Christopher Adrian Avery

The defendant, Ehsan Rahmanian, was tried for driving with a blood-alcohol concentration above the legal limit.

He brought a Charter application to exclude breath readings, arguing violations of sections 8 (unreasonable search and seizure) and 9 (arbitrary detention) due to the officer's failure to expressly invoke mandatory alcohol screening (MAS) authority.

The court found that the officer had reasonable suspicion to demand a screening sample based on problematic driving, odour of alcohol, and bloodshot eyes.

It further held that police are not required to declaratively invoke the MAS authority during testimony.

The Charter application was denied, and a finding of guilt was entered.

This criminal trial concerned charges of attempted murder, aggravated assault, and assault with a weapon against the defendant, Paul Nelson, stemming from a stabbing incident.

The defence argued self-defence.

The court found the complainant's testimony unreliable due to inconsistencies and intoxication.

Based on video evidence and eyewitness accounts, the court determined that the complainant initiated the physical altercation by ambushing and brutally beating the defendant.

The court concluded that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to kill the complainant, noting that the stabbing occurred while the defendant was being severely assaulted and was an attempt to escape.

Furthermore, the court found that the Crown failed to disprove self-defence, as the defendant had reasonable grounds to believe force was being used against him, acted for self-protection, and his response, while involving a knife, was not unreasonable given the relentless nature of the attack and limited options for de-escalation.

Consequently, the defendant was acquitted of all charges.

This criminal trial concerned charges of impaired operation and "80+" following a single-vehicle collision.

The central issue was the identification of the driver.

The Crown presented direct and circumstantial evidence, including testimony from a neutral witness who observed the male defendant exiting the driver's seat immediately after the crash.

The defendant's testimony was deemed unreliable due to intoxication, and his wife's testimony was found not credible as it contradicted other evidence.

The court concluded that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the driver.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay impaired driving and over 80 charges against the respondent.

The trial judge found a s. 8 Charter breach due to intrusive cell camera monitoring of the respondent using the toilet, despite prior judicial commentary on the issue.

The appeal court upheld the trial judge's finding of a s. 8 breach and the decision to exclude evidence and stay the charges, emphasizing the seriousness of the state misconduct and the lack of remedial action by the police detachment.

The defendant, Ciara Jenks, brought a Jordan application for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay, alleging a breach of her s.11(b) Charter right.

The court found a total delay of 665 days (21.9 months), exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court cases.

The judge attributed 42 days of the delay to the defence for unhelpful boilerplate disclosure requests and failure to bring issues to the court's attention, reducing net delay to 623 days (20.5 months).

The Crown was found responsible for significant disclosure delays and an inflexible approach to scheduling.

The court also acknowledged its own role in the delay by not intervening earlier.

The Crown's argument for further pandemic-related deductions was rejected due to lack of specific evidence.

The court concluded that the defendant's Charter right was infringed and stayed the charge.

The defendant, Brett Hicks, was charged with alcohol-impaired driving and refusing to provide a breath sample.

The court found the Crown failed to prove impairment beyond a reasonable doubt.

The breath demand was deemed unlawful because the officer failed to observe the required 15-minute waiting period for mouth alcohol dissipation, rendering the ASD result unreliable.

The court also found a breach of the defendant's s.10(b) Charter right to counsel, as police made only token efforts to contact his counsel of choice and failed to inform him of his right to wait, which rendered his refusal provisional.

Furthermore, the police's degrading treatment of the defendant in the holding cell, specifically denying him toilet paper and observing him use his mask, constituted an unreasonable search and seizure under s.8 of the Charter.

Consequently, the defendant was acquitted on both criminal charges, and related provincial offences were proven but stayed due to the s.8 Charter infringement.

The defendant was charged with possession of cocaine and marijuana for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown's case relied heavily on circumstantial evidence, primarily the defendant's fingerprints found on drug packaging discovered in a neighbour's yard, and the proximity of the defendant's parents' residence.

The defendant testified, denying knowledge or involvement with the drugs, explaining his fingerprints by routine household activities.

The court found the police investigation to be lacking and, despite suspicion, concluded that the circumstantial evidence did not amount to proof beyond a reasonable doubt, as the defendant's testimony might reasonably be true and other inferences could be drawn from the evidence.

The defendant was found not guilty on both charges.

The accused was charged with impaired driving, failing to provide a suitable breath sample, failing to surrender a valid insurance card, driving with liquor readily available, and speeding.

The accused pled guilty to the liquor and speeding charges.

On the remaining charges, the court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused's impairment was caused by alcohol rather than fatigue and head injury; that the accused intentionally failed to provide a breath sample, as the qualified technician failed to provide proper instructions or demonstration and prematurely terminated multiple attempts; and that the accused failed to exercise due diligence regarding the insurance card, as he reasonably believed he had provided a valid card and was never given an opportunity to correct the error.

