Laura M. Remigio

The appellant appealed his convictions and nine-year sentence for impaired driving causing death, criminal negligence causing death, and related offences.

The collision occurred after the appellant drove at excessive speeds and struck oncoming traffic.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in identifying him as the driver based on seatbelt marks, and in dismissing his Charter challenges regarding his arrest and right to counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly inferred the appellant was the driver and correctly held that police had reasonable grounds to arrest both occupants when they blamed each other.

The court also upheld the trial judge's s. 24(2) analysis and found the nine-year sentence was not demonstrably unfit given the high moral blameworthiness of the conduct.

The appellant appealed his convictions for human trafficking-related offences, arguing that the application judge erred in dismissing his section 11(b) Charter application for unreasonable delay.

The Court of Appeal found that while the application judge double-counted a five-month period of defence delay, the error was immaterial because the deduction of 24 months for the suspension of jury trials due to the COVID-19 pandemic was appropriate.

As the total delay fell well under the 30-month presumptive ceiling and the Crown made efforts to move the matter forward, the exceptional remedy of a stay was not warranted.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant pleaded guilty to 23 charges, including multiple frauds and breaches of court orders, and was sentenced to five years' imprisonment and ordered to pay restitution.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge committed a material error of principle by including a withdrawn charge in the sentencing analysis.

The global sentence was reduced to three and a half years.

Additionally, two restitution orders were vacated because the victims had recovered their losses, and the remaining restitution orders were varied to allow 10 years to pay.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual offences against a child arising from online communications, inducement to travel to another city under false pretences, and subsequent sexual assaults, and also sought leave to appeal a seven-year global sentence.

The court rejected arguments alleging misapprehension of evidence, improper application of W.(D.), unresolved inconsistencies in the complainant’s evidence, and unfairness arising from the lengthy delay between verdict and reasons.

Applying the presumption of integrity for delayed reasons, the court held that the appellant had not displaced the presumption or shown after-the-fact reasoning.

The court also held the sentence was fit, emphasizing the seriousness of sexual offences against children and the aggravating circumstances of grooming, vulnerability, isolation, and forced intercourse.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault, sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and assault with a weapon against his stepdaughter and sentenced to 8 years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by treating the appellant's silence during a police interview as a "tacit admission" of guilt on the charges he did not explicitly deny.

This error was foundational, materially affecting the trial judge's assessment of both the appellant's and the complainant's credibility.

The court held that the right to silence, protected under s. 7 of the Charter, prohibits drawing an inference of guilt from an accused's choice to remain silent on some allegations while denying others.

The convictions were quashed and a new trial was ordered.

The applicant was convicted of two counts of human trafficking and sentenced to 7.5 years imprisonment.

She sought bail pending appeal on three grounds: (1) the trial judge erred in admitting hearsay evidence; (2) the trial judge erred in dismissing an application to re-litigate the hearsay issue; and (3) the trial judge misapprehended evidence and provided insufficient reasons.

The motion judge found the appeal was not frivolous and that detention was not necessary in the public interest, granting bail pending appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed S.B.’s sentencing appeal and upheld an adult sentence for first degree murder under s. 72 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The majority held the Court of Appeal erred on the standard of proof by not applying beyond a reasonable doubt to rebuttal of diminished moral blameworthiness, but found no impact on outcome because the presumption was rebutted on the record and no reviewable error occurred in the accountability analysis, including treatment of social context evidence and rehabilitative potential.

Concurring judges agreed the appeal should be dismissed but disagreed that beyond a reasonable doubt is the proper standard for rebuttal under s. 72(1).

The appellant was convicted of trafficking a person under 18, procuring, advertising sexual services, and publishing child pornography, but acquitted of administering a noxious substance.

She appealed the convictions, arguing the verdicts were inconsistent.

The Crown appealed the conditional sentence of two years less a day, arguing it was demonstrably unfit for sexual offences against a child.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding sufficient evidence supported the verdicts despite the jury rejecting the complainant's drugging allegations.

