Laura M. Remigio

The applicant was convicted of two counts of human trafficking and sentenced to 7.5 years imprisonment.

She sought bail pending appeal on three grounds: (1) the trial judge erred in admitting hearsay evidence; (2) the trial judge erred in dismissing an application to re-litigate the hearsay issue; and (3) the trial judge misapprehended evidence and provided insufficient reasons.

The motion judge found the appeal was not frivolous and that detention was not necessary in the public interest, granting bail pending appeal.

The appellant, Harris Nnane, appealed his first-degree murder convictions, seeking to introduce fresh evidence from Alexander Fountain, who identified a third man, Jaiden Jackson (now deceased), as the shooter.

Nnane also argued the verdict was unreasonable regarding identity and planning/deliberation, and that the trial judge erred in jury instructions and by not conducting a post-verdict juror inquiry.

The majority dismissed the fresh evidence motion, finding it not credible due to collusion, and upheld the convictions, concluding the verdict was reasonable and no errors occurred.

The dissenting judge would have admitted the fresh evidence and ordered a new trial, finding Fountain's evidence reasonably capable of belief.

The appellant, convicted of home invasion robbery and declared a dangerous offender, appealed his sentence.

He argued that the sentencing judge erred by not awarding "Duncan credit" for harsh pre-sentence custody conditions, specifically institutional lockdowns.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that Duncan credit is discretionary and not an entitlement.

The court found no error in the sentencing judge's decision, which concluded that the appellant's experience in lockdown conditions did not exceed the typical hardships of incarceration already accounted for by the 1.5:1 credit for pre-sentence custody.

The applicant, Martin Ngigi, brought an amended O'Connor application seeking extensive medical and school records of the complainant, J.G., a nine-year-old boy with muscular dystrophy, who alleged assault.

The application also involved a Mohan voir dire to admit expert evidence from Dr. Ken Berger regarding neuromuscular conditions and cognitive function to support the records request.

The court dismissed the Mohan voir dire, finding Dr. Berger's expert evidence was not relevant, necessary, or impartial.

Consequently, the court also dismissed the O'Connor application for further records, concluding that the requested information was not likely relevant to the issues at trial or necessary for the applicant's full answer and defence, and that the complainant's significant privacy interests outweighed any potential probative value.

The defendant, Martin Ngigi, facing charges of Assault and Assault Bodily Harm, brought an application to qualify Dr. Ken Berger as an expert witness in neuromuscular conditions and cognitive function.

The Crown and counsel for the complainant conceded Dr. Berger's expertise in emergency medicine and trauma but disputed his qualifications in the other two areas.

Applying the Mohan test and the Pham factors for expert qualification, the court found Dr. Berger qualified to opine on neuromuscular conditions, noting his specialized knowledge beyond the trier of fact, despite some concerns about the breadth of his experience.

However, the court determined that Dr. Berger lacked sufficient specialized knowledge and experience to be qualified as an expert in cognitive function, citing vague and anecdotal evidence in that area.

This ruling addresses a defence application for a directed verdict of acquittal on a charge of first-degree murder, arguing a lack of evidence for planning and deliberation.

The Crown contended there was ample evidence.

The court reviewed the legal standard for directed verdict motions, emphasizing that the judge's role is to determine if a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could convict, without assessing credibility or weighing evidence.

Applying this standard, the court found sufficient circumstantial evidence, including the accused's identity, the execution-style nature of the killing, the use of a getaway vehicle, efforts to conceal identity, and post-offence conduct suggesting prior knowledge of legal rules, from which a jury could reasonably infer planning and deliberation.

Consequently, the application was dismissed, and the trial proceeded on the first-degree murder charge.

The defendant, Martin Ngigi, charged with assault, brought an O'Connor application for third-party records, including medical and school records related to the child complainant's muscular dystrophy and cognitive impairment.

As part of this application, the defendant sought to qualify an expert, Dr. Berger.

