Scott N. Latimer

The appellant was involved in a single-vehicle accident and walked to a nearby restaurant to use a phone.

A police officer arrested him in the restaurant washroom for failing to remain at the scene under the Highway Traffic Act.

This arrest led to impaired driving and refuse breath sample charges.

At trial, the judge upheld the arrest as lawful.

On appeal, the Superior Court found the trial judge erred by failing to assess whether the officer's subjective belief that an offence occurred was objectively justifiable in the circumstances.

The conviction appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The accused was charged with possession of fentanyl and cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

During the jury trial, the court ruled on several preliminary applications, including denying the accused's request to sit at counsel table and dismissing the Crown's application to adduce evidence of prior discreditable conduct.

At the close of the Crown's case, the defence moved for a directed verdict.

The court found that the Crown's case rested entirely on a single police officer's purported identification of the accused as the person who threw a bag of drugs during a chaotic takedown seven years prior.

The court concluded that the officer's identification was actually an inference based on the accused's proximity to the arrest, not an observation, and that there was no evidence upon which a properly instructed jury could reasonably convict.

The motion for a directed verdict was granted and the accused was acquitted.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing that excessive delay was caused in particular by a mistrial arising from inadequate state-provided interpreters.

Applying the Jordan framework, the court found total delay of 994 days and deducted 108 days as defence delay, including delay in setting the preliminary inquiry and defence unavailability after the mistrial.

The court held that, although the state bore responsibility for the mistrial itself, the system was immediately available to continue the retrial and the subsequent adjournment period was attributable to the defence.

With net delay calculated at 29.12 months in the Superior Court, the applicant failed to rebut the presumption of reasonableness below the 30-month ceiling.

The stay application was dismissed.

The plaintiffs moved to set aside an administrative dismissal order, later shifting to argue the dismissal was a nullity as to one plaintiff whose action had been automatically stayed under Rule 11.01 following an undisclosed transfer of interest.

The court found the dismissal order was a nullity with respect to the stayed action, but nevertheless dismissed that action for delay under Rule 11.03, applying the rule within the currency of the existing motion.

As to the second plaintiff's action, the court applied the Reid factors and found the plaintiffs had not satisfactorily explained significant delay, had not been transparent with the court regarding the transfer of interest, and that the defendant had suffered evidentiary prejudice.

Both actions were dismissed and costs of $7,500 were awarded to the defendant.

The applicant, charged with human trafficking offences alongside co-accused, brought a section 11(b) Charter application alleging unreasonable delay.

The total delay from charge to the anticipated end of trial was 48.36 months.

After deducting 11.29 months of defence delay, the net delay of 37.07 months exceeded the 30-month ceiling.

The court found the Crown failed to rebut the presumption of unreasonableness, noting a lack of vigilance during the Ontario Court of Justice case management process where the case was allowed to drift while awaiting co-accused counsel retainers.

The application was granted and the charges were stayed.

The offender, a youthful first-time offender, pleaded guilty to possession of commercial quantities of fentanyl and crystal methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking.

The court weighed the significant aggravating factor of the quantity and danger of the drugs against the mitigating factors of the guilty plea, lack of prior record, and positive rehabilitative prospects.

Applying the principles of denunciation, deterrence, and restraint, the court imposed a total sentence of nine years' imprisonment, reduced by 12 months for pre-trial custody and bail compliance, resulting in a net sentence of eight years.

The applicant sought a declaration of adverse possession over a triangular strip of disputed land along a shared boundary between two neighbouring waterfront properties on Burlington Bay.

The disputed land was registered under the Registry Act until February 24, 1997, when it was converted to the Land Titles system; under s. 51(2) of the Land Titles Act, the applicant was required to establish actual, exclusive possession for the ten-year period prior to that date (1987–1997).

The court found that a large hedge occupied and effectively blocked access to the bulk of the disputed area throughout the critical period, and that the garage and shoreline were shared in a neighbourly fashion rather than exclusively possessed.

The applicant failed to establish all three requirements of adverse possession — actual possession, intent to exclude, and effective exclusion of the true owner — and the application was dismissed.

A commercial loan dispute involving a bus company's default on a $559,250 equipment financing agreement.

The lender sought judgment for the full remaining balance plus interest and enforcement costs after the borrower ceased payments, failed to maintain insurance, and secretly sold the financed bus without notice.

The court determined that the acceleration clause, not the prepayment clause, applied following the borrower's multiple defaults.

The court rejected the borrower's arguments that section 17 of the Mortgages Act or section 8 of the Interest Act capped the lender's recovery, finding these provisions inapplicable to commercial loan agreements.

The court awarded judgment to the lender for the net amount owing after crediting the bus sale proceeds and security deposit.

The applicant sought child and spousal support from the respondent following their separation in October 2018.

The respondent claimed he had no income and was not legally entitled to work in Canada.

The court found that the respondent had been working at a family-owned grocery store since 2021 and had diverted income through family members to obscure his earnings.

The court imputed income of $70,000 annually and ordered retroactive child support of $78,232 plus prospective monthly payments of $1,397.

No spousal support was awarded based on the imputed incomes of both parties.

