Michael R. Dambrot

The appellant, who sustained a catastrophic impairment in a 2000 motor vehicle accident, appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision regarding his claim for enhanced attendant care benefits.

The Divisional Court upheld the LAT's findings that the appellant could not claim retroactive benefits without a valid reason for delay and that the definition of 'incurred' under the New Schedule applied procedurally to his claim.

However, the court allowed the appeal in part, finding that the 2% per month interest rate on overdue benefits under the Old Schedule applied as a substantive benefit, rather than the 1% rate under the New Schedule.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent damages for wrongful dismissal.

The trial judge found that the two appellant corporations operated as a single business and were common employers of the respondent.

The appellants argued there was insufficient evidence of common control, the action against one corporation was statute-barred, and the trial judge erred in awarding substantial indemnity costs under Rule 49 by failing to deduct hypothetical tax consequences from the damages award.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence supported the common employer finding, the addition of the second corporation was a valid correction of a misnomer, and Rule 49 comparisons must be based on the actual quantum of damages awarded rather than net tax consequences.

The appellant physician appealed a decision of the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board (HPARB) confirming the respondent hospitals' decision not to renew his hospital privileges.

The non-renewal was based on a long-standing pattern of disruptive behaviour and an inability to maintain collegial relationships with colleagues and staff, which jeopardized patient safety.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the HPARB's conclusion that the appellant's conduct led to a complete breakdown of trust and confidence.

The court also dismissed the appellant's late motions to amend his notice of appeal and adduce fresh evidence.

During a trial for first-degree murder, the Crown sought to introduce a video chronology prepared by police.

The chronology compiled still shots from extensive surveillance video, adding identifying information, circles, arrows, and short neutral descriptions.

The defence objected, arguing the video itself is the only admissible evidence and the chronology amounted to Crown advocacy.

The court ruled the video chronology admissible as a demonstrative aid to assist the jury in comprehending voluminous and complex video evidence.

The court held that such summaries are permissible if they are neutral, introduced through a witness who can be cross-examined, and accompanied by limiting instructions to the jury.

The accused were charged with first-degree murder.

At the outset of the trial, two of the accused brought an application to exclude cellphone video recordings showing them celebrating at a nightclub hours after the shooting, arguing the prejudicial effect outweighed the probative value.

The Crown argued the videos were probative of their relationship, their presence together after the shooting, and their state of mind.

The court found the videos highly probative of the accused's identity, relationship, and state of mind, and concluded that the probative value strongly outweighed any general prejudice.

The application to exclude the evidence was dismissed, and the videos were ruled admissible subject to agreed-upon editing.

During a trial for first degree murder, the Crown brought an application to adduce a post-arrest statement made by the accused to the police.

The accused brought a cross-application to exclude the statement under s. 24(2) of the Charter, arguing his s. 10(b) right to counsel was violated because he did not understand the legal advice he received from duty counsel and his own lawyer.

The court dismissed the Charter application, finding the accused was advised of his rights multiple times, spoke to counsel three times, and clearly understood the advice.

The court also ruled the statement was admissible in the Crown's case-in-chief, as there was independent evidence of fabrication to support its use as after-the-fact conduct evidence.

The three accused were jointly charged with first-degree murder.

One of the accused gave a post-arrest video statement to the police implicating himself and his co-accused.

The accused brought pre-trial applications to redact portions of the statement, and two of the accused alternatively sought to sever their trials.

The court granted the redactions consented to by the Crown but refused further redactions, finding the contested portions highly probative of the maker's involvement and credibility.

The court dismissed the application for severance, holding that the strong policy preference for joint trials applied and that a mid-trial and final jury instruction would adequately cure any reasoning prejudice to the co-accused.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought a pre-trial motion to sit at counsel table rather than in the prisoner's dock during their jury trial.

The court balanced fair trial considerations against courtroom security.

Given that the accused were detained in custody, had histories of institutional misconduct, and there was hostility between the co-accused, the court found that security concerns outweighed the potential prejudice of sitting in the dock.

The application was dismissed.

The Crown brought an application at the outset of a first-degree murder trial to admit six utterances made by the deceased shortly after being shot.

The court analyzed the admissibility of the statements under the dying declaration exception, the spontaneous utterance exception, and the principled approach to hearsay.

The court found that while only the statements made to police qualified as dying declarations, all six utterances were admissible as spontaneous utterances and under the principled approach to hearsay, as the pressure of the shooting excluded the possibility of concoction or distortion.

The offender, Connor Madison, was found guilty of second-degree murder for the fatal stabbing of Stephon Knight-Roberts.

The court was tasked with determining the period of parole ineligibility, which is statutorily set at a minimum of 10 years for second-degree murder.

Considering the brutal and prolonged nature of the offence, the offender's armed presence despite recognizances, and the devastating impact on the victim's family, balanced against the offender's Indigenous background, difficult upbringing, mental health issues, and genuine remorse, the court fixed the parole ineligibility period at 13 years.

