Corie Amanda Langdon

Following the accused's conviction for manslaughter, the Crown applied for a section 752.1 assessment to determine whether the accused might be declared a Dangerous Offender or Long-term Offender.

The court granted the application, finding reasonable grounds to believe the accused could be found to be a Dangerous Offender based on the brutality of the killing.

The court rejected the defence argument that the accused's ability to control his mental illness while in custody and his response to provocation negated the assessment order.

The defendant, Astrit Shkurta, brought an application under s. 11(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms for a stay of charges due to unreasonable delay.

The court applied the R. v. Jordan framework, calculating the total delay as 802 days.

After subtracting 286 days attributed to defence delay (including delays in Crown Pretrial Hearing (CPT) and Judicial Pretrial Hearing (JPT) scheduling, and lack of contact between the defendant and counsel), the net delay was found to be 516 days (16.96 months).

As this net delay was below the 18-month presumptive ceiling for the Ontario Court of Justice, the court found no s. 11(b) breach and dismissed the application.

The court also noted no evidence that the COVID-19 pandemic contributed to the delay in this specific case.

The accused, Rico Harvey, was charged with second-degree murder.

The Crown sought to admit two statements made by the accused to the police.

Defence counsel argued that the statements were not voluntary and that the accused's s. 10(b) Charter rights were violated.

The court found that the police violated the accused's s. 10(b) Charter rights by continuing the first interview despite his expressed dissatisfaction with legal advice and his vulnerable mental state.

The second statement was found to be tainted by the first due to temporal, contextual, and causal connections, including lack of food and sleep.

Applying the Grant factors, the court excluded both statements under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding the impact on the accused's rights serious and society's interest in adjudication on the merits favoring exclusion given the reliability of other evidence.

The court also found a reasonable doubt regarding the voluntariness of both statements due to oppressive circumstances.

The defendant, Ashton Gray, a 33-year-old Mi’kmaq, Black, and transgender individual with a history of mental health issues and homelessness, pleaded guilty to mischief to a religious structure (motivated by bias) and possession of an incendiary device.

These offenses occurred shortly after being released on a conditional sentence for previous mischief and assault charges.

The Crown sought to collapse the conditional sentence and impose an additional 6-9 months of jail.

The defense argued for a more lenient sentence, citing the defendant's background, the impact of colonialism and residential schools, and the relatively minor damage caused.

The court acknowledged the defendant's Gladue factors and mental health but emphasized the seriousness of the offenses, the breach of the conditional sentence, and the unacceptability of vigilante justice.

The conditional sentence was collapsed, and a total of 120 days of custody was imposed for the new offenses.

The offender, Jean Guy Thibeault, was sentenced for manslaughter and aggravated assault.

The court found the manslaughter to be an aggravated instance due to the victim's vulnerability, the unprovoked and brutal nature of the attack involving multiple stomping blows, the high moral culpability, and the offender's indifference to the victim's fate.

No mitigating circumstances were identified, and the offender expressed no remorse.

The court imposed a sentence of twelve years imprisonment for manslaughter, reduced to seven years after credit for pre-sentence custody, and a concurrent sentence of two years imprisonment for aggravated assault.

Mandatory lifetime firearm prohibition and DNA orders were also issued.

The accused, Shondell Lucas-Johnson, was convicted on two counts of procuring the sexual services of a person 18 years of age.

The complainant, ML, had prior experience in the sex trade and chose to work at a spa introduced by the accused.

The relationship was romantic and domestic, with ML retaining her earnings and sharing living expenses.

The court found the accused was not violent or threatening towards ML, who herself exhibited violence.

Aggravating factors included the accused's criminal record for domestic disputes and being on probation.

Mitigating factors included his youth, family support, and educational/employment history.

The Crown sought a three-year custodial sentence, while the defence sought nine to twelve months.

The court imposed a 12-month custodial sentence, with credit for 836 days of pre-trial custody, resulting in no further time to be served.

Ancillary orders included two years' probation, a DNA order, a five-year firearm prohibition, and a 150-meter no-contact/restriction order regarding the complainant.

One count was stayed under the Kienapple principle.

During a trial for second-degree murder and aggravated assault, a voir dire was conducted to determine the admissibility of utterances made by the defendant to a detective.

The Crown sought to admit the statements, arguing they were voluntary and that any Charter breach should not lead to exclusion.

The defence contended the statements were involuntary and obtained in violation of the defendant's rights under ss. 10(a) and 10(b) of the Charter, and thus should be excluded under s. 24(2).

The court found the utterances voluntary and no infringement of s. 10(a).

However, it found a serious breach of s. 10(b) due to the police's failure to facilitate access to counsel for 4.5 hours after the defendant asserted his right.

Applying the R. v. Grant factors, the court concluded that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, and therefore ruled the utterances inadmissible.

The accused was charged with 14 counts related to human trafficking, procuring, and material benefit involving two young women.

The Crown sought to admit cross-count similar fact evidence, which the court excluded due to substantial dissimilarities in the circumstances.

Regarding the first complainant, the court found her evidence unreliable and acquitted the accused of all related charges.

Regarding the second complainant, the court found no evidence of exploitation or coercion, resulting in acquittals for human trafficking and material benefit.

However, the court found the accused guilty of two counts of procuring for introducing and recruiting the second complainant to work in the sex trade.

The Crown brought an application under s. 714.1 of the Criminal Code to allow the complainant in a human trafficking case to testify by video link from Nova Scotia.

The complainant, who was 17 at the time of the alleged offences, had returned to Halifax and expressed severe anxiety about returning to Toronto to testify, fearing the accused's associates and the disruption to her support network.

