Lydia Riva

The court sentenced Renzo Gomez for dangerous driving causing death and dangerous driving causing bodily harm, following his guilty plea.

The facts established that Mr. Gomez drove at excessive speed, under the influence of alcohol, and with a history of prior driving offences, resulting in a fatal collision and serious injuries.

The court reviewed the impact on the victims and their families, the offender’s personal circumstances, and the applicable legal framework.

After considering aggravating and mitigating factors, the court imposed a custodial sentence of 6 years for causing death (with a 16-year driving prohibition) and 4 years for causing bodily harm (with a 14-year prohibition), to be served concurrently, along with a DNA order.

The Crown applied under section 714.1 of the Criminal Code for the complainant, LS, to give evidence at trial by videoconference from Bracebridge, Ontario, citing her location and personal circumstances.

The defence opposed, arguing it would compromise the accused's right to a fair trial by impairing cross-examination and that the proposed location was unsuitable.

The court granted the Crown's application, finding that LS's age, physical and mental disabilities, and the significant distance to the courthouse weighed in favour of the order.

The court dismissed the defence's concerns, noting that arrangements for physical evidence and police presence would mitigate risks to a fair trial and the integrity of testimony.

This criminal trial concerned charges of impaired driving causing death and bodily harm against Renzo Gomez, who had already pleaded guilty to dangerous driving.

The central issue was whether the accused's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol.

Despite a high-speed collision, the smell of alcohol on the accused's breath, and a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) range of 53-105 mg/100ml, the court found reasonable doubt.

This was primarily due to expert evidence highlighting inter-individual variability in the effects of alcohol and the consistent testimony of three witnesses (a police officer and two paramedics) who observed no signs of impairment in the accused.

The court emphasized that a high BAC alone, especially below 100 mg/100ml, does not automatically prove impairment beyond a reasonable doubt for criminal prosecution, and that such a threshold is a matter for Parliament.

The accused was acquitted of the impaired driving charges.

This was a ten-day judge-alone criminal trial where the defendant, D.F., faced 28 counts of physical and sexual assault against his former partner, C.L., alleged to have occurred between 2008 and 2020.

The defendant pleaded not guilty, asserting that the complainant fabricated the allegations in the context of a family law dispute, particularly after learning he had a new partner.

The court found the complainant's testimony to be neither credible nor reliable, citing numerous inconsistencies, contradictions, and the manipulation of text messages to falsely imply admissions from the defendant.

Conversely, the defendant's testimony was found credible and reliable.

The court dismissed all charges, concluding that the Crown had not proven the offences beyond a reasonable doubt, and explicitly stating belief in the defendant's account.

The 47-year-old first offender pleaded guilty to break and enter and possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking.

The offences were committed while she was suffering from a severe opioid addiction following the death of her partner.

After her arrest, she engaged in extensive rehabilitation and remained drug-free while on bail for over two years.

The court found that her exceptional rehabilitation, early guilty pleas, and lack of prior record justified a conditional sentence of two years less a day, rather than the penitentiary term sought by the Crown.

The offenders were sentenced for their roles in the home invasion robbery and murder of the victim.

Wight, who pleaded guilty to manslaughter and was an active participant in the severe beating, was sentenced to 13 years imprisonment, less pre-sentence custody credit.

Hoo-Hing, who was found guilty of second degree murder as a secondary party for facilitating entry and assisting in the robbery plan, received a mandatory life sentence with a 13-year period of parole ineligibility.

The court also ordered the forfeiture of $18,800 seized from Hoo-Hing as proceeds of crime.

The applicant sought bail pending appeal from convictions for two counts of sexual interference and two counts of sexual assault, for which he received a seven-year sentence.

The convictions related to historical sexual assaults on his niece.

The Crown opposed the application on the public interest ground, specifically concerning public confidence.

The court, applying the test from R. v. Oland, found that at least one ground of appeal regarding the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credibility might have merit, and that the appeal was not weak.

Considering the historical nature of the offences and the applicant's prior compliance with bail conditions, the court granted bail pending appeal with stricter terms, including provisions restricting his access to persons under the age of 16, satisfying public safety concerns.

During deliberations in a lengthy murder trial, the jury sent several notes indicating they had reached unanimous verdicts for two accused and a unanimous verdict on a lesser included offence for the third accused, but were deadlocked on the greater offence for the third accused.

Five majority jurors sent notes attacking the reasoning of the minority jurors, including allegations of racism.

The trial judge declined to conduct an inquiry into the minority jurors' reasoning or declare a mistrial, finding that doing so would violate the common law jury secrecy rule and s. 649 of the Criminal Code.

The court accepted the unanimous verdicts reached by the jury.

In a trial for first-degree murder involving three co-accused, the Crown and one co-accused sought to admit text messages and prior convictions of another co-accused to establish a drug dealer-purchaser relationship and a disposition for violence and firearms.

The court ruled the evidence admissible, finding that its probative value in supporting the co-accused's defence of lack of intent outweighed the prejudicial effect.

The court provided mid-trial and final limiting instructions to the jury regarding the permissible and impermissible uses of the disposition evidence.

The accused, charged with possession of controlled substances for the purpose of trafficking, brought a Garofoli application to exclude evidence obtained during the execution of a search warrant at her residence.

She argued her s. 8 Charter rights were violated because the Information to Obtain (ITO) relied on confidential informant information that was not credible, compelling, or corroborated.

Applying the Debot factors, the court found that while corroboration was limited, the highly compelling and credible nature of the information from two confidential sources provided sufficient grounds for the authorizing justice to issue the warrant.

The application was dismissed.

