Matthew James Bertram Shumka

The accused, a dermatologist, was charged with sexual assault in relation to five patients who alleged he intentionally touched them in a sexual manner during medical examinations.

The Crown brought a similar fact application to admit the evidence of each complainant across all counts, which the court allowed.

However, applying the W.(D.) framework and assessing the circumstantial evidence, the court found the complainants' evidence unreliable due to inconsistencies and the possibility of tainting from media reports.

The court concluded there was a reasonable possibility that the physical contact was inadvertent and incidental to the close-proximity medical examinations.

The accused was found not guilty.

Sentencing decision following convictions for two counts of incest and one count of sexual assault arising from repeated sibling sexual abuse, including conduct when the complainant was under 16.

The offender, though chronologically an adult, had accepted expert evidence establishing an intellectual disability and cognitive functioning equivalent to a child between 9 and 12, which materially reduced moral blameworthiness and made penitentiary custody uniquely harsh.

The court held that the Supreme Court’s decision in I.M. did not require prosecution or sentencing under the YCJA, but did require the offender’s developmental limitations to be fully reflected in proportional sentencing under the Criminal Code.

Applying the modern s. 12 framework from Hills and Senneville, the court found the five-year mandatory minimum in s. 155(2) for incest with a complainant under 16 grossly disproportionate both as applied and in a reasonably foreseeable scenario, declared it of no force and effect, and imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day followed by three years’ probation.

The accused was charged with second-degree murder after shooting the deceased in the head following a confrontation at a gas station and a subsequent car chase.

The dispute originated from the deceased's rap lyrics disrespecting the accused's deceased friends.

The accused admitted to manslaughter but denied intent to kill, claiming the gun was fired accidentally as a warning and raising the partial defence of provocation.

The court rejected the accused's evidence, finding the shooting was intentional and that the elements of provocation were not met.

The accused was convicted of second-degree murder.

The applicant, an adult charged with incest and sexual assault, brought a constitutional challenge arguing that his intellectual disability gave him a mental age of 9 to 12, and therefore he should be entitled to the protections of the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA).

The court held that the YCJA unambiguously applies based on chronological age, not mental age.

The court dismissed the Charter challenges, finding that while the YCJA excludes the applicant based on age, it is protected as an ameliorative program under s. 15(2) of the Charter.

The court also found no violation of s. 7, noting that the adult criminal justice system must accommodate the applicant's disability to ensure his procedural rights are protected.

The court sentenced Pal Pintyi for manslaughter in the death of his brother-in-law, Robert Racz.

The trial judge considered the turbulent relationship between the men, the history of threats and violence, and the provocation by the deceased.

The Crown sought eight years’ imprisonment; the defence sought five.

The court imposed a sentence of five years plus one day (time served), taking into account harsh pre-sentence custody conditions, provocation, and mitigating factors such as Pintyi’s background, remorse, and prospects for rehabilitation.

Ancillary orders included a lifetime weapons prohibition and a DNA order.

The court found Pal Pintyi guilty of manslaughter, not murder, in the death of his brother-in-law, Robert Racz.

The decision turned on whether the Crown had proven the intent required for murder beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court accepted that Pintyi acted out of fear and anger after years of abuse and threats from Racz, culminating in a confrontation where Pintyi struck Racz with a steel pipe and kicked him.

The evidence did not establish the necessary intent for murder, and the court found a reasonable inference that Pintyi acted impulsively in response to provocation.

The partial defence of provocation was not considered necessary, as the intent for murder was not proven.

This decision provides the full reasons for the sentencing of Alexander Raybe, who pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of a loaded prohibited firearm stemming from separate incidents in August and November 2021, both involving the discharge of a firearm in residential areas.

The court imposed a global sentence of 7 years in the penitentiary, less pre-sentence custody, with consecutive sentences for each offence.

The judge considered aggravating factors such as the discharge of firearms and the dangerous nature of the incidents, and mitigating factors including the guilty plea, the offender's youth, lack of prior record, difficult upbringing, and experience with systemic racism.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence as primary sentencing principles for firearms offences, while also applying the principles of totality and restraint.

Ancillary orders included a 10-year and a life firearms prohibition, and a DNA order.

The accused, Norbert Budai, was charged with first-degree murder in the death of his estranged wife, Henrietta Viski, who died after being doused with gasoline and set on fire.

Budai pleaded not guilty to first-degree murder but guilty to second-degree murder, which the Crown did not accept.

The court, sitting without a jury, found that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder was planned and deliberate, rejecting the defence's argument that Budai's consumption of alcohol and fentanyl limited his capacity to plan and deliberate.

Budai was found guilty of first-degree murder.

Moses Water breached his conditional sentence order (CSO) by violating house arrest, failing to carry his order, and assaulting someone.

The court found the breaches serious and wilful.

Despite 72 days already spent in custody due to the suspension of his CSO, the court determined this was insufficient.

Applying the principles of sentencing and the breach regime under the Criminal Code, the court ordered an additional 90 days in custody, followed by a modified conditional sentence with extended house arrest and curfew periods, emphasizing deterrence and rehabilitation.

Judge-alone first degree murder trial arising from an execution-style shooting captured on surveillance video.

The Crown relied on circumstantial identification evidence including post-offence vehicle tracking, cellphone location records, recognition evidence from a probation officer, and items seized under warrant from one accused's residence.

The court admitted the recognition evidence under the prior acquaintance/better position test, upheld the search warrant, and rejected defence photogrammetry evidence as unreliable despite admitting it.

The alternate suspect theory was also rejected.

Both accused were found guilty of first degree murder.

