R. v. Hudspeth, 2026 ONSC 1276

CITATION: R. v. Hudspeth, 2026 ONSC 1276

COURT FILE NO.: CRIM J(F) 266/23

DATE: 20260304

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

B E T W E E N:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

Sarah Egan, for the Crown

• and -

JAMES HUDSPETH

Hilary Dudding, for Mr. Hudspeth

HEARD: December 8, 2025

REASONS FOR SENTENCE

Stribopoulos J:

Introduction

1After an unsuccessful Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings or, in the alternative, the exclusion of evidence, Mr. Hudspeth pleaded not guilty to conspiracy to import cocaine into Canada, contrary to s. 465(1)(c) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.

2A truncated trial followed before me. The Crown and Mr. Hudspeth submitted an Agreed Statement of Facts, and Mr. Hudspeth declined to call any evidence. On the basis of the agreed facts, I found Mr. Hudspeth guilty of the offence charged. By proceeding in this manner, Mr. Hudspeth preserved his right to appeal his conviction by challenging the Charter ruling.

The Circumstances of the Offence

3The circumstances of the offence are set out in some detail in the Agreed Statement of Facts, which was marked as an exhibit at trial. What follows is a brief summary.

4The investigation that culminated in Mr. Hudspeth’s arrest began in February 2021, when John Cane—whom Craig Brown had met while serving a federal sentence—approached police and reported that, in January 2021, Mr. Brown had proposed importing cocaine into Canada from Colombia. From July 2021 to July 2022, police conducted an extensive undercover operation in which Mr. Cane acted as a police agent and undercover officers posed as co-conspirators. Their conversations with the targets of the investigation—initially Mr. Brown and later Mr. Hudspeth—were audio-recorded.

5Mr. Brown’s initial plan was to import cocaine concealed in “beekeeper’s sugar” through the Port of Hamilton. He claimed that X-ray machines could not differentiate cocaine from sugar. In late September 2021, Mr. Brown introduced Mr. Cane to Mr. Hudspeth, a beekeeper who owns a rural property in Milton. The three met at Mr. Hudspeth’s property and discussed the importation scheme, including where and how the cocaine would be received.

6In the fall of 2021, Mr. Brown and Mr. Hudspeth each travelled to Colombia twice during the same period. In late November 2021, Mr. Cane visited Mr. Hudspeth’s property. During that meeting, Mr. Hudspeth was provided with a phone to communicate directly with Mr. Cane, if necessary. Additionally, Mr. Hudspeth told Mr. Cane that a shipment would arrive in Canada sometime in January 2022. Despite these representations, the plan to import cocaine through the Port of Hamilton never materialized.

7In December 2021, Mr. Cane introduced Mr. Brown to his “godson”, who was, in fact, an undercover police officer, accompanied by a second undercover officer posing as his bodyguard. The “godson” represented himself as criminally connected and claimed he could facilitate the smuggling of the drugs through the Port of Halifax because he controlled dockworkers there. He agreed to provide that assistance in return for a share of the imported cocaine.

8On January 27, 2022, Mr. Brown told Mr. Cane that Mr. Hudspeth was no longer participating in the scheme. If Mr. Hudspeth had withdrawn from the conspiracy at that point, it appears he did not do so for long. In February 2022, Mr. Brown again discussed importing cocaine, stating that it would be delivered to Mr. Hudspeth’s property and stored in an outbuilding there.

9Mr. Brown travelled to Colombia on February 23, 2022. Mr. Hudspeth joined him on March 21, 2022, and remained in Colombia for one week. After Mr. Brown returned to Canada on May 4, 2022, he told Mr. Cane on several occasions that he had secured cocaine in Colombia, including that there was “probably seventy right now”, and discussed shipping it by container through Halifax. Mr. Hudspeth again travelled to Colombia in May 2022. In June 2022, Mr. Brown told Mr. Cane that a load was “ready to go” in Colombia and would be stored in Mr. Hudspeth’s outbuilding following its arrival and pending its distribution.

10On July 15, 2022, Mr. Brown, Mr. Hudspeth, and Mr. Cane met. Mr. Brown and Mr. Hudspeth indicated that Mr. Hudspeth would travel to Colombia to “secure” and “guarantee” the shipment. Mr. Hudspeth said it would be delivered to his property and stated, “we are a go then”. At a further meeting on July 22, 2022—this time with the “godson”—Mr. Hudspeth described himself as “one of the investors”. He said he would remain in Colombia as “collateral” until the portion of the load “fronted” by their supplier was paid in full, and Mr. Brown indicated that a total shipment of 120 kg was expected. Mr. Hudspeth also indicated that, after entering Canada, the cocaine would be delivered to his property.

