Brady Elizabeth Donohue

This decision addresses the application of section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms concerning the police's receipt and use of an IP address linked to child sexual abuse material (CSAM).

The court distinguishes the passive receipt of an IP address from a third-party American organization (NCMEC) from an active police request, finding no breach of section 8 rights.

The decision emphasizes the legislative framework governing mandatory reporting by Internet Service Providers (ISPs) in Canada and the U.S., which reduces the reasonable expectation of privacy in IP addresses used to access or distribute CSAM.

The court also finds that police steps to confirm ISP and location information without prior judicial authorization did not violate section 8.

Even if a breach occurred, the evidence would not be excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter due to the seriousness of the offence and limited impact of the breach.

Sean Done was convicted of accessing child pornography contrary to s. 163.1(4.1) of the Criminal Code.

The sentencing decision addresses the protracted procedural history, including Charter applications, and extensive evidentiary record including psychological and psychiatric assessments diagnosing pedophilia limited to internet offending.

The court emphasized the equivalence of accessing and possessing child sexual abuse material (CSAM), the aggravating factors such as the large quantity and nature of the material, sharing and trading of CSAM, and counselling others to avoid detection.

Mitigating factors included Mr. Done’s lack of prior record, engagement in therapy, and supportive family.

The court imposed a 22-month custodial sentence (after a 4-month reduction for Charter breaches), followed by two years probation with strict conditions, and ancillary orders including DNA, SOIRA registration for 20 years, forfeiture of the cellphone, and waiver of victim fine surcharge.

Tenzin Norbu was charged with first-degree murder.

The trial proceeded without a jury, with the accused admitting to causing the victim's death by pouring lighter fluid and igniting it.

The sole issue was whether Norbu was Not Criminally Responsible (NCR) on account of mental disorder.

Expert psychiatric evidence established that Norbu suffered from schizophrenia and was experiencing active psychosis at the time of the offence, rendering him incapable of knowing his actions were morally wrong.

The court found Norbu NCR and remanded him to the Ontario Review Board for disposition.

The accused, Allick Welcome, was convicted by a jury of sexual assault for removing a condom during consensual sex without the victim's knowledge ("stealthing").

The court considered aggravating factors, including the victim's emotional and financial impact and the breach of trust, and mitigating factors, such as the low risk of re-offence and the accused's expression of remorse.

A key consideration was the accused's immigration status, as a prison sentence exceeding six months would lead to automatic deportation without appeal.

The court imposed a conditional sentence order of two years less one day, including house arrest and ancillary orders, to allow the accused to appeal any removal order and to consider his family circumstances.

The Ontario Court of Justice sentenced the defendant for assault causing bodily harm.

The defendant, who had no prior criminal record, assaulted the victim on a public transit bus, causing a fractured arm and significant emotional and financial hardship.

Despite admitting the assault during trial, the defendant's admission was not considered equivalent to a guilty plea for sentencing mitigation.

The Crown sought a conditional sentence, while the defence sought a conditional discharge.

The court, applying principles of denunciation and deterrence, found a conditional sentence too severe and a conditional discharge inappropriate given the gravity of the offence and the defendant's blameworthiness.

A suspended sentence with two years of probation, including anger management and community service, along with a DNA order and weapons prohibition, was imposed.

The applicant, Benjamin Charlton, sought a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, arguing his right to a trial within a reasonable time was violated.

The total delay from charge to anticipated trial end was 16.5 months, which is below the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court cases established in R. v. Jordan.

The court applied the Jordan framework for cases below the ceiling, requiring the defence to show (1) sustained effort to expedite proceedings and (2) that the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have.

The court found the defence failed on both branches, particularly noting a four-month period of inaction regarding outstanding disclosure and rejecting the argument that the initial, earlier trial date should serve as the benchmark for reasonable time.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

Shelly-Ann James was charged with second-degree murder for the stabbing death of her mother.

The trial, heard without a jury, focused on whether Ms. James was Not Criminally Responsible (NCR) due to a mental disorder, specifically if her illness rendered her incapable of knowing her conduct was morally wrong.

