Jennifer Christine Caskie

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol content exceeding the legal limit.

The accused conceded her impairment, her elevated blood alcohol content, and that she was driving, but claimed she did not voluntarily consume the alcohol necessary to exceed the legal limit, asserting instead that a companion had spiked her drink with an unknown drug, rendering her unconscious and incapable of making conscious decisions about drinking and driving.

The court rejected the accused's characterization of the defence as a mens rea issue and determined it was an actus reus issue involving a claim of involuntary conduct akin to automatism.

The court found the accused bore the burden of proving involuntary conduct on a balance of probabilities and failed to meet this burden.

The court rejected the accused's claim of amnesia as not credible and found no evidentiary foundation for the claim of drug-induced impairment.

The court convicted the accused.

The accused, L.R., brought an application under section 24(2) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms to exclude a videotaped statement given to police, alleging a breach of her section 10(b) right to counsel and that the statement was involuntary due to oppressive conditions and inducements.

The Crown concurrently sought a finding that the statement was voluntary.

The court found that the Crown proved voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt, as L.R.'s will was not overborne by inducements or oppressive conditions, and she maintained her right to silence numerous times.

The court also found no breach of L.R.'s section 10(b) Charter rights, as she was properly informed of her rights, understood them, and was afforded opportunities to consult with duty counsel.

Consequently, L.R.'s application to exclude the statement was dismissed, and the Crown's application for admissibility was granted.

The applicant, L.R., brought a motion for a stay of charges under section 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging a breach of her right to trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b).

The central issue was whether the 18-month or 30-month presumptive ceiling from R. v. Jordan applied to a case proceeding by direct indictment in Superior Court without a preliminary inquiry.

The applicant argued for the 18-month ceiling, which would make the 26-month delay presumptively unreasonable.

The court reviewed several Ontario, Manitoba, and Alberta Superior Court and appellate decisions, all of which consistently held that the 30-month ceiling applies when a case is going to trial in Superior Court, regardless of whether a preliminary inquiry was held or if a direct indictment was preferred.

The court dismissed the applicant's motion, affirming that the 30-month ceiling was applicable and that the applicant had not demonstrated unreasonable delay falling short of that ceiling, nor had she taken meaningful steps to expedite proceedings.

The court also declined to grant leave for a further s. 11(b) application, emphasizing that all alternate arguments should be brought in one application.

Derrick Lawlor, charged with first-degree murder, sought to exclude an audio-recorded statement made to police while he was a patient in a psychiatric unit.

The Crown sought a ruling that the statement was voluntary and admissible.

The court found the statement voluntary, noting Lawlor initiated contact with police and was not under detention for Charter purposes.

The court also rejected arguments that the police's failure to re-caution Lawlor when he made incriminating statements violated his right to a fair trial, concluding that Lawlor was committed to speaking to the police regardless.

The statement was ruled admissible.

The accused pleaded guilty to one count of sexual interference contrary to section 151 of the Criminal Code involving a child victim over a period from January 2008 to December 2010.

Following a Gardiner hearing, the court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused committed numerous sexual assaults and acts of sexual interference against the victim, including sexual intercourse, oral sex, and anal sex, as well as creation of child pornography.

The accused held a position of trust as the victim's stepfather.

The court imposed a sentence of six years' imprisonment, along with ancillary orders including a DNA order, Sex Offender Information Registration Act compliance, a section 161 prohibition order for ten years, and a no-contact order during incarceration.

The accused was charged with driving while disqualified.

A Charter application was brought alleging violations of section 9 (arbitrary detention) and section 10(b) (right to counsel).

The court found no section 9 breach, as the initial stop was justified by reasonable suspicion based on the officer's observation of evasive driving and information about a prohibited driver.

However, a clear section 10(b) breach was established and conceded by the Crown, as the accused was detained and questioned for approximately 30 minutes without being advised of his rights to counsel.

The court found the evidence obtained prior to the breach was not tainted by the subsequent violation, as the connection was too tenuous.

The accused was convicted of driving while disqualified.

A sentence reduction was imposed as a remedy for the Charter violation.