Hilary Dudding

The offender was found guilty of conspiracy to import cocaine following a truncated trial based on an Agreed Statement of Facts.

The conspiracy involved a plan to import cocaine from Colombia, though no drugs were ever successfully imported.

The Crown sought a five-year penitentiary sentence, while the defence proposed a conditional sentence, arguing the offender played a subordinate role.

The court rejected the defence's characterization, finding the offender had a partnership interest in the enterprise.

Emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence for large-scale cocaine importation conspiracies, the court sentenced the offender to five years' imprisonment.

The accused was charged with multiple counts of assault, assault with a weapon, and sexual assault against his former stepchildren.

The allegations arose during a highly contentious parenting dispute between the accused and his former spouse over their shared child.

The court found significant inconsistencies in the testimony of the complainants and their mother, concluding that the mother had a strong motive to fabricate the allegations to exclude the accused from their child's life.

The court acquitted the accused on all counts due to the lack of credible and reliable evidence.

Additionally, the court ordered the transcripts and decision to be forwarded to the Children's Aid Society due to evidence that the mother had physically abused the complainants.

This decision concerns the prosecution of five members of the 2018 Canadian World Junior Hockey Team for sexual assault.

The complainant, E.M., alleged that after consensual sexual activity with Michael McLeod, she was sexually assaulted by McLeod and his teammates in a London hotel room.

The accused maintained that E.M. was a willing and active participant.

The court found significant inconsistencies and reliability issues in the complainant’s evidence, including contradictions with video evidence and other witness testimony.

The court concluded that the Crown had not proven the absence of consent beyond a reasonable doubt for any of the accused and acquitted all five.

The judgment provides a detailed analysis of the law of consent, credibility, and the use of myths and stereotypes in sexual assault trials.

This decision addresses the Crown's application to admit a text message as hearsay evidence under the principled exception in a high-profile sexual assault prosecution.

The court reviews the necessity and reliability requirements for hearsay, ultimately finding that the reliability threshold is not met and dismissing the application.

The ruling provides a detailed application of the Supreme Court’s guidance in R. v. Bradshaw and R. v. Charles on the dangers of hearsay and the use of corroborative evidence.

The Crown sought to admit a text message sent by Brett Howden to Taylor Raddysh as past recollection recorded, an exception to the hearsay rule.

The court reviewed the requirements for admissibility, including reliability, timeliness, absence of memory, and the witness’s ability to vouch for the accuracy of the record.

The court found that while the first three requirements were met, Mr. Howden could not vouch for the accuracy of the text message, as he had no memory of sending it and could not confirm its truthfulness.

As a result, the application to admit the text message as past recollection recorded was denied.

This decision addresses a defence motion for a mistrial after a jury note alleged unprofessional conduct by defence counsel, raising concerns about jury impartiality.

The court reviews the legal principles governing mistrials, including the presumption of jury impartiality, the test for reasonable apprehension of bias, and the discretion to discharge jurors or declare a mistrial.

The court finds that the fairness of the trial has been compromised and grants the motion for a mistrial, emphasizing that such a remedy is reserved for the clearest of cases where no other remedy will suffice.

The court granted a stay of proceedings under section 24(1) of the Charter after finding that the delay in bringing Christopher Vaughan to trial, while technically under the 30-month ceiling set by R. v. Jordan, was markedly longer than it reasonably should have been.

The delay was caused by a major disclosure failure by the Crown and chronic institutional delays in Brampton, as well as the Crown’s decision to prefer a direct indictment, which further prolonged the proceedings.

The court found that the Applicant had acted reasonably throughout and that the Crown was responsible for the delay.

The indictment was stayed.

This decision concerns a Gardiner hearing following a conviction for sexual interference.

The court analyzes the evidence to determine the aggravating facts necessary for sentencing, including the number of incidents, the nature and manner of the touching, and the position of trust.

The judge finds that the evidence supports three specific incidents of sexual touching by the accused, W.S., against K.M., his niece, while in a position of trust, and that the complainant’s evidence is credible and reliable.

The court rejects the defence’s arguments for a lesser finding and sets out the legal principles for fact-finding at sentencing following a jury verdict.

Joshua Auld pleaded guilty to two counts of robbery and one count of assault causing bodily harm.

The Crown sought a 10-year global sentence, while the defence proposed five years.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the use of a handgun and planning, and significant mitigating factors such as Mr. Auld's guilty plea, mental health issues, substance abuse recovery, challenging personal history rooted in systemic anti-Black racism, and onerous bail conditions.

Applying the principle of totality and considering the impact of anti-Black racism on moral culpability and rehabilitation potential, the court found a six-year and three-month aggregate sentence unduly harsh.

A global sentence of five years was imposed, with specific terms for each count and credit for pre-sentence custody.

Rohan Jones was charged with twenty offences, including procuring, advertising, and trafficking in the sex trade, as well as sexual assault and assault, involving three complainants (DG, JS, HD).

The Crown did not call HD, leading to directed verdicts for most counts related to her.

The trial focused on the credibility of the two main complainants, Ms. G and Ms. S, and the accused, Mr. Jones.

The court found significant credibility issues with all key witnesses, noting material inconsistencies, omissions, implausible explanations, and potential motives for false implication in the complainants' testimonies, and a lack of credibility in Mr. Jones's exculpatory account due to his criminal record and involvement in the drug trade.

Hotel records also contradicted both the complainants' and the accused's narratives regarding the frequency and nature of sex work.

Ultimately, the court was left with a reasonable doubt regarding Mr. Jones's guilt for each charge.

