Matthew James Bertram Shumka

The court sentenced Pal Pintyi for manslaughter in the death of his brother-in-law, Robert Racz.

The trial judge considered the turbulent relationship between the men, the history of threats and violence, and the provocation by the deceased.

The Crown sought eight years’ imprisonment; the defence sought five.

The court imposed a sentence of five years plus one day (time served), taking into account harsh pre-sentence custody conditions, provocation, and mitigating factors such as Pintyi’s background, remorse, and prospects for rehabilitation.

Ancillary orders included a lifetime weapons prohibition and a DNA order.

The court found Pal Pintyi guilty of manslaughter, not murder, in the death of his brother-in-law, Robert Racz.

The decision turned on whether the Crown had proven the intent required for murder beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court accepted that Pintyi acted out of fear and anger after years of abuse and threats from Racz, culminating in a confrontation where Pintyi struck Racz with a steel pipe and kicked him.

The evidence did not establish the necessary intent for murder, and the court found a reasonable inference that Pintyi acted impulsively in response to provocation.

The partial defence of provocation was not considered necessary, as the intent for murder was not proven.

This decision provides the full reasons for the sentencing of Alexander Raybe, who pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of a loaded prohibited firearm stemming from separate incidents in August and November 2021, both involving the discharge of a firearm in residential areas.

The court imposed a global sentence of 7 years in the penitentiary, less pre-sentence custody, with consecutive sentences for each offence.

The judge considered aggravating factors such as the discharge of firearms and the dangerous nature of the incidents, and mitigating factors including the guilty plea, the offender's youth, lack of prior record, difficult upbringing, and experience with systemic racism.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence as primary sentencing principles for firearms offences, while also applying the principles of totality and restraint.

Ancillary orders included a 10-year and a life firearms prohibition, and a DNA order.

The accused, Norbert Budai, was charged with first-degree murder in the death of his estranged wife, Henrietta Viski, who died after being doused with gasoline and set on fire.

Budai pleaded not guilty to first-degree murder but guilty to second-degree murder, which the Crown did not accept.

The court, sitting without a jury, found that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder was planned and deliberate, rejecting the defence's argument that Budai's consumption of alcohol and fentanyl limited his capacity to plan and deliberate.

Budai was found guilty of first-degree murder.

Moses Water breached his conditional sentence order (CSO) by violating house arrest, failing to carry his order, and assaulting someone.

The court found the breaches serious and wilful.

Despite 72 days already spent in custody due to the suspension of his CSO, the court determined this was insufficient.

Applying the principles of sentencing and the breach regime under the Criminal Code, the court ordered an additional 90 days in custody, followed by a modified conditional sentence with extended house arrest and curfew periods, emphasizing deterrence and rehabilitation.

The applicant sought to exclude evidence (a loaded handgun and drugs) found in a hidden compartment of a vehicle during a search, arguing that the search warrant lacked reasonable grounds for weapons and that the search continued after the warrant's expiration.

The court found that while the search warrant did not establish reasonable grounds to search for weapons, thus breaching the applicant's section 8 Charter rights regarding the "gun dog" search, the search itself was not unauthorized by law due to its duration, applying the principle that a search commenced within the warrant's timeframe can continue until completion.

Applying the Grant test under section 24(2) of the Charter, the court determined that despite the Charter breach, the evidence should be admitted.

The court reasoned that the state conduct was at the less serious end of the spectrum, the impact on the applicant's privacy was attenuated by other valid search grounds, and society's interest in adjudicating serious charges outweighed the breach.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The applicant, Dontay Williams, brought Charter applications under sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, seeking a stay of proceedings or exclusion of evidence.

He alleged unlawful detention and arrest without reasonable grounds, insufficient grounds for a search warrant, an unreasonable strip search, and unreasonable delay in accessing counsel.

The court dismissed all Charter applications, finding that the police had reasonable grounds for arrest, the search warrant was valid despite a technical error in its execution timeframe, the strip search was justified and conducted reasonably, and the delay in accessing counsel was reasonable given the circumstances.

This is an appeal by Amadin Asemota from his conviction for assault causing bodily harm and assault with a weapon.

The appellant alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel, citing various failures including inadequate disclosure review, failure to pursue Charter violations (stolen chain, strip search), improper advice on immigration consequences, breach of the Browne v. Dunn rule, and failure to locate witnesses.

The court found that the appellant failed to establish the factual basis for most of his claims and that trial counsel's conduct did not amount to incompetence.

The court emphasized the deference owed to counsel's strategic decisions, especially given the appellant's uncooperative behaviour and late disclosure of information.

The appeal was dismissed, and the conviction was upheld as safe.

The appellant appealed her conviction for operating a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol, challenging the trial judge's decision to admit breath test evidence under s.24(2) of the Charter and the admissibility of a qualified technician's certificate.