The court heard evidence of Ms. James's long history of schizophrenia, marked by delusions, disorganized thinking, and paranoia, including a fixed belief in an entity called "Jigsaw" and fears of being harmed or surveilled.

While expert opinions diverged on her capacity for moral wrongfulness, the court found no rational or reality-based motive for the killing.

Instead, it concluded that Ms. James acted in response to a delusional belief that she and her children were in danger.

The court accepted the opinion that her extensive symptom burden at the time of the killing prevented her from assessing the moral wrongfulness of her actions against societal norms.

Consequently, Ms. James was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder.

The applicant, Wendel McLean, sought a stay of proceedings under sections 11(b) and 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, arguing unreasonable post-conviction delay in the context of a dangerous offender application.

McLean was convicted of robbery with a firearm and break and enter, and the Crown initiated dangerous offender proceedings.

McLean argued that the 20-month delay between conviction and the scheduled dangerous offender hearing exceeded the 5-month presumptive ceiling for post-conviction delay set by R. v. Charley, after deducting delays attributable to him and the s. 752.1 assessment application.

The Crown contended that the entire dangerous offender proceeding is an exceptional circumstance to be deducted and that it acted reasonably.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the dangerous offender application as a whole is an exceptional circumstance, and the Crown had mitigated any resulting delay, thus no delay exceeding the presumptive ceiling was found.

Taha Shaikh pleaded guilty to multiple charges including assault causing bodily harm, uttering threats, assault, and failure to comply with a recognizance.

The court considered aggravating factors such as intimate partner violence, the victim's vulnerability, and the commission of offences while on a peace bond and house arrest.

Mitigating factors included the guilty plea, genuine remorse, family support, employment prospects, and sparing the victim from testifying at trial.

The court also addressed the "Coke Rule" regarding subsequent convictions and the calculation of pre-sentence custody credit (Duncan credit) for harsh jail conditions.

A global sentence of two years was deemed appropriate, but due to pre-sentence custody credit, the final sentence was one day in custody followed by three years probation with specific conditions.

During a jury trial for possession of a firearm, trafficking, and proceeds of crime, the Crown sought to have a key witness, the defendant's common-law spouse, declared an adverse witness under s. 9(1) of the Canada Evidence Act.

The witness's testimony contradicted prior statements and other evidence regarding consent to search, the defendant's movements, vehicle contents, and the source of seized cash.

The court found the witness adverse, citing inconsistencies and a motive to assist the defendant.

Leave was granted for the Crown to cross-examine her on specific points, with limiting instructions to the jury to ensure trial fairness.

This ruling addresses disputed facts for sentencing following a jury verdict where Andrew Mitchell was found guilty of break and enter with intent and assault causing bodily harm.

The Crown sought to include a black eye, hand injury, and concussion as bodily harm for the assault charge, while the defence argued only the black eye.

The court, applying principles from R. v. Ferguson, determined the factual basis for sentencing.

It found that the complainant suffered a black eye, hand injury, and concussion for the assault, and that the break and enter involved some level of violence and/or threats.

A young person was charged with second degree murder in connection with the death of S.K., who died from a single stab wound to the chest during a marijuana trafficking transaction that went wrong.

The accused admitted holding the knife that caused the fatal injury but claimed he was acting in self-defence and that the stabbing was accidental.

The Crown alleged intentional stabbing with either intent to kill or intent to cause bodily harm known to be likely to cause death.

The court found the accused not guilty of murder but guilty of unlawful act manslaughter, finding that while self-defence was not established, the accused did not have the specific intent required for murder.

Earl Hourihan was convicted of driving over 80 causing bodily harm, arising from a single motor vehicle accident where he struck a pedestrian on a push scooter.

The Crown sought a custodial sentence of 9 to 15 months, while the defence proposed a 90-day intermittent sentence with probation.

The court considered aggravating factors, including a prior impaired driving conviction and the severity of the victim's injuries, and mitigating factors such as the offender's remorse, efforts to address alcohol problems, and community standing.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence as predominant sentencing objectives for alcohol-related driving offences, particularly where bodily harm is involved.

A sentence of nine months imprisonment and a two-year driving prohibition was imposed, balancing rehabilitation with the need for strong public policy messaging.