The defendant, Chad Storey, was convicted of possession of child pornography, making sexually explicit material available to a child, sexual interference, and assault, involving two young complainants.

The Crown sought a 6-year penitentiary sentence, while the defence sought a 90-day concurrent sentence followed by probation, citing the defendant's intellectual challenges and stringent bail conditions.

The court, applying principles from R. v. Friesen, emphasized denunciation and deterrence for child sexual abuse offences.

It found that the defendant's intellectual disability did not reduce his moral blameworthiness to displace the need for a penitentiary sentence, as he demonstrated awareness of the wrongfulness of his actions.

The court also considered the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and lengthy house arrest bail conditions (50 months), granting 12 months credit for pre-trial custody and restrictive bail.

The defendant was sentenced to an aggregate of five years in the penitentiary, with ancillary orders including lifetime Sex Offender Information Registration Act compliance, DNA sample, 10-year firearm prohibition, and communication prohibition with victims.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred by limiting his analysis to the complainant's capacity to consent, rather than her direct assertion of non-consent.

The Superior Court of Justice found the trial judge misapplied the two-step consent analysis from R. v. Hutchinson, failing to address the subjective element of consent.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a new trial ordered, as the factual findings necessary for a substituted conviction were not made.

Z.A., in custody for 11 months awaiting trial on criminal harassment and probation breach charges, sought a review of his detention under s. 525 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown opposed release on secondary grounds, citing Z.A.'s history of harassing conduct and related convictions.

The court considered the COVID-19 pandemic and the passage of time but found a substantial likelihood of Z.A. committing further offences, given his persistent pattern of harassment despite warnings and previous convictions.

The application for release was dismissed.

During a first-degree murder trial, the accused brought an application for a mistrial and other relief following the late disclosure that undercover officers placed in his cell had audio-monitored their communications.

The accused sought further disclosure, challenged the Crown's claim of investigative privilege over the monitoring device, and argued the monitoring violated section 8 of the Charter.

The court dismissed the applications, finding that the Crown properly asserted public interest privilege over the device's specifics.

The court also held that the audio monitoring was lawfully conducted for officer safety under section 184.1 of the Criminal Code and did not constitute an unreasonable search or seizure.

The application for a mistrial was dismissed.

This ruling addresses the admissibility of text messages extracted from the accused's cell phone during a first-degree murder trial.

The defence argued the texts were irrelevant and constituted impermissible disposition evidence.

The Crown sought to admit them to corroborate the credibility and reliability of statements made by the accused to undercover officers, particularly regarding his lifestyle and interests.

The court found the majority of the texts relevant for supporting the officers' testimony, concluding their probative value outweighed their prejudicial effect.

However, the court excluded texts referring to violent consensual sex, masturbation, and a nude photograph, deeming them either too prejudicial or irrelevant.

The accused, Kalen Schlatter, applied for an order declaring his right to silence under s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was infringed by statements made to Toronto Police Services undercover officers placed in cells adjacent to his upon arrest, and to exclude these statements under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The court reviewed the police conduct, including the decision not to record the interaction surreptitiously without judicial authorization, and the nature of the conversation between the accused and the undercover officers.

The court found that the police did not actively elicit the statement in a manner akin to interrogation and that the accused had not met the onus of establishing a Charter violation.

The application was dismissed.

The Crown sought to admit evidence of the accused's prior discreditable conduct, including violent sexual images, search terms, and viva voce evidence of consensual choking sex, in a first-degree murder trial.

The defence intended to assert an alternate suspect (James Gardiner) and an inadequate police investigation defence.

The court ruled that the discreditable conduct evidence was not admissible generally, as its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value, not being sufficiently distinctive to constitute a signature.

However, the evidence would become admissible if the defence adduced evidence of the alternate suspect's bad character or raised an inadequate investigation/tunnel vision defence, to prevent a distorted picture for the jury.

Certain highly prejudicial evidence, such as a specific video, would need to be excised or altered if admitted.

The Crown appealed a sentence of 6.5 years imposed on the respondent for 102 counts of sexual offences against 18 young boys committed over more than 20 years while employed in positions of trust.

The respondent pleaded guilty to 43 counts of indecent assault on a male, 47 counts of gross indecency, and 10 counts of sexual assault, and was found guilty of 2 additional counts of gross indecency.

The sentencing judge found the respondent posed a very low to low risk for future sexual offending and imposed a concurrent sentence of 6.5 years, less six months' credit for pre-trial bail.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence demonstrably unfit and varied it to 10 years' imprisonment, less six months' credit for a net sentence of 9.5 years.

The accused were convicted of trafficking cocaine and conspiracy to import cocaine, with some offences committed in association with the 'Ndrangheta criminal organization.

The Crown relied on evidence from a paid police agent who recorded conversations with the accused detailing plans to import large quantities of cocaine.

The court sentenced the first accused to 11.5 years and the second accused to 9 years imprisonment, emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence for large-scale cocaine importation schemes.

The accused, Michael Lopez, was found guilty by a jury of human trafficking, receiving financial benefit from human trafficking, advertising sexual services, assault with a weapon, threatening death, obstructing justice, and two counts of assault.

He also pled guilty to two counts of breaching a recognizance.

The court considered sentencing principles, including denunciation, deterrence, and proportionality, and the significant aggravating factors of the prolonged exploitation and violence against a vulnerable complainant, balanced against the accused's rehabilitative efforts during pre-sentence custody.

The court imposed a global sentence of five years imprisonment, reduced to one year further imprisonment after accounting for four years of pre-sentence credit, followed by a three-year probation order with specific conditions.