Linda Elliott

The offender pleaded guilty to 11 Criminal Code offences involving the sexual abuse of children and the creation and possession of child pornography.

The offences included four counts of making child pornography, four counts of making child pornography available, two counts of invitation to sexual touching, and one count of sexual interference.

The offender abused five identifiable children, including his own biological daughter and his girlfriend's daughters, all under the age of 10.

He also possessed 1,868 images and 95 videos of child pornography across multiple devices, with many depicting severe abuse of very young children.

The court imposed a global sentence of 9 years and 3 months, with ancillary orders including DNA collection, lifetime SOIRA registration, lifetime weapons prohibition, and a 20-year Section 161 order.

The offender pleaded guilty to two counts of sexual interference involving a 12-year-old daughter and her similarly aged friend.

The Crown sought 3 to 3.5 years in penitentiary; the defence sought 15 months in a reformatory.

The court imposed a total sentence of 27 months jail (24 months for the daughter, 3 months consecutive for the friend), finding that denunciation, general deterrence, and separation from society must take precedence over rehabilitation in child sexual abuse cases.

The sentence reflects the serious breach of trust, the nature of the sexual conduct, and the early guilty plea.

The Crown sought to introduce evidence of the accused's prior discreditable conduct, specifically statements made 20 to 30 years prior expressing urges to harm homosexual men, to prove motive in a first-degree murder trial.

The court applied the Handy test for similar fact evidence and ruled the historical statements inadmissible, finding that their probative value was diminished by the passage of time and lack of action, while the risk of moral and reasoning prejudice was significant.

However, more recent statements made by the accused in 2014 were ruled admissible as they were proximate in time and relevant to intent.

Derrick Lawlor, charged with first-degree murder, sought to exclude an audio-recorded statement made to police while he was a patient in a psychiatric unit.

The Crown sought a ruling that the statement was voluntary and admissible.

The court found the statement voluntary, noting Lawlor initiated contact with police and was not under detention for Charter purposes.

The court also rejected arguments that the police's failure to re-caution Lawlor when he made incriminating statements violated his right to a fair trial, concluding that Lawlor was committed to speaking to the police regardless.

The statement was ruled admissible.

The accused pleaded guilty to multiple criminal charges arising from events in June, November 2015, and July 2016.

The charges included operating a motor vehicle while disqualified, obstruction of police, possession of methamphetamine, and possession of a loaded prohibited firearm.

The court imposed a global sentence of 26 months imprisonment, with 16 months remaining to be served after crediting enhanced pre-trial custody.

The sentence was followed by three years of probation and a three-year driving prohibition.

The court emphasized principles of general and specific deterrence, denunciation, and the serious nature of firearm offences, while also considering mitigating factors including guilty pleas, remorse, family support, and rehabilitation potential.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision that summarily dismissed her claim of discrimination based on disability.

The applicant alleged the police discriminated against her by refusing to investigate her complaints of psychotronic mind control due to a perceived mental illness.

The Divisional Court found the Tribunal's conclusion that the police properly refused to investigate because the complaints did not constitute a crime was reasonable.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The defence brought a Charter application alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Crown sought to admit breath sample results obtained following a roadside screening device demand.

The court found that although the officer unnecessarily provided rights to counsel at a time when none were legally required, this did not constitute a Charter breach.

The "forthwith" requirement under section 254(2) of the Criminal Code was satisfied, as there was no reasonable opportunity for the accused to consult with counsel before providing the sample.

The application was dismissed and the evidence was admitted.