11Police confirmed that Mr. Brown had booked a flight to Colombia for the evening of July 27, 2022; it is unknown whether Mr. Hudspeth had also booked a flight. Nevertheless, concerned for Mr. Hudspeth’s safety, police arrested both men on July 27, 2022, before either could travel to Colombia again. Although there is reason to think that, by the time of their arrest, a cocaine importation was imminent, given that nothing came of the men’s earlier claims to that effect, it is difficult to make a definitive finding in that regard. Ultimately, there is no evidence that any cocaine was ever successfully imported into Canada.

The Circumstances of the Offender

12Mr. Hudspeth is 70 years old. He has a prior but dated criminal record for alcohol related driving offences.

13Mr. Hudspeth was born in Kitchener, Ontario. He describes having a positive upbringing, despite his father’s struggles with alcoholism. Mr. Hudspeth’s parents are now deceased. He has an identical twin brother, who is his surety, with whom he now lives, and a younger brother. Mr. Hudspeth’s younger brother has some significant mental health issues and is supported by the Ontario Disability Support Program (“ODSP”). Mr. Hudspeth’s younger brother continues to reside in their childhood home, and Mr. Hudspeth has taken primary responsibility for meeting his various needs. (Unfortunately, Mr. Hudspeth’s twin brother is estranged from their younger brother, for reasons that were left unexplained at the sentencing hearing.)

14Mr. Hudspeth has had three long-term relationships. He was married from 1979 to 1993. He has two daughters from that union, who are now 41 and 39 years of age, respectively. He is in regular contact with both his daughters and has a good relationship with each of them, and his two grandchildren. Following his marriage, Mr. Hudspeth was in a 20-year long-distance relationship. More recently, Mr. Hudspeth has been in a relationship with his current girlfriend for the past four years.

15Mr. Hudspeth graduated from high school and then completed some college courses. Over the years, he has held various jobs. For the past 16 years, he has been operating his own business manufacturing leather gloves. Additionally, Mr. Hudspeth also earns income as a truck driver. In terms of hobbies, Mr. Hudspeth is an avid beekeeper, active in that community, and has frequently given presentations to schoolchildren about honeybees.

16According to Mr. Hudspeth, his arrest and charge have adversely affected his ability to earn a living due to restrictions on his travel. His glove manufacturing business has suffered because it required him to travel to the United States, something he could no longer do after he was charged. He has had to rely on his income as a truck driver to make ends meet, but that income has proven insufficient. Mr. Hudspeth reports that he had to sell his home to finance his legal fees. As noted, he is currently living with his twin brother.

17Like his father, Mr. Hudspeth has a problematic relationship with alcohol. He abused alcohol for nearly 30 years. His alcoholism played a role in his prior involvement with the criminal justice system. Thankfully, to his considerable credit, Mr. Hudspeth has maintained his sobriety over the last four years following his arrest in this case. He continues to be involved with Alcoholics Anonymous and attends meetings regularly, mainly to support others in their journeys to sobriety.

18In speaking with the author of the pre-sentence report, one of Mr. Hudspeth’s long-time friends provided a fair amount of insight into what may have caused him to commit his offence. His friend noted that Mr. Hudspeth “likes to take chances” and has made questionable financial decisions over the years. He further described Mr. Hudspeth as someone who is “friends with everybody” but sometimes makes “dumb” choices in his friends, leading to negative affiliations.

19At his sentencing hearing, Mr. Hudspeth filed numerous letters from close and extended family, as well as longstanding friends. The letter writers uniformly describe him in positive, even glowing, terms. According to those who know him best, Mr. Hudspeth is caring, thoughtful, compassionate, kind-hearted, generous, reliable, selfless, and family-oriented. In attesting to these character traits, many letter writers refer to the support Mr. Hudspeth provided to his mother, who suffered from Alzheimer’s disease before her passing, as well as the ongoing support he provides to his younger brother. Several also cite his sustained sobriety since his arrest as evidence that he has gained insight and grown as a person in response to these criminal proceedings.

20Many of his family and friends express concerns about how incarcerating Mr. Hudspeth would negatively impact him, including how it might set back his recovery. They also express concern about its potential impact on Mr. Hudspeth’s younger brother, who is very much dependent on him.

