Daniel Bradley Brown

This decision concerns the prosecution of five members of the 2018 Canadian World Junior Hockey Team for sexual assault.

The complainant, E.M., alleged that after consensual sexual activity with Michael McLeod, she was sexually assaulted by McLeod and his teammates in a London hotel room.

The accused maintained that E.M. was a willing and active participant.

The court found significant inconsistencies and reliability issues in the complainant’s evidence, including contradictions with video evidence and other witness testimony.

The court concluded that the Crown had not proven the absence of consent beyond a reasonable doubt for any of the accused and acquitted all five.

The judgment provides a detailed analysis of the law of consent, credibility, and the use of myths and stereotypes in sexual assault trials.

This decision addresses the Crown's application to admit a text message as hearsay evidence under the principled exception in a high-profile sexual assault prosecution.

The court reviews the necessity and reliability requirements for hearsay, ultimately finding that the reliability threshold is not met and dismissing the application.

The ruling provides a detailed application of the Supreme Court’s guidance in R. v. Bradshaw and R. v. Charles on the dangers of hearsay and the use of corroborative evidence.

The Crown sought to admit a text message sent by Brett Howden to Taylor Raddysh as past recollection recorded, an exception to the hearsay rule.

The court reviewed the requirements for admissibility, including reliability, timeliness, absence of memory, and the witness’s ability to vouch for the accuracy of the record.

The court found that while the first three requirements were met, Mr. Howden could not vouch for the accuracy of the text message, as he had no memory of sending it and could not confirm its truthfulness.

As a result, the application to admit the text message as past recollection recorded was denied.

This decision addresses a defence motion for a mistrial after a jury note alleged unprofessional conduct by defence counsel, raising concerns about jury impartiality.

The court reviews the legal principles governing mistrials, including the presumption of jury impartiality, the test for reasonable apprehension of bias, and the discretion to discharge jurors or declare a mistrial.

The court finds that the fairness of the trial has been compromised and grants the motion for a mistrial, emphasizing that such a remedy is reserved for the clearest of cases where no other remedy will suffice.

This ruling addresses a constitutional challenge to the statutory scheme for introducing defence-held records in criminal trials, specifically under s. 278.92 of the Criminal Code.

The applicant, a young person charged with sexual assault, argued that the definition of "record" was overly broad and that the disclosure and complainant participation requirements violated their ss. 7 and 11(d) Charter rights.

The court dismissed the constitutional challenge, determining that electronic communications between the accused and complainant (unless containing s. 276(1) content) and material already disclosed by the Crown with complainant consent are not "records" for s. 278.92 purposes.

The court also clarified that the complainant's participatory rights at s. 278.94 hearings are limited to making submissions, without cross-examination or adducing evidence.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and dangerous driving causing death following a motor vehicle collision.

This pre-trial motion addressed the admissibility of evidence obtained during the police investigation.

The court found multiple Charter violations including unlawful detention without rights advisement, compelled statements in violation of section 7 rights, unlawful arrest and breath demand, unlawful vehicle seizure without reasonable grounds, and unlawful seizure of blood samples and airbag data.

The court determined that the investigation was fundamentally flawed from its inception, with police taking investigative shortcuts that resulted in evidence being unlawfully obtained.

The court found that evidence obtained in violation of the Charter could not be relied upon to lawfully seize other evidence, rendering subsequent warranted seizures unlawful as well.

The applicants, John Jansen and Britaney Hall, sought a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay from charge to anticipated trial end was 39 months and 13 days, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling established by R. v. Jordan.

The court deducted defence-attributable delays, including Jansen's explicit waiver of 2.5 months and Hall's 6-month delay due to a certiorari application and changes in preliminary hearing instructions.

After accounting for discrete unexpected events, the net delay for Jansen was approximately 35 months and for Hall approximately 27.5 months.

The court found the case to be moderately complex and applied the Jordan transitional exception, concluding that the Crown's reliance on the previous R. v. Morin framework was reasonable.

Both applications for a stay of proceedings were dismissed.

The appellant challenged fraud convictions on the basis of improper jury vetting by prosecution offices and police database checks of prospective jurors.

The court held that while disclosure obligations were breached and some vetting conduct was improper, a new trial requires a reasonable possibility that proper disclosure would have produced a differently constituted jury.

On the record, that threshold was not met.

The court also held that the conduct did not amount to a miscarriage of justice based on appearance of unfairness.

The appeal was dismissed.