The appellant argued errors in assessing the seriousness and impact of Charter breaches (s.8, 9, 10(b), and a newly raised s.10(a) issue) and in balancing the factors for exclusion.

She also argued that the certificate contained inadmissible hearsay regarding the alcohol standard solution.

The court dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's s.24(2) analysis, finding no error in the assessment of the seriousness or impact of the breaches, nor in the balancing of factors.

The court refused to allow the appellant to raise the s.10(a) and hearsay issues for the first time on appeal, citing an insufficient evidentiary record, presumed tactical omission, and no resulting miscarriage of justice.

The accused pleaded guilty to multiple impaired driving and related offences occurring on two separate occasions: November 27, 2017 and September 15, 2018.

On the first occasion, the accused was observed driving erratically on Highway 401 with a blood alcohol concentration of 340 mg/100ml while subject to a lifetime driving prohibition.

On the second occasion, he was involved in a collision on Highway 401 with a blood alcohol concentration of 210-220 mg/100ml while on bail conditions.

The court imposed a global sentence of 24 months incarceration less pretrial custody, with consecutive sentences on the impaired driving charges and lifetime driving prohibitions.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired and driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood following a traffic stop.

The accused challenged the admissibility of breath sample test results, alleging breaches of Charter rights under sections 8 and 10(b), specifically regarding the timing of the roadside screening demand, the timing of breath samples, and the adequacy of rights to counsel advisement in a language he understood.

The court found that the roadside demand was made forthwith, the breath samples were taken as soon as practicable, and the police took reasonable steps to ensure the accused understood his rights to counsel in Mandarin.

The court admitted the evidence and found the accused guilty on both counts, with the impaired driving count stayed pursuant to the Kienapple principle.

The accused was charged with sexual assault of a minor cousin, invitation to sexual touching, and uttering threats.

The Crown's case relied primarily on the complainant's testimony regarding an alleged assault occurring between November 17-21, 2016.

The accused provided an alibi defence, testifying he was at a friend's residence during the entire specified period.

The critical issue became the date of the alleged offence.

The complainant's evidence, while credible on the substance of the allegations, established that any assault could not have occurred on the dates specified in the information.

The court found that although the date of an offence is generally not material, it became critical when the accused raised an alibi defence.

The Crown failed to prove the offence occurred within the timeframe alleged, and no amendment to the information was sought.

The charges were dismissed.

The accused was charged with Operation Impaired and Operation over 80 following an incident on September 28, 2016.

A civilian witness reported erratic driving to police.

The accused was stopped at his residence and arrested.

Breath tests conducted approximately 90 minutes after the incident showed readings of 135 mgs and 131 mgs.

The court found reasonable and probable grounds for arrest, determined that breath tests were taken as soon as practicable, and found the accused guilty on both counts based on the evidence of impaired driving and the breath test results exceeding the legal limit.

Jermaine Smith was tried without a jury on two counts of robbery, two counts of disguise with intent, and one count of failing to comply with a recognizance.

A statement given to police was ruled inadmissible.

The Crown relied on the doctrine of recent possession to identify Smith as one of the robbers, based on his girlfriend redeeming stolen lottery tickets given to her by Smith.

The court found Smith was in possession of the recently stolen tickets but deemed it unsafe to infer he was one of the robbers due to the easily transferable nature of the goods, lack of other corroborating evidence, and inconsistencies in witness descriptions.

Smith was found not guilty of the robbery and disguise charges but guilty of failing to comply with a recognizance, which he conceded.

The accused, Jermaine Smith, faced charges including robbery.

During his judge-alone trial, the Crown sought to admit a statement Smith gave to police.

The defence challenged its admissibility, arguing it was not voluntary due to an alleged inducement by Detective Stinson, who purportedly threatened to charge Smith's girlfriend and involve the Children's Aid Society if Smith did not confess.

The court found a reasonable doubt regarding the voluntariness of the statement, primarily due to the police's failure to audio or video record a critical "pre-interview" with Smith, despite recording facilities being available.

Consequently, the statement was ruled inadmissible.

The accused was charged with over 80 care or control and impaired care or control.

Police arrested the accused for possession of stolen property and subsequently made a breathalyzer demand based on observations of an odour of alcohol and allegedly slurred speech.

The defence brought a Charter application to exclude the breath sample results, arguing the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds for the demand.

The court found that the observations of alcohol odour and slurred speech were insufficient to establish reasonable and probable grounds for arrest and the breathalyzer demand, constituting a section 8 Charter breach.

Applying the Grant analysis, the court excluded the breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding the seriousness of the breach and deprivation of liberty outweighed society's interest in adjudicating the case on its merits.