The plaintiff brought a motion to set aside an administrative dismissal of her claim filed in 2018 concerning ownership of a thirty-foot strip of land.

The plaintiff alleged she purchased the property in 1994 from the prior owner, but the defendant acquired title in 2014.

After filing her claim in 2018, the plaintiff took no further action for approximately six years until the registrar administratively dismissed the claim in Fall 2024.

The court applied the four-factor test from Scaini v. Prochnicki to assess whether the dismissal should be set aside, considering whether there was a satisfactory explanation for delay, whether the delay was caused by inadvertence, whether the plaintiff moved promptly to set aside the dismissal, and whether the defendant suffered prejudice.

The court found the plaintiff had not met her onus and dismissed the motion.

The court considered whether the Crown had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Kimera Fullwood was in possession of a prohibited firearm found in a residence during a drug trafficking investigation.

The court reviewed the law on circumstantial evidence and possession, ultimately finding that the evidence was reasonably capable of supporting an alternative inference that another individual, Hasnan Sandhu, brought the firearm into the residence without Fullwood’s knowledge.

Fullwood was acquitted on the firearm charges.

The court granted summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s claim as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiff, Kathy Olson, sued the defendants for breach of contract and misrepresentation after renovations to her cottage proved deficient.

The court found that Olson had sufficient knowledge of the deficiencies and the basis for a claim by summer 2019, more than two years before she commenced her action in July 2022.

The court held that the limitation period had expired, and there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

This decision addresses a lien action under the Construction Act, where the plaintiffs allege a contract for services with the defendants for which they have not been paid.

The court reviews the parties' compliance with section 39 of the Act, the sufficiency of particulars and document inspection, and the need for a timetable to move the proceeding forward.

The court finds the defendants' response to the section 39 request sufficient, denies the plaintiffs' requests for further particulars and inspection, and orders the plaintiffs to plead and attend cross-examination.

Costs are awarded to the defendants.

The non-party moving party, Westbrook Greenhouse Systems Ltd., sought to set aside a portion of a 2022 third-party production order obtained by the plaintiff, Enertec Engineering.

Westbrook's president had failed to respond to the original motion because he misread the scope of the requested production, mistakenly believing it only applied to municipal filings.

The court found that this inattentive but honest mistake fell within the scope of Rule 37.14(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Consequently, the court granted the motion to set aside the production paragraph to allow the issue to be re-litigated, but declined to award costs to Westbrook due to its president's initial carelessness.

The decision addresses a Charter application by Brandon Abrams regarding the timing of detention and the police obligation to hold off investigation until section 10(b) of the Charter is fully implemented.

The court finds that Abrams was not detained prior to his formal arrest, but that his section 10(b) rights were breached when police questioned him about new charges before he had a renewed opportunity to consult counsel.

The court excludes identity documents from evidence but admits drugs, an airsoft pistol, and drug paraphernalia.

The court considered whether to instruct the jury on the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent in a sexual assault trial.

The defence requested the instruction, but the Crown opposed.

After reviewing the evidence and relevant case law, the court found that the air of reality test was not met and declined to instruct the jury on this defence.

The decision discusses the legal standards for the air of reality test, the reasonable steps requirement, and the dangers of impermissible "twin myth" reasoning.

Wilchina Casseus pleaded guilty to attempted auto theft.

The Crown and defence jointly recommended a suspended sentence.

The court, concerned by the prevalence of auto theft in Halton Region, requested evidence on the matter.

Despite the joint recommendation and the offender being a first-time offender, the judge departed from the recommendation, finding it would bring the administration of justice into disrepute given the aggravating factors (pre-planning, intrusion on private property, high-risk flight, lying to police) and the pressing local concern of auto theft.

An eight-month conditional sentence was imposed.

The accused, Ismet Bajcinca, brought an application for a stay of criminal proceedings due to unconstitutional delay under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that almost twenty-seven months passed between the laying of the charge and the anticipated end of trial, significantly exceeding the 18-month ceiling for the Ontario Court of Justice.

The primary cause of delay was identified as the Crown's complacent approach to disclosure and case management, despite some leisurely conduct by the defence.

After calculating the net delay, which was well above the ceiling, and finding no exceptional circumstances, the court granted the stay of proceedings.

The judge expressed concern over a joint sentencing recommendation for attempted motor vehicle theft, finding it inadequate given the prevalence of such crimes in the region.

Citing R v. Anthony-Cook and R v. Lacasse, the court found the provided information insufficient to determine if the proposed sentence was in the public interest.

Pursuant to section 723 of the Criminal Code, the court ordered the Crown to produce evidence regarding the prevalence of auto theft in Halton Region, including statistical information, and adjourned the sentencing hearing.

The Electrical Safety Authority appealed the acquittal of Turano’s Home Improvement Ltd. at trial.

The trial judge had acquitted the corporate defendant, finding that its identity was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt, primarily due to the absence of "Ltd" on the contract letterhead.

The appellate court found that the trial judge erred by focusing too narrowly on the letterhead and failing to consider the totality of the evidence, which included witness testimony and documentary evidence confirming the corporate entity's involvement.

The appeal was granted, and the corporate defendant was found guilty on the dismissed counts.