Sonya Lynn Andersen

This decision addresses the lawfulness of a warrantless arrest and subsequent searches, including multiple strip searches, of John Kikiantonis by Toronto Police Service officers.

The court found the arrest unlawful due to insufficient reasonable and probable grounds, primarily relying on uncorroborated confidential source information and subjective officer observations.

The court held that the strip searches violated sections 7 and 8 of the Charter, emphasizing the intrusive nature of strip searches and the necessity of case-specific grounds and proper documentation.

The failure to properly record the strip search and the lack of opportunity for re-consultation with counsel after authorization of the strip search were also Charter breaches.

The evidence obtained was excluded under section 24(2), resulting in an acquittal.

The court sentenced O’Neil Freeman for two counts of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, following a joint submission.

The decision reviews the factual background, the parties’ submissions, and the applicable sentencing principles, including the “gap principle” and the impact of systemic disadvantage.

The court imposed a sentence of one day plus 19.5 months’ credit for pre-sentence custody for one count, and a conditional sentence of two years less a day for the other, with strict house arrest and curfew conditions, recognizing the mitigating factors of rehabilitation, dated record, and hardship.

The applicant brought a Charter application seeking to exclude firearms and ammunition seized during the execution of a search warrant at his residence.

He alleged breaches of his rights under ss. 7, 8, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found the search warrants were valid and the applicant lacked standing to challenge the failure to file a Report to Justice for discarded property.

However, the court found that police used excessive force in breach of s. 7 by deploying a taser on the unarmed applicant and dragging him by his hair.

The court also found a breach of s. 10(b) because police failed to hold off on questioning the applicant before facilitating his right to counsel.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute and excluded the firearms and ammunition under s. 24(2).

The offender was found guilty of possessing a loaded 9mm handgun with an over-capacity magazine in his car, while bound by two weapons prohibitions and trafficking drugs.

The court applied the Kienapple principle to conditionally stay the s. 92(1) charge.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for gun crimes associated with drug trafficking, the court imposed a total sentence of 4 years (minus 10 days) for the firearm and breach offences, consecutive to a prior sentence for the drug offences.

The offender received statutory credit for pre-sentence custody plus 150 days of enhanced credit for harsh conditions due to lockdowns and the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Crown sought a review of a bail decision that released C.T., who was charged with firearms trafficking.

The Crown argued there was a material change in circumstances (a defaced, loaded firearm registered to C.T. was found with suspected bank robbers), an error of law by the bail justice (mischaracterizing the offences as not involving firearm use), and that the decision was clearly inappropriate.

The court found a material change and an error of law, necessitating a de novo bail hearing.

While the strength of the Crown's case, gravity of the offences, firearm use in trafficking, and potential lengthy imprisonment all favored detention, the court ultimately maintained C.T.'s release, citing his successful four-month house arrest and the risks posed by the COVID-19 pandemic within correctional facilities.

H.K. sought a review of his detention order under s. 520 of the Criminal Code, arguing material changes due to the COVID-19 pandemic, reduced privileges, and preliminary hearing adjournment.

The court found COVID-19 constituted a material change, requiring a de novo analysis.

However, the proposed surety (H.K.'s father, IK) was deemed unsuitable due to credibility issues and lack of influence over H.K., leading to a substantial risk of reoffending.

The court also found that H.K.'s detention was necessary on tertiary grounds to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice, despite his pre-existing medical condition and the heightened risks of COVID-19 in correctional facilities, given the inadequate release plan.

The application for detention review was dismissed.

The applicant sought a bail review to vacate a prior detention order and be released under revised terms, citing the COVID-19 pandemic as a material change in circumstances.

The court found the pandemic constituted a material change, warranting a de novo hearing.

However, the application was dismissed as the applicant failed to demonstrate that his continued detention was not necessary on both secondary and tertiary grounds, given his history of non-compliance, the unsuitability of proposed sureties, the strength of the Crown's case, and the gravity of the offences.

The court also found that the pandemic circumstances did not sufficiently mitigate the risks to public safety or confidence in the administration of justice.

The offender was convicted of attempting to possess a firearm and transferring ammunition, and pleaded guilty to conspiracy to traffic in marijuana.

The court found the offender was a mid-level marijuana dealer and was actively engaged in a business enterprise of supplying illegal firearms and ammunition for profit.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence, the court imposed a global sentence of 4 years and 9 months, less 5 months credit for pre-trial custody and strict bail conditions, leaving 4 years and 4 months to serve.

Kevin Hanse was charged with firearm and ammunition offenses, with the Crown's case relying heavily on wiretap interceptions using alleged code words like "car" "whip" "gas" and "snub." The defence sought to introduce internet search results from "weedmaps.com" and "wikileaf.com" through an articling student to suggest that "snub" and "gas" were slang terms for marijuana, thereby challenging the Crown's interpretation.