During the Mohan voir dire to determine Dr. Berger's qualifications, counsel for the complainant sought to cross-examine the proposed expert.

The defendant opposed this, arguing that complainant's counsel lacked standing and that the court should be guided by R. v. J.J. The Crown supported the complainant's counsel's position.

The court ruled that complainant's counsel is permitted to cross-examine the proposed expert in both the Mohan voir dire and the O'Connor application, finding no jurisprudential, legislative, or policy bar to such cross-examination in common law O'Connor proceedings, distinguishing them from statutory regimes for sexual assault cases.

The accused, Saaid Mohiadin, charged with first-degree murder, brought a mid-trial application to exclude bank records due to late disclosure, arguing a violation of his s. 7 Charter right to make full answer and defence.

The Crown sought to admit the records to corroborate a key witness's testimony.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while disclosure was not ideal, it did not render the trial unfair, and any potential prejudice could be remedied by recalling the witness for further cross-examination.

The court emphasized that exclusion of evidence for late disclosure is reserved for exceptional cases where no other remedy suffices.

Pierre Aragon was re-sentenced for aggravated assault after his indeterminate dangerous offender sentence was set aside on appeal.

The Crown and defence jointly submitted that the criteria for a dangerous offender finding were no longer met, proposing a finite sentence followed by a long-term supervision order.

The court accepted the joint submission, finding Aragon to be a long-term offender, and imposed a 7-year custodial sentence with credit for time served, followed by a 10-year long-term supervision order.

The court considered the gravity of the offence, Aragon's extensive criminal record, and the principle of proportionality, distinguishing his case from co-accused due to differing facts and antecedents.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought a pre-trial motion to be permitted to sit at counsel table rather than in the prisoner's box.

The court dismissed the application, reaffirming the traditional functional approach to courtroom seating.

The judge balanced fair trial interests, including the presumption of innocence, with courtroom security concerns and the need for the jury to clearly observe the accused, especially given that identification was a main issue in the case.

The court emphasized that clear jury instructions can mitigate any perceived prejudice from the accused's placement and noted the accused's significant criminal record and institutional misconduct as legitimate security concerns.

The defendant, Martin Ngigi, charged with assault, brought an O'Connor application for the disclosure of the complainant J.G.'s extensive medical records related to muscular dystrophy and potential cognitive conditions.

The application sought to establish "likely relevance" to the mechanism of injury, credibility, reliability, and competence to testify.

The court dismissed the broad request for all records, finding insufficient evidentiary basis, particularly the lack of an affidavit, to establish "likely relevance" for most records.

However, the court found two specific outpatient records from J.G.'s muscular dystrophy specialist, proximate to the alleged incident, to be "likely relevant" for information on prescriptions, dosage, timing of medications, and the status of J.G.'s muscular dystrophy.

These two records were ordered to proceed to a Stage 2 review for potential disclosure to the defence, while the broader application was denied.

The appellant, Ricardo Francis, appealed his convictions for possessing a loaded firearm and possession of drugs for trafficking, and his seven-year sentence.

The convictions arose from vehicle and strip searches conducted after his arrest on an outstanding warrant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the searches lawful under s. 8 of the Charter.

However, the Court granted leave to appeal the sentence, finding that the trial judge erred in principle by failing to adequately consider the principle of restraint for a youthful, first-time offender.

The sentence was varied from seven years to five years imprisonment.

The appellant, a youthful first offender, appealed sentences imposed for four home invasion robberies, which resulted in a total term of nine years imprisonment (adult and youth sentences).

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in principle by failing to differentiate youth sentencing principles from adult ones, misapplying the paramountcy of individual deterrence and rehabilitation for youthful first offenders, and improperly using the appellant's youth as an aggravating factor.

The court reduced the global adult sentence from nine years to seven years, while affirming the one-year concurrent youth sentence as it was already spent.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearm-related offences (robbery, aggravated assault, prohibited possession) and sought leave to appeal his 9-year sentence.

