Daniel Bradley Brown

The accused, a dermatologist, was charged with sexual assault in relation to five patients who alleged he intentionally touched them in a sexual manner during medical examinations.

The Crown brought a similar fact application to admit the evidence of each complainant across all counts, which the court allowed.

However, applying the W.(D.) framework and assessing the circumstantial evidence, the court found the complainants' evidence unreliable due to inconsistencies and the possibility of tainting from media reports.

The court concluded there was a reasonable possibility that the physical contact was inadvertent and incidental to the close-proximity medical examinations.

The accused was found not guilty.

This decision concerns the prosecution of five members of the 2018 Canadian World Junior Hockey Team for sexual assault.

The complainant, E.M., alleged that after consensual sexual activity with Michael McLeod, she was sexually assaulted by McLeod and his teammates in a London hotel room.

The accused maintained that E.M. was a willing and active participant.

The court found significant inconsistencies and reliability issues in the complainant’s evidence, including contradictions with video evidence and other witness testimony.

The court concluded that the Crown had not proven the absence of consent beyond a reasonable doubt for any of the accused and acquitted all five.

The judgment provides a detailed analysis of the law of consent, credibility, and the use of myths and stereotypes in sexual assault trials.

This decision addresses the Crown's application to admit a text message as hearsay evidence under the principled exception in a high-profile sexual assault prosecution.

The court reviews the necessity and reliability requirements for hearsay, ultimately finding that the reliability threshold is not met and dismissing the application.

The ruling provides a detailed application of the Supreme Court’s guidance in R. v. Bradshaw and R. v. Charles on the dangers of hearsay and the use of corroborative evidence.

The Crown sought to admit a text message sent by Brett Howden to Taylor Raddysh as past recollection recorded, an exception to the hearsay rule.

The court reviewed the requirements for admissibility, including reliability, timeliness, absence of memory, and the witness’s ability to vouch for the accuracy of the record.

The court found that while the first three requirements were met, Mr. Howden could not vouch for the accuracy of the text message, as he had no memory of sending it and could not confirm its truthfulness.

As a result, the application to admit the text message as past recollection recorded was denied.

This decision addresses a defence motion for a mistrial after a jury note alleged unprofessional conduct by defence counsel, raising concerns about jury impartiality.

The court reviews the legal principles governing mistrials, including the presumption of jury impartiality, the test for reasonable apprehension of bias, and the discretion to discharge jurors or declare a mistrial.

The court finds that the fairness of the trial has been compromised and grants the motion for a mistrial, emphasizing that such a remedy is reserved for the clearest of cases where no other remedy will suffice.

During jury selection for a second-degree murder trial, the accused requested the trial judge use the expanded stand-by power under s. 633 of the Criminal Code to ensure at least one Black juror was selected.

The Crown opposed the request.

The trial judge conducted a detailed analysis of the legislative history and conflicting jurisprudence regarding s. 633.

The court concluded that while s. 633 can be used to enhance jury diversity to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice, the specific grounds advanced by the defence—that a Black juror could help others understand cultural norms—did not constitute reasonable cause.

The request was denied.

This ruling addresses a constitutional challenge to the statutory scheme for introducing defence-held records in criminal trials, specifically under s. 278.92 of the Criminal Code.

The applicant, a young person charged with sexual assault, argued that the definition of "record" was overly broad and that the disclosure and complainant participation requirements violated their ss. 7 and 11(d) Charter rights.

The court dismissed the constitutional challenge, determining that electronic communications between the accused and complainant (unless containing s. 276(1) content) and material already disclosed by the Crown with complainant consent are not "records" for s. 278.92 purposes.

The court also clarified that the complainant's participatory rights at s. 278.94 hearings are limited to making submissions, without cross-examination or adducing evidence.

The accused, a Black man charged with second-degree murder, brought an application to challenge prospective jurors for cause based on anti-Black racism.

The court determined the specific anti-bias instructions and questions to be posed to the jury panel.

The court also ruled that, under the new legislative regime, the trial judge rather than defence counsel would ask the challenge for cause questions to preserve objective neutrality and underscore the court's commitment to an impartial jury.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and dangerous driving causing death following a motor vehicle collision.

This pre-trial motion addressed the admissibility of evidence obtained during the police investigation.

The court found multiple Charter violations including unlawful detention without rights advisement, compelled statements in violation of section 7 rights, unlawful arrest and breath demand, unlawful vehicle seizure without reasonable grounds, and unlawful seizure of blood samples and airbag data.

The court determined that the investigation was fundamentally flawed from its inception, with police taking investigative shortcuts that resulted in evidence being unlawfully obtained.

The court found that evidence obtained in violation of the Charter could not be relied upon to lawfully seize other evidence, rendering subsequent warranted seizures unlawful as well.

The applicants, John Jansen and Britaney Hall, sought a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay from charge to anticipated trial end was 39 months and 13 days, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling established by R. v. Jordan.

The court deducted defence-attributable delays, including Jansen's explicit waiver of 2.5 months and Hall's 6-month delay due to a certiorari application and changes in preliminary hearing instructions.

After accounting for discrete unexpected events, the net delay for Jansen was approximately 35 months and for Hall approximately 27.5 months.

The court found the case to be moderately complex and applied the Jordan transitional exception, concluding that the Crown's reliance on the previous R. v. Morin framework was reasonable.

Both applications for a stay of proceedings were dismissed.

The Crown brought an application for the forfeiture of a $50,000 recognizance against a surety after the accused absconded to Pakistan on the morning of his sentencing for sexual assault.

The surety, the accused's wife, argued for partial forfeiture due to financial hardship and lack of fault.

The court applied the 'pull of bail' principle, finding that the surety failed to strictly supervise the accused and that absconding is the most serious breach of a recognizance.

The court ordered the full $50,000 forfeited, but stayed enforcement for 45 days to allow the accused an opportunity to voluntarily return to Canada.

The appellant appealed his conviction, seeking to introduce fresh evidence from a toxicologist.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, finding that although it was available at trial, the failure to lead it was an oversight by defence counsel rather than a tactical decision.

The court concluded that the evidence met the fourth Palmer criterion, as it was independent, objective evidence capable of raising sufficient concern about the complainant's credibility to reasonably affect the verdict.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant challenged fraud convictions on the basis of improper jury vetting by prosecution offices and police database checks of prospective jurors.

The court held that while disclosure obligations were breached and some vetting conduct was improper, a new trial requires a reasonable possibility that proper disclosure would have produced a differently constituted jury.

On the record, that threshold was not met.

The court also held that the conduct did not amount to a miscarriage of justice based on appearance of unfairness.

The appeal was dismissed.