The Court also dismissed the Crown's sentence appeal, holding that the trial judge properly applied the Friesen framework and that the offender's significant mental disabilities and history of exploitation constituted exceptional circumstances justifying a conditional sentence.

The procuring conviction was stayed on consent under the Kienapple principle.

The appellant, Harris Nnane, appealed his first-degree murder convictions, seeking to introduce fresh evidence from Alexander Fountain, who identified a third man, Jaiden Jackson (now deceased), as the shooter.

Nnane also argued the verdict was unreasonable regarding identity and planning/deliberation, and that the trial judge erred in jury instructions and by not conducting a post-verdict juror inquiry.

The majority dismissed the fresh evidence motion, finding it not credible due to collusion, and upheld the convictions, concluding the verdict was reasonable and no errors occurred.

The dissenting judge would have admitted the fresh evidence and ordered a new trial, finding Fountain's evidence reasonably capable of belief.

The accused was tried before a judge alone on charges of robbery, wearing a disguise with intent to commit an indictable offence, and conspiracy to commit robbery arising from an attempted armed carjacking by three masked men.

The Crown's case on identity was wholly circumstantial and relied on eyewitness evidence, an abandoned BMW linked to the offence, the accused's driver's licence and fingerprint in that vehicle, surveillance video showing two men near where the vehicle was abandoned, and clothing seized from the accused's residence matching distinctive clothing seen on video.

Applying the circumstantial evidence framework, the court held that guilt was the only reasonable inference and found the accused guilty on all three counts.

The court nevertheless expressed concern about the propriety of adding a conspiracy count where the only evidence of agreement was the commission of the substantive offence, and invited submissions on the rule against multiple convictions and possible severance.

The two accused pleaded guilty to multiple offences involving trafficking in firearms, cocaine, and fentanyl.

The Crown and defence agreed on the base sentences but disagreed on the extent of credit for harsh pre-trial custody conditions at the Toronto South Detention Centre.

The court determined the fit sentences to be 6 years for the first accused and 7 years for the second accused, then quantified the 'Duncan' credit as a 1-year reduction for each accused due to the deplorable conditions, including frequent lockdowns and overcrowding.

After applying the 1.5:1 'Summers' credit, the remaining sentences were calculated.

The appellant, convicted of home invasion robbery and declared a dangerous offender, appealed his sentence.

He argued that the sentencing judge erred by not awarding "Duncan credit" for harsh pre-sentence custody conditions, specifically institutional lockdowns.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that Duncan credit is discretionary and not an entitlement.

The court found no error in the sentencing judge's decision, which concluded that the appellant's experience in lockdown conditions did not exceed the typical hardships of incarceration already accounted for by the 1.5:1 credit for pre-sentence custody.

The applicant, Martin Ngigi, brought an amended O'Connor application seeking extensive medical and school records of the complainant, J.G., a nine-year-old boy with muscular dystrophy, who alleged assault.

The application also involved a Mohan voir dire to admit expert evidence from Dr. Ken Berger regarding neuromuscular conditions and cognitive function to support the records request.

The court dismissed the Mohan voir dire, finding Dr. Berger's expert evidence was not relevant, necessary, or impartial.

Consequently, the court also dismissed the O'Connor application for further records, concluding that the requested information was not likely relevant to the issues at trial or necessary for the applicant's full answer and defence, and that the complainant's significant privacy interests outweighed any potential probative value.

The defendant, Martin Ngigi, facing charges of Assault and Assault Bodily Harm, brought an application to qualify Dr. Ken Berger as an expert witness in neuromuscular conditions and cognitive function.

The Crown and counsel for the complainant conceded Dr. Berger's expertise in emergency medicine and trauma but disputed his qualifications in the other two areas.

Applying the Mohan test and the Pham factors for expert qualification, the court found Dr. Berger qualified to opine on neuromuscular conditions, noting his specialized knowledge beyond the trier of fact, despite some concerns about the breadth of his experience.