The conviction appeal argued that the trial judge erred by not conducting a fulsome post-verdict inquiry into a juror's comments, leading to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's determination that the record was sufficient and that the strong presumption of juror impartiality had not been rebutted.

The sentence appeal argued that the 9-year sentence was unfit and disproportionate to co-accused sentences.

The Court granted leave to appeal sentence but dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence fit given the seriousness of the home invasion, the appellant's role (shooting the victim, using a handgun, breach of prohibition), and the justified distinctions from co-accused who pleaded guilty and had lesser roles.

The accused pleaded guilty to two counts of breaching the conditions of his Long Term Supervision Order (LTSO) by consuming prohibited substances.

The first breach involved alcohol consumption in January 2019, and the second involved smoking a joint laced with crystal methamphetamine in October 2019.

A third alleged breach involving incidental contact with crystal methamphetamine was found not proven beyond reasonable doubt following a Gardiner hearing.

The court imposed a sentence of 14 months less presentence custody, with enhanced credit for the harsh conditions of presentence detention and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Taha Shaikh pleaded guilty to multiple charges including assault causing bodily harm, uttering threats, assault, and failure to comply with a recognizance.

The court considered aggravating factors such as intimate partner violence, the victim's vulnerability, and the commission of offences while on a peace bond and house arrest.

Mitigating factors included the guilty plea, genuine remorse, family support, employment prospects, and sparing the victim from testifying at trial.

The court also addressed the "Coke Rule" regarding subsequent convictions and the calculation of pre-sentence custody credit (Duncan credit) for harsh jail conditions.

A global sentence of two years was deemed appropriate, but due to pre-sentence custody credit, the final sentence was one day in custody followed by three years probation with specific conditions.

The applicant sought to exclude evidence (a loaded handgun, ammunition, and illegal drugs) found during a vehicle search incident to arrest and a subsequent strip search at the police station, alleging violations of section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court dismissed the application, finding both the vehicle search (justified as incident to arrest and an inventory search) and the strip search (justified as incident to arrest and for custodial safety) were lawful.

The court also upheld the validity of the telewarrants used for a later search of the vehicle, finding the grounds for their issuance and the resort to the telewarrant process were reasonable.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder in the death of a sex-trade worker.

The Crown's case was based on circumstantial evidence including DNA evidence, cell phone records, security footage, and evidence of post-offence conduct.

The trial judge sentenced the appellant to life imprisonment with 25 years of parole ineligibility.

On appeal, the appellant challenged four aspects of the trial judge's charge to the jury: the characterization of the cause of death as strangulation, instructions on non-fatal injuries, examples of circumstantial evidence, and instructions on post-offence conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.

This decision addresses multiple pre-trial motions in a large-scale drug trafficking prosecution, focusing on Charter violations related to search and seizure (s.8) and the right to counsel (s.10), as well as the voluntariness of an utterance.

The court found the initial warrantless search for cocaine unconstitutional and excluded the evidence.

The initial search warrant for the Warwick premises was quashed, but other evidence seized under it was admitted.

Covert camera evidence was admitted despite an unlawful installation, but references to it were excised from subsequent Informations to Obtain (ITOs).

Tracking warrants and general warrants for other properties were largely upheld after excising unconstitutionally obtained information.

An accused's utterance was found voluntary and admitted, despite a s.10 Charter violation, as the impact on Charter rights was deemed slight and exclusion would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The defendant was charged with care and control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and with care and control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The defendant was found sitting in the driver's seat of a parked vehicle with the engine off and keys in the cupholder.

The Crown relied on a statutory presumption of care and control under section 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant rebutted the presumption by establishing on a balance of probabilities that he did not occupy the driver's seat for the purpose of setting the vehicle in motion.

The court found that even if the presumption applied, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant created a realistic risk of danger.

The charges were dismissed.