This is an appeal from convictions under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act for aiding or abetting persons to possess a passport to contravene the Act and aiding or abetting illegal entry into Canada.

The appellant drove individuals to a border crossing, presenting Canadian passports that did not match the individuals, with Nigerian passports subsequently found.

The appellant challenged the admissibility of lay opinion identification evidence from border services officers, arguing a voir dire was required.

The Court of Appeal found no voir dire was necessary, as the evidence constituted admissible lay opinion based on direct observations.

The appellant also argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence, which the Court found to be an error in narration, not substance, and thus not warranting appellate intervention.

Finally, the Court dismissed the unreasonable verdict argument, finding the circumstantial evidence of guilt overwhelming.

The appeal was dismissed.

The offender, a 32-year-old Black man with no prior criminal record, was found guilty of possessing a loaded handgun in his vehicle.

The firearm was discovered during a vehicle search for cannabis.

The court considered an Enhanced Pre-Sentence Report detailing the offender's background of poverty, systemic racism, and trauma, which mitigated his moral blameworthiness.

Finding that the offender possessed the gun for personal protection rather than criminal enterprise, and emphasizing his rehabilitative potential, the court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day followed by 18 months of probation.

The appellant, Kester Ellis, appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The appeal raised two main issues: whether cell phone location tracking data, obtained under a facially invalid warrant (a s. 8 Charter breach), should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, and whether the Crown's opening statement contained inadmissible and prejudicial investigative hearsay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's decision to admit the evidence under s. 24(2) due to the unintentional nature of the warrant error, minimal privacy impact, and societal interest in adjudication on the merits.

The court also found the Crown's opening statement to be permissible narrative evidence, not improper hearsay.

Marcus Cumsille was found guilty of offering to transfer a firearm.

The court considered sentencing principles, aggravating and mitigating factors, including the impact of anti-Black racism and trial delay.

Despite the Crown seeking a three-year prison sentence and the defence seeking a suspended sentence, the court imposed a 17-month sentence, reduced to a 75-day conditional sentence after credit for pre-sentence custody and stringent bail conditions.

The decision emphasized balancing denunciation, deterrence, and rehabilitation, and considered the practical realities of the COVID-19 pandemic on incarceration.

The offender was found guilty of sexual assault with a weapon after inserting a vibrator into the unconscious or sleeping victim.

At sentencing, the court considered the constitutionality of s. 742.1(f)(iii) of the Criminal Code, which prohibits conditional sentences for sexual assault.

Following recent precedent, the court declared the provision unconstitutional under ss. 7 and 15 of the Charter.

Weighing the paramount objectives of denunciation and deterrence against the offender's significant rehabilitation and lack of prior record, the court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day, followed by one year of probation, and ordered $5,000 in restitution to the victim.

Following a wiretap prosecution involving multiple accused, the court considered conspiracy, firearms trafficking by offer, drug trafficking conspiracy, robbery conspiracy, and criminal organization allegations arising from intercepted jail and street communications.

The court acquitted on the firearm conspiracy counts after finding a reasonable doubt whether one accused merely pretended to agree, but convicted that accused of offering to transfer a firearm because he made a genuine-looking offer perceived as such by the recipient.

A co-accused's guilty plea to conspiracy to traffic in a controlled substance was narrowed on the facts to cocaine rather than heroin.

The court rejected the robbery conspiracy and criminal organization allegations, holding the evidence showed loosely connected criminal conduct and friendship networks rather than the structure, continuity, and cohesion required for a criminal organization.

The applicant, Traequon Mahoney, sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code, seeking release from custody pending trial on two sets of serious charges (armed robbery and firearm offences).

The court found a material change in circumstances, entitling the applicant to a de novo hearing.

While acknowledging the seriousness of the charges and the applicant's breach of prior bail conditions, the court noted the applicant's lack of criminal record and a new, potentially stronger, release plan.

The court found the secondary and tertiary grounds for detention to be evenly balanced.

Ultimately, the application was adjourned, with the judge requiring further sworn affidavits from the proposed sureties and the applicant to provide a detailed, firm, and enforceable 24/7 supervision schedule and specific bail conditions, including weapon searches, social media restrictions, and no-contact provisions with prior associates.

The applicants, two of three co-accused in a large project prosecution involving a criminal organization, brought applications for a stay of proceedings alleging unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The trial was delayed by six weeks to accommodate the schedule of counsel for the third co-accused.

The court found that the net delay for one applicant fell below the 30-month Jordan ceiling.

For the other applicant, the court found that the delay exceeded the ceiling but was justified by exceptional circumstances, specifically case complexity and the strong public interest in holding a joint trial.

Both applications were dismissed.

The applicant brought a motion for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) was infringed.

The total delay from the charge to the anticipated end of the trial was nearly 35 months.

The court analyzed the periods of delay, particularly focusing on delays caused by the applicant's change of counsel.

The court concluded that the deductible defence delay reduced the net delay to below the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

Furthermore, the applicant failed to demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite the proceedings.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The applicants, alleged members of the 'Five Point Generals' criminal organization, brought a Charter application challenging the validity of Tracking Data Warrants, Transmission Data Recording Warrants, and Part VI wiretap authorizations.

Two applicants argued there were insufficient grounds to link them to specific phone numbers, while the others argued they should not have been named in the Information to Obtain (ITO) as the conditions under s. 185(1)(e) of the Criminal Code were not met.

The court dismissed the applications, finding that the police had reasonable grounds to believe the phone numbers were linked to the applicants and that there was sufficient evidence of association with the criminal organization to justify naming the other applicants in the ITO.