The applicant sought to exclude evidence (a loaded handgun and drugs) found in a hidden compartment of a vehicle during a search, arguing that the search warrant lacked reasonable grounds for weapons and that the search continued after the warrant's expiration.

The court found that while the search warrant did not establish reasonable grounds to search for weapons, thus breaching the applicant's section 8 Charter rights regarding the "gun dog" search, the search itself was not unauthorized by law due to its duration, applying the principle that a search commenced within the warrant's timeframe can continue until completion.

Applying the Grant test under section 24(2) of the Charter, the court determined that despite the Charter breach, the evidence should be admitted.

The court reasoned that the state conduct was at the less serious end of the spectrum, the impact on the applicant's privacy was attenuated by other valid search grounds, and society's interest in adjudicating serious charges outweighed the breach.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a charge of operating a conveyance with a blood alcohol concentration equal to or exceeding 80 mg.

The trial judge had acquitted the respondent on the basis that a 'deficient sample' registered by the approved instrument constituted a 'sample' under s. 320.31(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, thereby requiring a new system calibration check before the next sample.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court allowed the appeal, holding that a deficient sample is not a 'sample' within the meaning of the provision and that there is no implied requirement for a calibration check immediately before each sample.

The court also rejected the respondent's argument that the certificate of qualified technician was inadmissible hearsay, finding itself bound by horizontal stare decisis.

A new trial was ordered.

The applicant, Dontay Williams, brought Charter applications under sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, seeking a stay of proceedings or exclusion of evidence.

He alleged unlawful detention and arrest without reasonable grounds, insufficient grounds for a search warrant, an unreasonable strip search, and unreasonable delay in accessing counsel.

The court dismissed all Charter applications, finding that the police had reasonable grounds for arrest, the search warrant was valid despite a technical error in its execution timeframe, the strip search was justified and conducted reasonably, and the delay in accessing counsel was reasonable given the circumstances.

This is an appeal by Amadin Asemota from his conviction for assault causing bodily harm and assault with a weapon.

The appellant alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel, citing various failures including inadequate disclosure review, failure to pursue Charter violations (stolen chain, strip search), improper advice on immigration consequences, breach of the Browne v. Dunn rule, and failure to locate witnesses.

The court found that the appellant failed to establish the factual basis for most of his claims and that trial counsel's conduct did not amount to incompetence.

The court emphasized the deference owed to counsel's strategic decisions, especially given the appellant's uncooperative behaviour and late disclosure of information.

The appeal was dismissed, and the conviction was upheld as safe.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for assault arising from an altercation on a public transit bus.

The appellant claimed he was making a citizen's arrest after the complainant inadvertently bumped him with her knapsack.

The trial judge rejected this defence, finding the appellant used grossly excessive force and had no reasonable grounds for an arrest.

On appeal, the appellant raised new arguments, including Charter violations and claims that the complainant committed mischief, and sought to introduce fresh evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's findings of fact or sentence, and dismissed the motions to admit fresh evidence.

The appellant pleaded guilty to assault, being unlawfully in a dwelling house, and criminal harassment against his former intimate partner.

He was given a suspended sentence and 18 months of probation.

He appealed, seeking a conditional discharge and a reduction of the probation term to 12 months, which was the Crown's position at trial.

The Superior Court of Justice upheld the suspended sentence, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the proportionality principle.

However, the court reduced the probation term to 12 months, holding that the trial judge erred by imposing a longer term than the Crown requested without giving the parties notice and an opportunity to make submissions.

The appellant appealed her conviction for operating a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol, challenging the trial judge's decision to admit breath test evidence under s.24(2) of the Charter and the admissibility of a qualified technician's certificate.

The appellant argued errors in assessing the seriousness and impact of Charter breaches (s.8, 9, 10(b), and a newly raised s.10(a) issue) and in balancing the factors for exclusion.

She also argued that the certificate contained inadmissible hearsay regarding the alcohol standard solution.

The court dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's s.24(2) analysis, finding no error in the assessment of the seriousness or impact of the breaches, nor in the balancing of factors.

The court refused to allow the appellant to raise the s.10(a) and hearsay issues for the first time on appeal, citing an insufficient evidentiary record, presumed tactical omission, and no resulting miscarriage of justice.

The applicant, currently on trial for sexual assault in the Ontario Court of Justice, sought an order of certiorari to quash the trial judge's dismissal of his mistrial application and an order of mandamus to permit him to re-elect a jury trial.

The mistrial application was based on the late disclosure of a police occurrence report.

The Crown moved to summarily dismiss the application, arguing it constituted an impermissible interlocutory appeal.

The Superior Court agreed with the Crown, finding that the trial judge's decision regarding the disclosure regime and the mistrial was within her jurisdiction, and therefore certiorari was unavailable.

The application was summarily dismissed.

The applicant sought bail pending his summary conviction appeal after being convicted of unlawfully entering a dwelling house, theft, possession of property obtained by crime, and threatening death.

The Crown conceded that the applicant would surrender into custody and that his detention was not required in the public interest, but argued the appeal was frivolous.

The court found that the applicant's proposed fresh evidence regarding his extreme intoxication on the day of the offences raised an arguable ground of appeal concerning his capacity to form specific intent.

The application for bail pending appeal was granted.

The appellant, an Uber driver, appealed his conviction for sexual assault of a passenger, arguing the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny and misapprehended evidence.

The Crown cross-appealed the 60-day conditional sentence, arguing it was demonstrably unfit given the breach of trust.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error or material misapprehension of evidence.

The Court allowed the Crown's sentence appeal, finding the trial judge erred in principle and imposed a demonstrably unfit sentence that failed to reflect the serious breach of trust by a professional driver.

The sentence was increased to six months' imprisonment.