The Positions of the Parties

21There is no dispute between the parties concerning the ancillary orders that should form part of Mr. Hudspeth’s sentence, including a DNA order, a s. 109 weapons prohibition order for ten years, and a victim surcharge. The DNA order is discretionary, while a s. 109 order is mandatory.

22The Crown submits that for the offence of conspiracy to import cocaine, the primary sentencing objectives are denunciation and deterrence, and that those objectives require the imposition of a penitentiary sentence in this case. In that regard, the Crown disputes the defence submission that, because Mr. Hudspeth agreed to serve as collateral for the shipment, his role should be viewed as akin to that of a courier.

23On behalf of the Crown, Ms. Egan emphasized that Mr. Hudspeth was involved in the conspiracy at an organizational level and that his involvement persisted for many months. She also noted that he was not in financial difficulty before committing the offence, suggesting that his motive was greed. In that regard, given the value of the cocaine once imported, and its minimal cost in Colombia, Ms. Egan noted the participants in the conspiracy stood to reap millions of dollars in profit had they been successful.

24Given all of this and bearing in mind the range of sentences for conspiracy to import cocaine, Ms. Egan submitted that the court should impose a sentence of five years of imprisonment.

25In contrast, on behalf of Mr. Hudspeth, Ms. Dudding submitted that a conditional sentence of two years less a day, followed by three years of probation, would be fit and appropriate in the circumstances.

26With respect to the offence, Ms. Dudding argued that, for much of its duration, the conspiracy remained vague and ill-informed. She further submitted that Mr. Hudspeth played a subordinate role, pointing to his willingness to place himself at significant risk by agreeing to store the cocaine at his property and to act as “collateral” for the shipment. In that regard, as the most vulnerable participant, Ms. Dudding argued that Mr. Hudspeth’s role was analogous to that of a drug courier. She also noted that it was Mr. Brown—not Mr. Hudspeth—who had the connections in Colombia and took the lead in dealings with the putative co-conspirators. At its highest, Ms. Dudding submitted, Mr. Hudspeth played a “mid-level” role in the conspiracy and was far from a principal.

27Turning to Mr. Hudspeth’s personal circumstances, Ms. Dudding emphasized that he committed the offence while still in the throes of addiction and highlighted the significant steps he has taken since his arrest toward his recovery. Ms. Dudding noted that, apart from his prior and unrelated convictions, Mr. Hudspeth has lived an entirely prosocial life: he has maintained gainful employment and has been a loving, supportive, and generous presence in the lives of those close to him. Ms. Dudding also noted the time that has passed since Mr. Hudspeth’s arrest and his compliance with the terms of his release. Further, although he did not plead guilty, she submitted that by proceeding as he did—on an Agreed Statement of Facts and without calling evidence—Mr. Hudspeth spared significant prosecutorial and judicial resources.

28Ms. Dudding also emphasized the collateral consequences Mr. Hudspeth has suffered as a result of the charge, including the loss of his business and his home. Additionally, she emphasized the potential impact on his younger brother, who depends on him, should he be incarcerated.

29Finally, while acknowledging that a conditional sentence falls outside the range ordinarily imposed for this offence, Ms. Dudding submitted that such a sentence, if properly fashioned, could adequately address the objectives of denunciation and deterrence in this case. She emphasized that sentencing remains an individualized exercise and that the court may depart from established ranges where the circumstances warrant it.

30In all the circumstances, Ms. Dudding submitted that a conditional sentence would be fit and appropriate.

Mr. Hudspeth’s Role in the Conspiracy

31It is sensible to address Mr. Hudspeth’s role in the conspiracy before turning to the appropriate sentence. In particular, it is necessary to assess his claim that he was, at most, a “mid-level” participant who played only a subordinate role in the scheme. I reject that submission for several reasons.

32First, Mr. Hudspeth was involved in the conspiracy throughout much of its duration. Second, he personally attended and participated in many meetings with Mr. Cane. On one occasion, Mr. Hudspeth met with him alone and received a phone so they could communicate directly. He also met with the “godson”. Third, while the conspiracy was ongoing, he made numerous visits to Colombia—the country where the conspirators planned to source the cocaine—suggesting his direct involvement in those efforts. Fourth, the use of Mr. Hudspeth’s property and his attendance in Colombia to “guarantee” the shipment were integral to the execution of the plan. Finally, and most significantly, Mr. Hudspeth described himself as “one of the investors”, indicating that he had a material stake in the venture.