The court granted the application, finding that the complainant's vulnerability and the potential for emotional distress in Toronto would likely interfere with the presentation of her evidence, and that modern video technology sufficiently protected the accused's right to make full answer and defence.

The accused was convicted of two counts of cruelty to animals under sections 446(1) and 445.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code following a protracted trial.

The accused maintained approximately 107 cats in severely neglected conditions, resulting in widespread disease, suffering, and the eventual euthanization of all but one animal.

The Crown sought a custodial sentence of four to six months imprisonment followed by three years probation, a DNA data banking order, and a lifetime prohibition on pet ownership.

The accused sought a non-custodial disposition.

The court imposed a conditional discharge with 12 months probation, 100 hours of community service, and a restriction to no more than two domestic animals at any time, rejecting both custodial sentencing and the lifetime pet prohibition.

The accused was charged with five sexual assault offences involving three separate complainants, with allegations spanning from 2002 to 2003.

The trial proceeded on the basis of the complainants' evidence alone, with no corroborating evidence.

The court found that each complainant engaged in significant inconsistencies between their media interviews, police statements, and trial testimony.

Each complainant also deliberately withheld material information from police and Crown counsel, including post-assault contact with the accused that contradicted their claims of trauma and fear.

The court concluded that the complainants' credibility and reliability were severely compromised by their deceptive conduct, late disclosures, and contradictory evidence.

The court found that the evidence failed to meet the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused on all charges.

The accused was charged with cruelty to animals under sections 445.1(1)(a) and 446(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

At the time of police intervention on April 24, 2011, the accused had at least 107 cats living in her home in filthy, disease-ridden conditions.

The cats suffered from malnutrition, dehydration, upper respiratory infections, urine and fecal scalding, alopecia, periodontal disease, and genetic defects from inbreeding.

The court found that the accused's conduct constituted a marked departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable person.

The mens rea of the offences was established on a modified objective test: the Crown proved that pain, suffering, and injury were reasonably foreseeable consequences of the accused's failure to provide adequate food, water, shelter, and care.

The accused's "colour of right" defence failed as no reasonable person could have believed the conditions were acceptable.

The court found the accused guilty on all counts.

The applicant sought release on bail while charged with first-degree murder and attempted murder arising from a group attack on a public street.

Applying the reverse onus provisions and the tertiary ground framework, the court found the applicant had discharged the onus on the primary ground but failed on the secondary and tertiary grounds.

The court relied on strong surveillance evidence, the applicant's alleged misleading police statement, the inadequacy of the proposed supervision plan, the gravity of the offences, and the likelihood of a lengthy penitentiary sentence.

The bail application was dismissed.

The court sentenced the accused for an unprovoked workplace aggravated assault in which he struck a co-worker in the face and neck with a screw driver, causing a permanent facial scar.

The defence argued for an intermittent sentence below six months because a custodial term of six months or more could trigger deportation consequences for a permanent resident.

Applying proportionality, parity, and the collateral-consequences approach, the court held that immigration consequences could be considered but could not distort a fit sentence for a serious personal injury offence.

The court imposed 12 months' imprisonment, 24 months' probation, a weapons prohibition, and a DNA order, and stayed the assault with a weapon count under the Kienapple principle.

The accused was convicted of historical gross indecency against a child relative, with the abuse spanning ten years.

The Crown sought a five-year sentence, while the defence argued for three to four years.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, noting the profound breach of trust and the severe, lasting impact on the victim.

The court imposed a base sentence of 57 months, reduced by 33 months of enhanced pre-sentence custody credit, resulting in a net sentence of two years less a day to be served in a provincial facility, followed by three years of probation.

Additional orders included a DNA order, lifetime registration on the National Sex Offender Registry, and lifetime prohibition orders under sections 161 and 110 of the Criminal Code.

In a historical sexual abuse trial involving multiple complainants and allegations spanning several decades, the court applied the W.(D.) framework together with a reliability-focused analysis drawn from recent jurisprudence on historical evidence.

The court held that one gross indecency charge alleged after repeal of the offence had to be quashed, directed acquittals on additional counts that could not be proven, and admitted count-to-count similar fact evidence as between the remaining complainants.

The accused's testimony was rejected as not credible and tailored, but the court distinguished between credibility and reliability in assessing the complainants' evidence.

One complainant's evidence was found credible and reliable and sufficiently corroborated in important respects, resulting in a conviction for gross indecency; the other complainant's evidence was found sincere but unreliable in material respects, resulting in acquittals on those counts.

In a criminal prosecution alleging historical sexual offences against two protected complainants, the Crown brought a mid-trial application to admit each complainant’s evidence as similar fact evidence on a count-to-count basis.

Applying the framework in Handy, the court held the evidence was admissible to demonstrate a situation-specific propensity to sexually abuse young male family members, to negate fabrication, and to assist in assessing credibility and reliability.

The court found extensive contextual and behavioural similarities, no realistic basis for collusion, and a high degree of probative value that outweighed the risk of moral or reasoning prejudice.

The Crown’s application was granted and the evidence was admitted.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery, use of an imitation firearm, break and enter, and breach of probation, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing eyewitness identification evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge carefully considered the evidence and was entitled to conclude that the circumstantial evidence, including descriptions of clothing and the discovery of a replica gun, proved the case beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Crown sought leave to appeal from a Superior Court order allowing the respondent's appeal from his conviction on two counts of sexual assault and directing a new trial.

The Crown conceded the appeal did not raise an issue of broader significance but argued leave should be granted because the merits were very strong.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, finding the merits alone did not warrant granting leave in the circumstances.