Charon Kerr

Ji Feng pleaded guilty to failing to stop at an accident resulting in death, contrary to section 320.16(3) of the Criminal Code.

The incident involved striking and killing a cyclist while distracted by medical news, followed by deliberate actions to obscure her involvement.

The Crown sought a nine-month jail sentence, while the defence proposed a twelve-month conditional sentence.

The court emphasized denunciation and general deterrence as primary sentencing objectives for such a grave offense, noting the maximum life imprisonment penalty.

Despite mitigating factors like a guilty plea, remorse, and positive rehabilitative prospects, the court found a conditional sentence inconsistent with sentencing principles due to the accused's heightened moral culpability from obscuring her involvement.

A traditional jail sentence was deemed necessary to denounce the conduct.

Considering the potential immigration consequences for the non-citizen accused, the court imposed a sentence of 179 days jail, a two-year driving prohibition, and a DNA sample, allowing for an appeal to the Immigration Appeal Division.

This is a sentencing decision for two young men who pleaded guilty to willfully promoting hatred against Jewish and Black people, contrary to section 319(2) of the Criminal Code, by posting hateful and dehumanizing posters in public places.

The Crown sought imprisonment, while the defence requested a conditional discharge.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the nature of the hate speech and its community impact, and mitigating factors, such as the offenders' youth, lack of prior record, guilty pleas, and efforts towards rehabilitation.

The judge emphasized denunciation and deterrence as primary sentencing objectives.

Ultimately, the court imposed a conditional sentence of imprisonment for six months, to be served in the community with strict conditions including home confinement, followed by two years of probation with community service and mandatory counselling, rejecting a conditional discharge or suspended sentence as insufficient.

The accused pleaded guilty to assaulting her three-year-old son by striking him multiple times on the buttocks, causing extensive bruising, and grabbing him by the face while screaming at him.

The Crown proceeded summarily and sought a suspended sentence with three years probation.

Defence counsel sought a conditional discharge.

The court imposed a conditional discharge for three years with conditions including curfew, probation supervision, participation in counselling and anger management programs, and restrictions on contact with the child except as authorized by the Children's Aid Society or family court order.

The court also imposed ancillary orders for DNA collection and a five-year weapons prohibition.

The defendant pleaded guilty to mischief, assault, threatening bodily harm, criminal harassment, and breaching a Youth Justice Court probation order, all committed against a minor victim between September 2013 and February 2014.

The offences involved a pattern of controlling and abusive behaviour in a dating relationship, including physical assault, property damage, threats, and distribution of intimate images.

The court imposed a blended sentence consisting of time served (59 days credited), one day of imprisonment, a six-month conditional sentence, and three years of probation with strict conditions including no contact with the victim and a 20-metre exclusion zone.

A DNA order and ten-year firearms prohibition were also imposed.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay an "over 80" charge against the respondent, Hany Ibrahim, due to a violation of his s. 11(b) Charter right to trial within a reasonable time.

The appellate court reviewed the trial judge's calculation of institutional delay, finding errors in the characterization of neutral time and inherent preparation time.

After recalculating, the institutional delay was determined to be 10 months, at the upper limit of the Morin guidelines.

The court upheld the stay of proceedings, emphasizing the straightforward nature of the case, the respondent's expeditious conduct, the institutional nature of the delay, and the significant prejudice suffered by the respondent.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference against his daughter between September 2007 and June 2008.

The Crown proceeded summarily with the accused's consent and waiver of limitation periods.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings on the grounds that his right to trial within a reasonable time had been infringed.

The total delay from charge to anticipated conclusion of trial was approximately 18 months and 19 days.

After deducting neutral intake time and inherent time requirements, the court determined institutional delay of 12 months, which exceeded but only slightly the 8-10 month guideline established in R. v. Morin.

The court found minimal actual prejudice to the accused, balanced against society's strong interest in having serious sexual assault charges decided on their merits.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.