33The combined effect of these facts satisfies me beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Hudspeth, like Mr. Brown, had a partnership interest in the enterprise, and that they each played complementary roles as they endeavoured to execute their plan.

Law and Analysis

34Sentencing is inherently discretionary. There is no formula judges can follow to determine the appropriate sentence. Instead, judges must consider the purposes of sentencing, the governing sentencing principles—especially proportionality—and the applicable sentencing range. Against that backdrop, and after accounting for aggravating and mitigating factors, the sentencing judge must craft a just and appropriate sentence.

The Purpose, Objectives, and Principles of Sentencing

35Sentencing judges must remain mindful of the fundamental purpose of sentencing, which Parliament has identified as the protection of society and contributing "to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society": Criminal Code, s. 718.

36Achieving that purpose requires the court to impose "just sanctions" that address one or more of the traditional sentencing objectives: Criminal Code, s. 718. These include denunciation, general and specific deterrence, separation of offenders from society, rehabilitation, reparation to victims, promoting a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledging the harm done to victims and the community: see Criminal Code, ss. 718(a)-(f).

37To fashion an appropriate sentence, the court must respect what Parliament has prescribed as the fundamental principle of sentencing: that a sentence "must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender": Criminal Code, s. 718.1. In other words, the sentence must fit both the seriousness of the crime and the offender's level of moral blameworthiness in its commission: see R. v. Ipeelee, 2012 SCC 13, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 433, at paras. 36-37; R. v. Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 206, at paras. 40-43. The Supreme Court has identified proportionality as the "central tenet" of sentencing: Ipeelee, at para. 36; see also Nasogaluak, at para. 41; R. v. J.W., 2025 SCC 16, 448 C.C.C. (3d) 285, at para. 41.

38To arrive at a proportionate sentence, the court must respect the principle of parity. That is because proportionality is a function of the circumstances of the offence and offender, compared to sentences previously imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances. As the Supreme Court has explained, a sentencing judge must reconcile individualization and parity to achieve a proportionate sentence: see R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1089, at para. 53, citing Criminal Code, ss. 718.2(a) and (b). However, they do not operate in tension; "parity is an expression of proportionality": R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, [2020] 1 S.C.R. 424, at para. 32; see also Friesen, at paras. 30-33; R. v. Parranto, 2021 SCC 46, [2021] 3 S.C.R. 366, at paras. 11-12.

39Ultimately, proportionality "has a restraining function" because it helps "guarantee that a sentence is individualized, just and appropriate": R. v. Bissonnette, 2022 SCC 23, [2022] 1 S.C.R. 597, at para. 51; see also Ipeelee, at para. 37. Accordingly, proportionality "acts as a brake to ensure that, in the pursuit of public protection measures, including deterrence and denunciation, sentences are not unduly excessive": R. v. Gilmore, 2025 ONCA 517, at para. 36; see also Gilmore, at para. 34; Quebec (Attorney General) v. Senneville, 2025 SCC 33, at para. 35.

40To arrive at a proportionate sentence, a sentencing judge must also account for any collateral consequences: see R. v. Suter, 2018 SCC 34, [2018] 2 S.C.R. 496. Collateral consequences include those flowing from the commission of the offence, the conviction, or the sentence itself: see Suter, at para. 47. For example, where a sentence will separate an offender from their family, that separation is a collateral consequence that must be meaningfully considered in determining a fit sentence: see R. v. D.B., 2025 ONCA 577, 451 C.C.C. (3d) 400, at paras. 19-21. Because collateral consequences relate to the offender’s circumstances, they may render a sentence more onerous for that particular offender. They must therefore be taken into account to ensure the sentence remains proportionate: see Suter, at paras. 48, 51.

Sentencing for Conspiracy to Import Cocaine

41The offence of conspiracy to import cocaine carries a maximum sentence of life imprisonment and no longer carries a mandatory minimum sentence: see Criminal Code, s. 465(1)(c), and Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C., 1996, c. 19, s. 6(3)(a). The maximum sentence of life imprisonment undoubtedly reflects Parliament’s view of the offence’s gravity.

