Aaron Del Rizzo

The appellant challenged both conviction and sentence arising from a historic sexual exploitation prosecution involving a youth pastor and a 13-year-old complainant.

The court rejected the conviction appeal, holding that the trial judge properly applied the W.(D.) framework, did not reduce the case to a credibility contest, and was entitled to rely on corroborative evidence from an independent witness in assessing credibility and reliability.

The court also held that the reliability analysis disclosed no reversible error and attracted appellate deference.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed on consent because the conditional sentence imposed exceeded the maximum custodial sentence available at the time of the offence, and the sentence was varied to time served with probation removed.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on impaired driving charges.

The trial judge had excluded all evidence, including pre-arrest observations by a civilian and police, under s. 24(2) of the Charter due to ss. 8, 10(a), and 10(b) breaches.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in concluding the pre-arrest observations were 'obtained in a manner' that violated the Charter, as they were temporally and contextually distinct from the subsequent breaches.

A new trial was ordered.

The applicant sought leave to extend the time to appeal a 2015 finding that he was not criminally responsible (NCR) for several offences.

The applicant had previously launched and abandoned an appeal in 2017.

The court applied the test for extending time to appeal, finding that the applicant lacked a bona fide intention to appeal within the relevant time frame, failed to adequately explain the seven-year delay, and presented an appeal with doubtful merit.

The application for leave to extend time was dismissed.

Sentencing following a jury trial in which one offender was convicted of manslaughter arising from a fatal street shooting and the other was convicted of accessory after the fact to manslaughter.

The court applied the post-jury-verdict sentencing framework to find that the shooter did not intend to kill, acted in response to a threat or use of force, but used unreasonable excessive force by intentionally firing a loaded handgun.

In fixing sentence, the court emphasized denunciation and deterrence for urban gun violence, prior weapons prohibitions, drug trafficking activity, post-offence flight, and the devastating victim impact, while also giving weight to youth, remorse, support, and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions.

The principal offender received 9 years less 49 months' credit, and the accessory received 2 years less 19.5 months' credit, together with DNA orders and weapons prohibitions.

The appellant appealed his convictions for impaired care and control and 'over 80'.

He argued the trial judge's reasons for the impaired conviction were legally insufficient and that his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel of choice was breached.

The Superior Court of Justice found the trial judge's reasons were insufficient because they failed to address exculpatory evidence and an alternative innocent inference.

The Court also found a s. 10(b) breach because police failed to inform the appellant he could wait a reasonable time for his counsel of choice, failed to facilitate contact, and failed to hold off on investigative steps.

The breath evidence was excluded under s. 24(2).

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge misapplied the W.(D.) analysis, misapprehended his evidence, and erred in assessing the complainant's reliability given her intoxication and memory gaps.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly applied the credibility assessment principles, correctly understood the appellant's evidence as untruthful rather than a mistaken belief, and appropriately evaluated the complainant's reliability against the totality of the evidence.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's refusal to order a Not Criminally Responsible (NCR) assessment and the calculation of pre-sentence custody credit for an offender convicted of possession of a weapon dangerous to the public peace.

The offender, a homeless man with schizophrenia, was involved in an altercation with a taxi driver and a homeless couple.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's discretionary decision to refuse the assessment based on the evidence, including video surveillance.

The court also upheld the trial judge's allocation of pre-sentence custody credit across multiple charges, applying the principles from Barnett.

The appellant appealed a sexual assault conviction on the basis of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The court applied the governing framework requiring proof of the material facts, incompetence, and a resulting miscarriage of justice, and found that although the appellant did not prove counsel failed to advise him of immigration consequences, counsel's lack of preparation and failure to put the defence theory and key allegations to Crown witnesses amounted to incompetence.

The court held that these omissions materially affected credibility findings and undermined both the reliability and apparent fairness of the trial.

The conviction was quashed.

The appellant appealed her summary convictions and 30-day concurrent sentences for two counts of assault against her landlords.

She argued the trial judge erred by failing to consider defence evidence, interfering with her cross-examinations, refusing to admit a 9-1-1 call, admitting undated photos and video, refusing to let her call the investigating officer, failing to order an interpreter for the complainants, and relying on disputed sentencing reports.

The Superior Court of Justice found no errors in the trial judge's credibility assessments, evidentiary rulings, or trial management, and dismissed the appeal.

On a Crown appeal and accused's cross-appeal arising from convictions on two sexual assault counts and acquittals on other sexual and harassment counts, the court dismissed both appeals.

The court upheld exclusion of Facebook records because, although authenticity and best-evidence requirements for electronic documents could be met, the affidavits relied on to bring the records within the business records exception were fundamentally deficient and failed to connect the documents to the affiants.

The court further held that the trial judge properly applied the Kienapple principle to conditionally stay overlapping counts, committed no reversible error in acquitting on criminal harassment and other counts, and properly admitted bank security video.

The accused's challenge to the similar fact ruling failed because the incidents involving three complainants displayed a signature modus operandi making coincidence objectively highly improbable.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as moot because the sentence had been fully served.

The accused, charged with sexual assault, applied for certiorari and mandamus to quash a trial judge's decision to defer hearing a constitutional challenge and stay of proceedings application until after the trial on the merits.

The accused argued that a police media release violated their Charter rights and sought a stay.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding the trial judge committed no jurisdictional error in exercising his discretion to manage court resources and defer the constitutional issue, noting that an acquittal would render the constitutional issues moot for the purpose of the criminal trial.