However, the court determined that Dr. Berger lacked sufficient specialized knowledge and experience to be qualified as an expert in cognitive function, citing vague and anecdotal evidence in that area.

This ruling addresses a defence application for a directed verdict of acquittal on a charge of first-degree murder, arguing a lack of evidence for planning and deliberation.

The Crown contended there was ample evidence.

The court reviewed the legal standard for directed verdict motions, emphasizing that the judge's role is to determine if a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could convict, without assessing credibility or weighing evidence.

Applying this standard, the court found sufficient circumstantial evidence, including the accused's identity, the execution-style nature of the killing, the use of a getaway vehicle, efforts to conceal identity, and post-offence conduct suggesting prior knowledge of legal rules, from which a jury could reasonably infer planning and deliberation.

Consequently, the application was dismissed, and the trial proceeded on the first-degree murder charge.

The defendant, Martin Ngigi, charged with assault, brought an O'Connor application for third-party records, including medical and school records related to the child complainant's muscular dystrophy and cognitive impairment.

As part of this application, the defendant sought to qualify an expert, Dr. Berger.

During the Mohan voir dire to determine Dr. Berger's qualifications, counsel for the complainant sought to cross-examine the proposed expert.

The defendant opposed this, arguing that complainant's counsel lacked standing and that the court should be guided by R. v. J.J. The Crown supported the complainant's counsel's position.

The court ruled that complainant's counsel is permitted to cross-examine the proposed expert in both the Mohan voir dire and the O'Connor application, finding no jurisprudential, legislative, or policy bar to such cross-examination in common law O'Connor proceedings, distinguishing them from statutory regimes for sexual assault cases.

The accused, Saaid Mohiadin, charged with first-degree murder, brought a mid-trial application to exclude bank records due to late disclosure, arguing a violation of his s. 7 Charter right to make full answer and defence.

The Crown sought to admit the records to corroborate a key witness's testimony.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while disclosure was not ideal, it did not render the trial unfair, and any potential prejudice could be remedied by recalling the witness for further cross-examination.

The court emphasized that exclusion of evidence for late disclosure is reserved for exceptional cases where no other remedy suffices.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought a pre-trial motion to be permitted to sit at counsel table rather than in the prisoner's box.

The court dismissed the application, reaffirming the traditional functional approach to courtroom seating.

The judge balanced fair trial interests, including the presumption of innocence, with courtroom security concerns and the need for the jury to clearly observe the accused, especially given that identification was a main issue in the case.

The court emphasized that clear jury instructions can mitigate any perceived prejudice from the accused's placement and noted the accused's significant criminal record and institutional misconduct as legitimate security concerns.

Pierre Aragon was re-sentenced for aggravated assault after his indeterminate dangerous offender sentence was set aside on appeal.

The Crown and defence jointly submitted that the criteria for a dangerous offender finding were no longer met, proposing a finite sentence followed by a long-term supervision order.

The court accepted the joint submission, finding Aragon to be a long-term offender, and imposed a 7-year custodial sentence with credit for time served, followed by a 10-year long-term supervision order.

The court considered the gravity of the offence, Aragon's extensive criminal record, and the principle of proportionality, distinguishing his case from co-accused due to differing facts and antecedents.

The defendant, Martin Ngigi, charged with assault, brought an O'Connor application for the disclosure of the complainant J.G.'s extensive medical records related to muscular dystrophy and potential cognitive conditions.

The application sought to establish "likely relevance" to the mechanism of injury, credibility, reliability, and competence to testify.

The court dismissed the broad request for all records, finding insufficient evidentiary basis, particularly the lack of an affidavit, to establish "likely relevance" for most records.

However, the court found two specific outpatient records from J.G.'s muscular dystrophy specialist, proximate to the alleged incident, to be "likely relevant" for information on prescriptions, dosage, timing of medications, and the status of J.G.'s muscular dystrophy.

These two records were ordered to proceed to a Stage 2 review for potential disclosure to the defence, while the broader application was denied.