42The Court of Appeal has acknowledged that the importation of cocaine is “among the most serious crimes known to Canadian law”: R. v. Hamilton (2004), 186 C.C.C. (3d) 129 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 104. As Doherty J.A. observed in that case, also at para. 104:

The use and sale of cocaine kills and harms both directly and indirectly. The direct adverse health effects on those who use the drug are enormous and disastrous. Cocaine sale and use is closely and strongly associated with violent crime. Cocaine importation begets a multiplicity of violent acts. Viewed in isolation from the conduct which inevitably follows the importation of cocaine, the act itself is not a violent one in the strict sense. It cannot, however, be disassociated from its inevitable consequences. Unlike the trial judge … I characterize cocaine importation as both a violent and serious offence …

43Further, in assessing the gravity of a conspiracy involving the distribution of a deadly narcotic such as cocaine, the Court of Appeal has noted that the quantity the conspirators intended to traffic is a relevant consideration. In R. v. Russo (1998), 42 O.R. (3d) 120 (C.A.), at para. 15, Doherty J.A. made the following observation:

Conspiracies that contemplate the sale of large amounts of a drug like cocaine clearly pose a much more significant danger to the community than do agreements to supply small amounts to others for purely personal use. The amount the respondents agreed to sell … indicates that they were ready and willing to participate in the drug trade at a very high level. The trial judge erred in principle in giving no weight to the magnitude of the crime contemplated by the agreement made by the respondents.

44It is therefore not surprising that, in conspiracies to import significant quantities of cocaine, even in cases where no drugs ever made their way into Canada—so-called “dry conspiracies”—lengthy penitentiary sentences are nevertheless warranted: see R. v. Tello, 2018 ONSC 2259, aff’d 2023 ONCA 335, 425 C.C.C. (3d) 452 (sentence of 11 years and 8 months imposed on a first offender after trial for conspiracy to import 1,000 kg of cocaine); R. v. Ursino, 2019 ONSC 1171 (sentence of 6 years imposed on a first-time offender after trial for conspiracy to import between 50 and 500 kg of cocaine, though the offender also received consecutive sentences for other serious drug offences).

45Most analogous to Mr. Hudspeth’s offence are the circumstances of the offence in R. v. Lawson (2005), 197 O.A.C. 68 (C.A.). The offender was convicted after trial of conspiracy to import cocaine into Canada. The conspiracy involved a plan to import 100 kg of cocaine by boat. The appellant was an active participant in the conspiracy, but not a principal. The plan never came to fruition, and no cocaine was imported. The trial judge imposed a sentence of eight years. The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown’s sentence appeal, rejecting the submission that the sentence was unfit.

46The range of sentences imposed in these cases demonstrates two things. First, lengthy penitentiary sentences are warranted for those who conspire to import cocaine into Canada. Second, that remains so even when the conspirators ultimately fail to achieve their goal. This is not surprising, given the gravity of the offence, which requires a sentence that both denounces the conduct and deters others who might contemplate committing it. As noted, if the conspirators succeed, the cocaine will, once in Canada, occasion untold human suffering. The need for sentences that prioritize denunciation and deterrence reflects this, as well as the reality that those who commit this crime are invariably driven by greed and a corresponding callous disregard for the needless suffering their crime causes.

47Nevertheless, it must be remembered that sentencing ranges are “guidelines rather than hard and fast rules”: Nasogaluak, at para. 44. They help structure a sentencing judge’s exercise of their discretion because they reflect the application of the objectives and principles of sentencing to a particular offence: see Lacasse, at para. 57. Ultimately, a sentencing judge may exercise their discretion to impose a sentence below or above the established range, given that the “determination of a just and appropriate sentence is a highly individualized exercise that goes beyond a purely mathematical calculation”: Lacasse, at para. 58; see also Nasogaluak, at para. 44.

The Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances

48In determining the appropriate sentence, a sentencing judge must consider any aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender: see Criminal Code, s. 718.2(a). A proper inventory of these factors is essential to evaluating the gravity of the offence and the offender’s degree of responsibility in its commission. They serve to “push the sentence up or down the scale of appropriate sentences for similar offences”: Nasogaluak, at para. 43.

49In this case, there is only one potential aggravating factor: Mr. Hudspeth has a prior criminal record. However, because that record is unrelated and rather dated, it deserves very little, if any, weight in sentencing him for his present offence. Turning to the mitigating factors, there are a few.

50First, the way Mr. Hudspeth chose to litigate this case, by effectively entering a “no contest” plea, is deserving of at least some weight in mitigation: see R. v. R.P., 2013 ONCA 53, 295 C.CC. (3d) 28, at paras. 95, 101; leave to appeal refused, [2013] S.C.C.A. 133; R. v. Simpson, 2021 ONSC 6032, at paras. 188-89, 196; R. v. Smoke, [2020] O.J. No. 5884 (S.C.J.), at para. 9. After all, it avoided the need for a three-week jury trial and the expenditure of already taxed judicial and prosecutorial resources in this very busy jurisdiction. However, I share Presser J.’s view that “what is effectively a plea of ‘no contest,’ offered after an unsuccessful Charter challenge, is not as mitigating as a full and unequivocal guilty plea at an earlier stage of proceedings.”: R. v. Hussey-Rodrigues, 2024 ONSC 2671, at para. 42.