The Crown sought certiorari and mandamus to quash a preliminary inquiry judge's order discharging the accused on two counts of indecent assault, and to compel the judge to proceed with the inquiry.

The preliminary inquiry judge had refused an adjournment requested by the Crown, which was necessary because the complainant was unwilling to testify remotely due to privacy concerns, and the judge erroneously believed he lacked jurisdiction to impose conditions or accommodate an in-person hearing.

The Superior Court found that the preliminary inquiry judge committed jurisdictional errors by failing to recognize his inherent powers to safeguard proceedings, relying on irrelevant factors (Crown's non-use of s. 545(1) of the Criminal Code), and misapplying the Darville adjournment test by introducing speculative future conditions.

The application was granted, the discharge order quashed, and the preliminary inquiry judge was directed to proceed.

In a first degree murder jury trial, the accused brought a Charter application to exclude taxi dispatch records and related audio recordings voluntarily provided by a taxi company to police without judicial authorization.

The court held that the accused had no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the basic service-order information, including phone numbers, pickup locations, first names used, and associated audio of brief taxi-ordering calls, such that no search or seizure occurred for s. 8 purposes.

In the alternative, the court found that the October 2017 police requests were justified by exigent circumstances arising from the immediate aftermath of a homicide and concern for public safety, the taxi driver, and preservation of evidence, while the later May 2020 request would have been unreasonable if s. 8 were engaged.

Applying the Grant factors in the further alternative, the court held that any breach was not serious, the privacy impact was minimal, and society’s interest in adjudication on the merits strongly favoured admission.

The exclusion application was dismissed.

During a jury trial for first degree murder, the Crown sought to introduce recognition evidence from five witnesses to identify the accused in surveillance videos.

The witnesses, including a police officer and four security guards, had prior interactions with the accused in the community.

The court applied the test for non-expert opinion evidence of identity, finding that each witness had a sufficient prior acquaintance with the accused and was in a better position than the jury to identify him.

The court rejected arguments that the evidence was overly prejudicial or tainted by the witnesses' knowledge of the investigation.

The Crown's application to adduce the recognition evidence was granted.

During a trial for first-degree murder, the Crown sought to admit a Resident Information Form for an apartment unit as a business record under s. 30 of the Canada Evidence Act.

The accused objected, arguing the form was not created in the ordinary course of business, contained double hearsay, and lacked threshold reliability.

The court dismissed the objections, finding the form was routinely collected and relied upon by property management, satisfying the statutory requirements for admissibility.

The form was admitted into evidence.

The applicant brought a pre-trial motion alleging violations of his rights under ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter following the execution of a search warrant at his residence.

He challenged the validity of the telewarrant, the reasonable and probable grounds in the Information to Obtain, and the unannounced dynamic entry by police.

The court dismissed the s. 8 claims, finding the warrant valid and the entry justified by safety concerns.

The Crown conceded a s. 9 breach due to a 27-hour delay in bringing the applicant before a justice of the peace.

However, the court declined to order a stay of proceedings, finding that a reduction in sentence upon conviction would be an adequate alternative remedy.

During a trial for first-degree murder, the Crown brought an application to admit expert evidence regarding street gangs, specifically the rivalry between 'C3' and the 'Scarlettwood Crips'.

The Crown sought to qualify a police detective as an expert to provide context and establish motive for the seemingly random shooting of an unarmed man.

The defence opposed the application, arguing the evidence was highly prejudicial and the officer was not properly qualified.

The court allowed the application, finding the evidence was logically relevant to motive, necessary to assist the jury in understanding the context of the shooting, and that the officer was qualified.

The court ruled that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect, subject to specific exclusions of certain highly prejudicial videos and appropriate jury instructions.

The applicant, who had been in custody for eight months on various assault charges, applied for a bail review under s. 525 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown opposed release on the secondary ground due to the applicant's lengthy criminal record and history of breaching court orders.

The court found that while there were secondary ground concerns, the applicant had already served the equivalent of 12 months, which approached the likely sentence of 12 to 15 months if convicted.

Applying the principle of proportionality, the court held that the risk of the applicant serving a disproportionate sentence outweighed the secondary ground concerns, and ordered his release on a recognizance with his mother as a surety.

The Crown applied for certiorari to quash a preliminary inquiry judge's decision discharging the accused of first-degree murder and committing him only on second-degree murder.

The Crown argued the judge committed jurisdictional error by ignoring inferences favourable to the Crown and failing to consider the whole of the evidence regarding planning and deliberation.

The Superior Court agreed, finding the preliminary inquiry judge erred by drawing an inference favourable to the accused regarding the interaction with the victim, and by failing to consider circumstantial evidence of planning, such as the accused's change of clothing and pre-arranged taxi escape.

The application was granted, the discharge quashed, and mandamus issued directing committal on first-degree murder.

A young person was charged with second degree murder in connection with the death of S.K., who died from a single stab wound to the chest during a marijuana trafficking transaction that went wrong.

The accused admitted holding the knife that caused the fatal injury but claimed he was acting in self-defence and that the stabbing was accidental.

The Crown alleged intentional stabbing with either intent to kill or intent to cause bodily harm known to be likely to cause death.

The court found the accused not guilty of murder but guilty of unlawful act manslaughter, finding that while self-defence was not established, the accused did not have the specific intent required for murder.