The accused was acquitted on all charges except those to which he pled guilty.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol content exceeding the legal limit.

The accused conceded her impairment, her elevated blood alcohol content, and that she was driving, but claimed she did not voluntarily consume the alcohol necessary to exceed the legal limit, asserting instead that a companion had spiked her drink with an unknown drug, rendering her unconscious and incapable of making conscious decisions about drinking and driving.

The court rejected the accused's characterization of the defence as a mens rea issue and determined it was an actus reus issue involving a claim of involuntary conduct akin to automatism.

The court found the accused bore the burden of proving involuntary conduct on a balance of probabilities and failed to meet this burden.

The court rejected the accused's claim of amnesia as not credible and found no evidentiary foundation for the claim of drug-induced impairment.

The court convicted the accused.

The defendant was charged with "over 80" (operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood) following a failed approved screening device test.

The sole issue was whether the arresting officer's belief that the screening device was accurate was objectively reasonable.

The court found that the officer's reliance on the device's lock-out feature, which prevents operation if calibration or accuracy checks are not current, provided a sufficient and reasonable basis for believing the device was functioning properly.

The defendant was convicted.

The accused was charged with impaired driving following a minor collision at a gas station and subsequent erratic driving on Highway 404.

A civilian witness observed the accused stumble when exiting his vehicle at the gas station and subsequently followed the vehicle on the highway, observing consistent swerving and lane violations.

Police officers observed similar driving deficiencies and noted physical signs of impairment including red eyes, slurred speech, unsteadiness, and an odour of alcohol.

The accused testified he consumed only two or three light beers over eight hours and attributed his driving errors to distraction from a following vehicle with flashing lights.

The court found the accused's testimony not credible and convicted him based on the consistent observations of the civilian witness and two police officers, corroborated by in-car video evidence.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while her blood alcohol level exceeded 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood.

The defence raised two arguments: first, that the arresting officer failed to copy his scratch notes, resulting in lost evidence that should trigger a stay or exclusion of evidence; and second, that the absence of scratch notes rendered the officer's testimony unreliable regarding grounds for arrest.

The court found that while the failure to copy scratch notes constituted a breach of section 7 of the Charter, the officer's testimony was sufficiently detailed and reliable to establish that the notes were transcribed accurately.

The court found no remedy was warranted in a judge-alone trial and convicted the accused.

The accused was charged with "over 80" (operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood).

The defence raised two arguments: (1) a Charter section 11(b) right to trial within a reasonable time, and (2) that the breath samples were not taken as soon as practicable.

The court found that the net delay after deducting defence-caused delay was 9 months and 22 days, below the presumptive ceiling of 18 months for Ontario Court of Justice cases.

The defence failed to demonstrate sustained efforts to expedite the proceedings or that the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have.

The court also found that the breath samples were taken as soon as practicable within the circumstances, with all delays adequately explained or reasonable.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused was charged with operation of a motor vehicle with over 80 mg of alcohol per hundred millilitres of blood following a traffic stop in Callander, Ontario on December 12, 2015.

The trial involved a blended trial and Charter application.

The defence raised two issues: (1) whether the Intoxilyzer samples were taken as soon as practicable, and (2) whether the officer properly utilized the approved screening device (ASD) to establish reasonable and probable grounds for arrest.

The court found that the samples were obtained as soon as practicable within a 37-minute period that included necessary processing and the accused's right to counsel.

The court also found that the officer's reliance on the ASD result was reasonable under the circumstances.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and over 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood following a traffic stop on November 15, 2013.

The accused challenged the charges on Charter grounds, alleging violations of sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b).

The court found no violation of the right to counsel, determining that the accused had sufficient English comprehension to understand her rights despite English being her second language.

However, the court found a violation of section 9 (arbitrary detention) because the booking sergeant relied solely on blood alcohol content when determining when to release the accused, rather than considering all relevant circumstances as required by section 498 of the Criminal Code.

The court found the over-holding to be approximately 3-4 hours.

The court convicted the accused of both charges but stayed the impaired driving charge under the Kienapple principle to avoid double punishment.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while her blood alcohol concentration was over the legal limit and operating a motor vehicle while her ability to drive was impaired by alcohol.

The accused brought a Charter application challenging the lawfulness of her arrest and the seizure of breath samples.

The court found that the officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds to believe the accused was impaired by alcohol, relying instead on an ambiguous admission by the accused that she would "blow over" without clarifying what threshold she meant.

The court concluded that the officer conducted an unreasonable search and seizure and arbitrarily detained the accused in violation of sections 8 and 9 of the Charter.

The breath sample evidence was excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter, and both charges were dismissed.