51Second, before his offence, Mr. Hudspeth mostly led a prosocial life. He has enjoyed gainful employment throughout his adult life. Furthermore, the record makes clear that he possesses many very positive character traits. All that bodes well for his eventual rehabilitation.

52Finally, Mr. Hudspeth has the love and support of immediate and extended family, and a great many close friends. That, too, suggests that when his sentence is completed, he will enjoy a considerable support network, which will undoubtedly assist his reintegration into society and his ultimate rehabilitation.

The Collateral Consequences

53As noted, the court must consider collateral consequences, as they inform the circumstances of the offender and must therefore be accounted for in fashioning a proportionate sentence. Two collateral consequences are relevant here.

54First, because of his arrest and the ensuing criminal proceedings, Mr. Hudspeth has been unable to travel outside Canada. This has adversely affected his ability to operate his business. Combined with the cost of financing his defence, these circumstances required him to sell his home. In short, Mr. Hudspeth has suffered considerable financial hardship as a result of his offence, a collateral consequence that must be considered in determining a fit sentence.

55Second, given Mr. Hudspeth’s younger brother’s significant mental health issues and Mr. Hudspeth’s role in attending to his needs, any period of incarceration would inevitably affect his brother. The impact of an offender’s incarceration on family members is a relevant collateral consequence that the court must consider.

56That said, I am not satisfied on this record that Mr. Hudspeth’s brother is entirely dependent on him, or that he could not manage in Mr. Hudspeth’s absence. Mr. Hudspeth’s brother does not live with him and receives support through ODSP. There also appear to be other immediate and extended family members who could assume some of the responsibilities Mr. Hudspeth has undertaken. Finally, there is no evidence that other community supports have been explored, or that Mr. Hudspeth’s brother would be ineligible for them.

The Appropriate Sentence

57To arrive at a fit sentence, I have carefully considered the circumstances of the offence and the offender. With respect to the former, I have considered the collateral consequences Mr. Hudspeth has suffered, including the likely impact of the sentence on his younger brother. I have also considered the purpose, objectives, and principles of sentencing, the applicable sentencing range, the absence of aggravating factors, and the mitigating factors. In addition, I have considered the principle of parity, including the lengthier sentence that will be imposed on Mr. Brown later today, given his prior related criminal record, while accounting for the fact that, unlike Mr. Hudspeth, Mr. Brown pleaded guilty.

58I do not consider specific deterrence to be a relevant sentencing objective in this case. I accept that, due to the collateral consequences arising from the charge and given the strides Mr. Hudspeth has made since his arrest toward sustained sobriety, he has already been specifically deterred. It is extremely unlikely that he will reoffend.

59Nevertheless, denunciation and general deterrence remain pressing sentencing objectives. As the authorities demonstrate, even for offenders like Mr. Hudspeth, this offence ordinarily warrants a lengthy penitentiary sentence. In that regard, despite Ms. Dudding’s able submissions, I have concluded, for the reasons already explained, that Mr. Hudspeth had a partnership interest in the enterprise. His circumstances are therefore far removed from those of a drug courier, for whom conditional sentences have, in some cases, been imposed.

60In all the circumstances, I accept the Crown’s submission that five years’ imprisonment is a fit sentence for this offender and this offence. Anything less would, in my view, fall short of denouncing Mr. Hudspeth’s gravely serious crime and deterring others who might contemplate importing cocaine into Canada.

61With respect to general deterrence, given that the motivation for this crime is invariably the prospect of substantial profits—often in the millions of dollars—the sentence must send a clear and unequivocal message: if you conspire to import cocaine and are caught, the consequences will be severe.

Conclusion

62Accordingly, for his offence, Mr. Hudspeth is sentenced to five years of imprisonment.

63Additionally, the court will issue a DNA order and a weapons prohibition order under s. 109 for ten years.

64Finally, there will be a $200 victim surcharge. Mr. Hudspeth will have seven years to pay that amount.

Signed: “J. Stribopoulos J.”

Released: March 4, 2026

CITATION: R. v. Hudspeth, 2026 ONSC 1276