable to the Crown.

The accused pleaded guilty to dangerous operation of a motor vehicle.

On December 10, 2012, the accused was driving a 2000 Honda Civic at speeds between 84 and 122 km/h in a 60 km/h zone on Brimley Road in Toronto when he lost control, struck a tree, and injured two passengers.

The Crown sought a suspended sentence with probation and driving prohibition.

The defence sought a conditional discharge.

The court found that while a conditional discharge would be in the accused's best interests, it would not be in the public interest given the accused's prior speeding convictions, the injuries sustained, and the need for deterrence in dangerous driving cases.

A young person was convicted of multiple offences arising from a home invasion style robbery committed on August 8, 2011.

The offences included unlawfully being in a dwelling, aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, forcible confinement, threatening death, and robbery while armed with a firearm.

The Crown applied to designate the offences as serious violent offences under section 42(9) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The court found that the young person facilitated entrance into the victims' apartment and was a party to the offences, though he did not directly participate in the physical violence.

The victims suffered substantial physical and psychological harm, including one victim having his thumb and toe severed.

The court granted the Crown's application for serious violent offence designation and imposed a custodial sentence.

The accused was charged with multiple firearm-related offences following a search of his apartment.

The defence challenged the validity of the search warrant, arguing that the Information to Obtain (ITO) was insufficient to justify issuance.

The Crown conceded that the redacted ITO did not disclose reasonable and probable grounds but argued the warrant was valid based on unredacted information protected to preserve confidential informant identity.

The court applied the Garofoli Step 6 procedure, excised erroneous information from the ITO regarding the accused's alleged involvement in drug trafficking, and determined that the remaining information—comprising credible and detailed information from a reliable confidential informant—provided sufficient grounds for the warrant's issuance.

The Charter motion was dismissed.

The accused was charged with impaired care or control of a motor vehicle and driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

The Crown alleged that on May 9, 2010, the accused was found in a parked vehicle with the engine running in a parking lot near a licensed establishment.

A police sergeant observed signs of impairment and made an approved instrument demand.

The accused challenged the lawfulness of the arrest and the admissibility of the breath samples on Charter grounds, alleging violations of sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b).

The court found no Charter breaches and admitted the breath samples.

However, the court found reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest but insufficient evidence to prove impairment beyond a reasonable doubt, resulting in acquittal on the impaired charge but conviction on the over 80 charge.

The accused pleaded guilty to one count of break and enter with intent to commit theft and one count of robbery.

The offences occurred on March 28, 2011, when the accused and three accomplices broke into two residential apartments in Toronto.

In the first incident, they stole electronic equipment.

In the second incident, they forcibly entered an occupied apartment, assaulted the occupants with a knife, and stole cash, electronics, jewelry, and other valuables.

The Crown sought a five-year penitentiary sentence, while the defence sought twenty months.

The court imposed a sentence of twenty months for the robbery and ten months concurrent for the break and enter, taking into account the accused's youth, difficult background, rehabilitation potential, and the seriousness of home invasion offences.

The accused brought an application to stay the proceeding pursuant to Section 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms for an alleged breach of the right to trial within a reasonable time under Section 11(b) of the Charter.

The charge was laid on October 26, 2010, and the trial date was set for March 28, 2012, representing a delay of approximately 17 months.

The court analyzed the delay using the framework established in R. v. Morin, considering the length of delay, waiver, reasons for delay, and prejudice.

The court found that the operative delay was 8 months (6 months institutional delay plus 2 months Crown delay), which fell within the acceptable guideline of 8-10 months.

The application was dismissed.

The accused pleaded guilty to robbery, wearing a disguise with intent, and failing to comply with probation.

On November 1, 2011, the accused and a co-accused robbed a pharmacy of narcotics valued at approximately $14,329.

The co-accused was armed with a knife while the accused herded employees.

Both wore disguises and escaped in a stolen vehicle.

The accused was arrested at the co-accused's residence where police found the disguises and stolen narcotics.

The accused admitted involvement during police investigation.

The court imposed a sentence of 20 months for robbery, 15 months concurrent for wearing a disguise with intent, and 5 months for failing to comply, less pre-trial custody, followed by two years probation with conditions including substance abuse counseling, a lifetime firearms prohibition under section 109, and a DNA order.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with over 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown sought to rely on the statutory presumption under section 258(1)(c)(ii) of the Criminal Code, which permits the Crown to avoid calling expert evidence if breath samples are taken "as soon as practicable" after the alleged offense.

The trial judge found that there was an unexplained delay of approximately 36 minutes between the accused's arrival at the police station and the administration of the first breath test.

The Crown failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for this delay.

Consequently, the Crown could not rely on the statutory presumption and the charge was dismissed.