Beverley Richards

This ruling addresses the admissibility of text messages extracted from the accused's cell phone during a first-degree murder trial.

The defence argued the texts were irrelevant and constituted impermissible disposition evidence.

The Crown sought to admit them to corroborate the credibility and reliability of statements made by the accused to undercover officers, particularly regarding his lifestyle and interests.

The court found the majority of the texts relevant for supporting the officers' testimony, concluding their probative value outweighed their prejudicial effect.

However, the court excluded texts referring to violent consensual sex, masturbation, and a nude photograph, deeming them either too prejudicial or irrelevant.

During a first-degree murder trial, the accused brought an application for a mistrial and other relief following the late disclosure that undercover officers placed in his cell had audio-monitored their communications.

The accused sought further disclosure, challenged the Crown's claim of investigative privilege over the monitoring device, and argued the monitoring violated section 8 of the Charter.

The court dismissed the applications, finding that the Crown properly asserted public interest privilege over the device's specifics.

The court also held that the audio monitoring was lawfully conducted for officer safety under section 184.1 of the Criminal Code and did not constitute an unreasonable search or seizure.

The application for a mistrial was dismissed.

The accused, Kalen Schlatter, applied for an order declaring his right to silence under s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was infringed by statements made to Toronto Police Services undercover officers placed in cells adjacent to his upon arrest, and to exclude these statements under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The court reviewed the police conduct, including the decision not to record the interaction surreptitiously without judicial authorization, and the nature of the conversation between the accused and the undercover officers.

The court found that the police did not actively elicit the statement in a manner akin to interrogation and that the accused had not met the onus of establishing a Charter violation.

The application was dismissed.

The Crown sought to admit evidence of the accused's prior discreditable conduct, including violent sexual images, search terms, and viva voce evidence of consensual choking sex, in a first-degree murder trial.

The defence intended to assert an alternate suspect (James Gardiner) and an inadequate police investigation defence.

The court ruled that the discreditable conduct evidence was not admissible generally, as its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value, not being sufficiently distinctive to constitute a signature.

However, the evidence would become admissible if the defence adduced evidence of the alternate suspect's bad character or raised an inadequate investigation/tunnel vision defence, to prevent a distorted picture for the jury.

Certain highly prejudicial evidence, such as a specific video, would need to be excised or altered if admitted.

The applicant sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code after a justice of the peace ordered detention on primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds.

The charges involved alleged firearms offences, dangerous driving, and failing to stop for police following an incident in which a shotgun was allegedly discharged and a high‑speed police pursuit ensued.

The applicant proposed a revised release plan involving multiple sureties and electronic monitoring.

The court found serious credibility issues with both the applicant and the proposed surety and concluded the release plan would not adequately mitigate risks of flight or non‑compliance.

The court held that detention remained justified on the primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds and dismissed the bail review application.

The Crown applied during a murder trial for a psychiatric assessment and a further fitness hearing after concerns arose about the accused’s ability to participate meaningfully in the proceedings.

Evidence from a psychiatrist indicated that although the accused had a rudimentary understanding of the nature and consequences of the proceedings, severe psychosis and delusional beliefs impaired his ability to communicate with counsel or defend himself.

The court reviewed the statutory test for fitness under s. 2 of the Criminal Code and the governing “limited cognitive capacity” test from appellate jurisprudence.

Considering the accused’s conduct in court and expert evidence, the judge concluded there were reasonable grounds to believe the accused could not meaningfully participate in his defence.

An assessment order was granted and the issue of fitness was directed to be determined again by a jury.