The court conducted a voir dire and ruled the internet evidence inadmissible.

The judge found that the evidence did not meet the strict criteria for judicial notice of adjudicative facts, as the sources lacked indisputable accuracy and the facts were not notorious or generally accepted slang for marijuana.

The court emphasized the need for accuracy and reliability in evidence presented to a jury, rejecting the argument that trial fairness or cost considerations should relax the evidentiary standards for adjudicative facts.

The applicant sought to exclude evidence from his impaired driving trial based on two alleged Charter violations.

First, he argued that the approved screening device demand was invalid because the officer lacked reasonable suspicion that he had operated a motor vehicle within the preceding three hours, as required by s. 254(2) of the Criminal Code.

Second, he argued that video surveillance of him urinating in a police cell violated s. 8 of the Charter.

The court found that the first breach was not established, as the officer's reasonable suspicion could be inferred from the circumstances.

The court found that the second breach was established but declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, balancing the seriousness of the violation against the minimal impact and society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

The accused was charged with driving with excess alcohol under s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

He brought a Charter application challenging the validity of the approved screening device (ASD) test and the subsequent breathalyzer readings, arguing violations of s. 8 (unreasonable search and seizure), s. 7 (life, liberty, and security), s. 9 (arbitrary detention), and s. 10(a) and 10(b) (right to counsel).

The court dismissed the Charter application, finding that the officer properly investigated whether the accused had consumed non-alcoholic substances prior to the ASD test and was entitled to rely on the "Fail" result to form reasonable and probable grounds for the breath demand.

The accused was found guilty and sentenced to a $1,000 fine and a one-year driving prohibition.

The accused was tried on a ten-count indictment alleging assaults, sexual assaults, and death threats within an intimate relationship.

Applying the W(D.) framework and the criminal standard of proof, the court found serious credibility and reliability concerns in the complainant's evidence, including significant inconsistencies, concerns about the authenticity of calendar entries, and evidence inconsistent with her denials of strong attachment to the accused.

The accused's evidence was also approached with caution, but portions of it were accepted and partially corroborated by defence witnesses.

The court held that although some counts could be considered together for contextual purposes, the totality of the evidence did not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

The defendant was charged with refusing to provide an approved screening device (ASD) sample during a RIDE program stop.

The Crown was required to prove a valid demand, failure to comply, and an intention to refuse.

The court found that while the defendant failed to provide a proper breath sample after numerous attempts, he had not formed the requisite intention to refuse.

The defendant's mental health condition, including anxiety, nervousness, and paranoia stemming from a traumatic experience in 2010, rendered his nervousness almost disabling.

The court acquitted the defendant, finding he had raised a reasonable doubt as to his intention to evade providing a proper sample.

The judgment also addresses systemic concerns regarding defence counsel competence and the integrity of the adversarial system.

The defendant was charged with exceeding 80 mg of alcohol per 100 ml of blood (exceed 80) on March 13, 2013.

The sole issue was whether the defendant's right to be free from arbitrary detention under the Charter was violated when a police officer conducting sobriety checks targeted motorists leaving a liquor store parking lot.

The court held that location-based targeting of police enforcement efforts does not constitute a Charter violation.

The court distinguished between group targeting (which requires careful scrutiny) and location targeting (which raises no Charter concerns).

The court found that even if location targeting required justification, the LCBO parking lot location had a rational connection to impaired driving concerns.

The defendant was found guilty.

The appellant appealed a conviction for dangerous driving entered after trial in the Ontario Court of Justice, where a $500 fine was imposed.

The appeal challenged the sufficiency of the evidence establishing the actus reus and mens rea of dangerous driving and raised additional issues regarding judicial notice of the roadway and the disclosure of settlement discussions during trial.

The appeal court held that the trial judge reasonably accepted the police officer’s evidence describing excessive speed and running a red light in a busy urban area and rejected the appellant’s contradictory testimony.

The court also found no prejudice arising from the trial judge’s inquiry about potential settlement discussions.

The conviction was supported by sufficient evidence and no reversible error occurred.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction decision dismissing a charge of assault with a weapon after the trial judge granted a directed verdict at the close of the Crown’s case.

The trial judge applied the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt rather than the proper test for a directed verdict.

Applying the test from U.S.A. v. Shephard, the appeal court held that the correct inquiry was whether there was any evidence upon which a reasonable jury properly instructed could return a verdict of guilty.

The record contained substantial circumstantial evidence identifying the respondent as the assailant, including possession of a knife with the victim’s blood and injuries consistent with the fight.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered before a different justice.