This ruling provides the judge's reasons for not allowing the defence of self-defence to be put to the jury in a second-degree murder trial.

The accused, Connor Madison, was found guilty by a jury.

The court concluded that the defence of self-defence lacked an "air of reality" because the evidence indicated the accused's actions were an act of revenge for a prior robbery, rather than a response to an ongoing threat.

The victim was unarmed and no longer posing a threat when the fatal stabbings occurred, and the accused's conduct was deemed unreasonable in the circumstances.

This ruling concerns the admissibility of a post-arrest statement made by the accused, charged with second-degree murder, to the police.

The Crown sought to admit the statement for cross-examination, while the accused sought to exclude it, alleging violations of his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel and that the statement was involuntary due to a lack of operating mind and an oppressive atmosphere (including the absence of face masks during the COVID-19 pandemic).

The court found no Charter violation, determining that delays in providing counsel were justified by safety and practical considerations, and that the accused's repeated requests for counsel during the interview did not trigger a right to a second consultation under the *Sinclair* framework.

The court also concluded that the accused possessed an operating mind and that the interview conditions, including the lack of masks, did not create an oppressive atmosphere given the prevailing public health understanding at the time.

The statement was deemed voluntary and admissible for cross-examination, though specific portions where the accused asserted his right to silence or requested counsel were deemed inadmissible for direct cross-examination.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment that awarded her only $1,897.89 on a claim of over $880,000 against the respondent, who was a guarantor of a second mortgage.

The appellant sought to add various payments she allegedly made for repairs, renovations, and to keep a first mortgage in good standing to the principal of the second mortgage.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's factual findings and no errors of law in rejecting the appellant's claims, including her late assertion of equitable subrogation.

The cross-appeal regarding the trial judge's decision to award no costs was also dismissed.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment awarding $10,000 in defamation damages to the respondent seniors' residence.

The appellant had published an article on his blog alleging financial irregularities, fraud, and elder abuse at the residence.

The trial judge found the statements about elder abuse were defamatory and not protected by the defences of justification, fair comment, or responsible communication on a matter of public interest.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence or application of the defamation defences.

This ruling addresses three pre-trial applications by the Crown regarding the admissibility of evidence in a second-degree murder trial.

The Crown sought to introduce evidence of the accused's prior discreditable conduct (possession of a knife two hours before the stabbing), contemporaneous discreditable conduct (robbery of a gun from the accused by the deceased), and after-the-fact conduct (failure to assist the victim, calm departure, disposal of evidence, and flight).

The accused conceded the admissibility of the gun robbery evidence but opposed the others, arguing lack of probative value or undue prejudice.

The court granted all three applications, finding the evidence relevant to material issues such as intent, self-defence, and the overall narrative, with probative value outweighing any prejudicial effect.

The mother appealed an interim order that temporarily varied a final parenting schedule to a week-about arrangement.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in law by failing to apply the stringent test required for an interim variation of a final parenting order.

The motion judge improperly conflated the best interests of the child analysis with the requirement to find compelling or exceptional circumstances to disturb the status quo on an interim basis.

The interim variation was set aside and the father's motion was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Assessment Review Board which determined that the current value assessment of a landfill site should exclude the value of a facility used to generate electricity from landfill gas.

The appellants argued the facility was a commercial activity, not used exclusively for landfilling activities.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the generation of electricity from landfill gas is an environmental control activity required by the site's environmental compliance approval, and thus falls within the definition of landfilling activities under O. Reg. 282/98.

The appellants appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision directing the Registrar to revoke their motor vehicle dealer registrations.

The tribunal found the appellants engaged in a pattern of dishonest conduct, including falsifying bills of sale and failing to disclose accident damage, and knowingly provided a false statement on a renewal application.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the liability findings and concluding that the penalty of revocation was not clearly unfit given the pattern of manipulating unsophisticated consumers.

The appellant, a municipal councillor, appealed a decision declaring her seat vacant for breaching the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act.

The application judge found she intentionally used her position to influence council regarding a fire department service charge levied against her son, and failed to leave a closed meeting where the matter was discussed.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no errors of law or palpable and overriding errors of fact in the application judge's findings on liability or the imposition of the penalty.

The applicant, charged with offences under the Security of Information Act for allegedly attempting to communicate safeguarded information to a foreign entity, brought an application to stay the proceedings due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The prosecution had been ongoing for over eight years, complicated by extensive litigation over national security privilege under s. 38 of the Canada Evidence Act regarding a CSIS warrant.

The court applied the Jordan framework, calculating the total delay and subtracting defence delay and discrete exceptional events, including the time taken for the national security litigation and the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court found that the remaining delay of over 40 months significantly exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling and that the case was not particularly complex.

Consequently, the court held that the applicant's s. 11(b) rights were breached and ordered a stay of proceedings.