Vadim Paskarou

Ji Feng pleaded guilty to failing to stop at an accident resulting in death, contrary to section 320.16(3) of the Criminal Code.

The incident involved striking and killing a cyclist while distracted by medical news, followed by deliberate actions to obscure her involvement.

The Crown sought a nine-month jail sentence, while the defence proposed a twelve-month conditional sentence.

The court emphasized denunciation and general deterrence as primary sentencing objectives for such a grave offense, noting the maximum life imprisonment penalty.

Despite mitigating factors like a guilty plea, remorse, and positive rehabilitative prospects, the court found a conditional sentence inconsistent with sentencing principles due to the accused's heightened moral culpability from obscuring her involvement.

A traditional jail sentence was deemed necessary to denounce the conduct.

Considering the potential immigration consequences for the non-citizen accused, the court imposed a sentence of 179 days jail, a two-year driving prohibition, and a DNA sample, allowing for an appeal to the Immigration Appeal Division.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over the legal limit.

At trial, the accused brought Charter applications alleging breaches of his rights to counsel and privacy.

The court dismissed the s. 10(b) claims, finding the brief delay in providing rights to counsel was justified and the accused freely chose to speak to duty counsel.

However, the court found a s. 8 breach because the accused was video recorded urinating in his cell without reasonable privacy measures.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the breath sample evidence under s. 24(2) due to the seriousness of the police's ongoing failure to address washroom privacy despite prior judicial pronouncements.

The charge was dismissed.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with more than 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood.

A nuclear power plant security officer arrested the accused for impaired driving based on observations of confused speech and admission of alcohol consumption, though without detecting an odour of alcohol at the time.

Responding police officers, upon arrival, determined there were insufficient grounds to continue the arrest for impaired driving but formed reasonable suspicion to conduct a roadside screening test.

The accused remained handcuffed throughout the entire investigative detention and roadside testing process for approximately 36 minutes, despite being cooperative and coherent.

The court found multiple Charter violations: the initial arrest lacked objective reasonable grounds, the continued handcuffing during the investigative detention was arbitrary, and the manner of obtaining the roadside breath samples was unreasonable.

Applying the Grant analysis, the court excluded all breath sample evidence and acquitted the accused.

The defendant was charged with having care and control of a vehicle with excess blood alcohol (over 80 mg/100 mL).

The defendant challenged the admissibility of breath test results on two grounds: first, that a breach of section 10(b) of the Charter (right to counsel) warranted exclusion of evidence under section 24(2); and second, that the Crown failed to prove the breath tests were administered as soon as practicable as required by section 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The court found that while a section 10(b) breach occurred (a nine-minute delay in informing the defendant of his right to counsel), the breach was not serious enough to warrant exclusion under the Grant test.

The court also found that the breath tests were administered as soon as practicable within the statutory two-hour window.

The defendant was convicted.

The accused was charged with Over 80 following a drinking and driving investigation.

The officer's approved screening device malfunctioned, resulting in an eight-minute delay while a second device was obtained.

During this delay, the accused was placed in the police car and subjected to a pat-down search.

The accused was arrested and advised of his right to counsel six minutes later.

The defence raised six Charter breaches.

The court found that the ASD demand and test were conducted forthwith despite the delay caused by device malfunction.

The court found breaches of sections 8 and 9 regarding the detention in the police car and search, and a technical breach of section 10(b) regarding the delay in right to counsel advice.

However, applying the section 24(2) test from R v Grant, the court found that admission of the breath test evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute given the minor impact of the breaches on the accused's Charter-protected interests and society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

The accused was found guilty.

The defendant was charged with failing to comply with a recognizance that prohibited him from possessing drug paraphernalia, specifically scales.

Police stopped him for riding a bicycle on the sidewalk without lights.

During the stop, which lasted over six minutes, police conducted a criminal investigation into bail compliance without advising the defendant of his Charter rights to counsel.

The defendant was detained and questioned about scales, which he admitted to possessing.

The Crown conceded that sections 10(a) and 10(b) Charter rights were violated.

The court applied the section 24(2) test and excluded the evidence of the scales, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The charge was dismissed.

The accused was charged with driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit and impaired driving following a motor vehicle collision.

The Crown was unable to rely on the statutory presumption under s. 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code because breath samples were not taken within two hours of the alleged offence.

The Crown sought to rely on a toxicologist's report and invited the trial judge to perform retrograde extrapolation calculations to determine the accused's blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving.

The trial judge declined to perform such calculations and dismissed both charges.

The applicant sought to exclude evidence from his impaired driving trial based on two alleged Charter violations.

First, he argued that the approved screening device demand was invalid because the officer lacked reasonable suspicion that he had operated a motor vehicle within the preceding three hours, as required by s. 254(2) of the Criminal Code.

Second, he argued that video surveillance of him urinating in a police cell violated s. 8 of the Charter.

The court found that the first breach was not established, as the officer's reasonable suspicion could be inferred from the circumstances.

The court found that the second breach was established but declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, balancing the seriousness of the violation against the minimal impact and society's interest in adjudication on the merits.