Lisa Wannamaker

The young person A.H. was charged with multiple counts of assault, sexual assault, uttering threats, and breach of a lawful order against A.M., a young person with whom he had a brief relationship.

The trial focused on the credibility and reliability of A.M.'s and A.H.'s testimonies, as A.H. denied all allegations.

The court found A.M.'s testimony to be credible and reliable, corroborated by other evidence, and rejected A.H.'s testimony due to inconsistencies and evasiveness.

A.H. was found guilty on all counts.

Pierre Aragon was re-sentenced for aggravated assault after his indeterminate dangerous offender sentence was set aside on appeal.

The Crown and defence jointly submitted that the criteria for a dangerous offender finding were no longer met, proposing a finite sentence followed by a long-term supervision order.

The court accepted the joint submission, finding Aragon to be a long-term offender, and imposed a 7-year custodial sentence with credit for time served, followed by a 10-year long-term supervision order.

The court considered the gravity of the offence, Aragon's extensive criminal record, and the principle of proportionality, distinguishing his case from co-accused due to differing facts and antecedents.

This criminal trial concerned a charge of sexual interference against the defendant, D.C., involving his stepson, J.R., who was 10 years old at the time of the alleged assault.

J.R. was the sole witness, testifying via Zoom and through prior video statements to police.

The court assessed J.R.'s testimony, finding him believable and consistent on the core allegation.

However, the court noted a significant lack of specific details, several inconsistencies regarding minor facts, and a complete absence of corroborating evidence.

Applying the high standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt required in criminal cases, the court concluded that despite J.R.'s apparent truthfulness, the evidence was insufficient to be sure that the assault occurred as alleged.

Consequently, D.C. was found not guilty.

The defendant, Chad Storey, was convicted of possession of child pornography, making sexually explicit material available to a child, sexual interference, and assault, involving two young complainants.

The Crown sought a 6-year penitentiary sentence, while the defence sought a 90-day concurrent sentence followed by probation, citing the defendant's intellectual challenges and stringent bail conditions.

The court, applying principles from R. v. Friesen, emphasized denunciation and deterrence for child sexual abuse offences.

It found that the defendant's intellectual disability did not reduce his moral blameworthiness to displace the need for a penitentiary sentence, as he demonstrated awareness of the wrongfulness of his actions.

The court also considered the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and lengthy house arrest bail conditions (50 months), granting 12 months credit for pre-trial custody and restrictive bail.

The defendant was sentenced to an aggregate of five years in the penitentiary, with ancillary orders including lifetime Sex Offender Information Registration Act compliance, DNA sample, 10-year firearm prohibition, and communication prohibition with victims.

During a first-degree murder trial, the court ruled on three pre-charge issues.

First, the court held that post-offence conduct evidence regarding a Facebook profile change and a payment in cocaine could not be used to infer intent, as the conduct was equally consistent with innocent explanations.

Second, the court denied the Crown's request to urge an adverse inference against the accused for failing to call a witness to corroborate his intoxication defence, noting it would improperly shift the burden of proof.

Finally, the court removed jury instructions on alternate modes of participation after the accused conceded he caused the victim's death as a principal.

During a murder trial, the defence sought to qualify a clinical pharmacist as an expert to provide opinion evidence on the effects of cocaine, marijuana, and alcohol on the accused's brain and executive functions.

The Crown opposed the qualification, arguing the proposed evidence strayed into psychiatry and neurology.

Following a Mohan voir dire, the court qualified the witness as an expert in pharmacology to testify on the general effects of the drugs, but strictly limited his evidence, prohibiting opinions on consciousness, automatism, or conclusive statements about the accused's specific cognitive decoupling.

During a murder trial, the accused elected to testify.

In cross-examination, the Crown sought to play the entirety of the accused's 43-minute police statement for impeachment purposes.

The defence objected, arguing this would allow the Crown to impermissibly split its case.

The court dismissed the objection, finding that playing the statement in its entirety would not offend the rule against case-splitting, as the accused knew the case to meet, the statement contained numerous contradictions relevant to his state of mind, and playing it was the most efficient way to put the inconsistencies to him.

The Crown sought to introduce eleven autopsy photographs in a homicide trial where the accused allegedly struck the deceased with a hammer.

The defence contested the admissibility of two photographs that showed the deceased's face alongside the injuries.

The court applied the balancing test for probative value versus prejudicial effect.

Finding that the contested photographs were redundant because other uncontested photographs adequately showed the same injuries without displaying the deceased's face, the court excluded the two photographs to avoid unnecessary emotional impact on the jury.

During a first-degree murder trial, the defence sought to cross-examine a Crown witness on out-of-court exculpatory statements made by the accused.

The defence argued the statements were not tendered for the truth of their contents, but to test the witness's credibility and reliability.

The Crown objected to the use of these statements.

The court ruled that generally, out-of-court exculpatory utterances of an accused cannot be introduced through a non-accused witness to challenge credibility, as this offends the rules against hearsay and prior consistent statements.

The court permitted the defence to cross-examine the witness on one specific pre-offence statement to test her recollection, but prohibited questioning on another statement that appeared to be based on hearsay from other individuals.

The Crown sought a pre-emptive ruling to limit defence counsel's cross-examination of two key Crown witnesses (DC and ZH) on their prior manslaughter convictions related to the same killing for which the accused, Jordan Osborne, was charged with first-degree murder.

Defence counsel intended to use these convictions to undermine credibility by demonstrating character defects and a motive to distance themselves from the murder by implicating Osborne.

The court found that prior convictions are legislatively deemed relevant to credibility under s. 12 of the Canada Evidence Act.

Distinguishing the case from precedents concerning prior acquittals or convictions used to bind a jury on culpability, the court held that the manslaughter convictions were relevant to the witnesses' credibility and potential vested interest in the outcome.

The court further determined that the probative value of this defence-led evidence was not substantially outweighed by the potential for reasoning prejudice, which could be mitigated by a limiting instruction to the jury.

The Crown's application to limit cross-examination was dismissed, allowing defence counsel to question the witnesses about their manslaughter convictions.

Jordan Osborne was charged with first-degree murder.

The Crown sought to admit his video-recorded confession into evidence.

Defence counsel argued the confession was involuntary due to police misrepresentations, implicit threats or promises regarding a reduced charge, and oppressive conditions (a thin jumpsuit).

The court, applying the common law confessions rule from *R. v. Oickle*, found that the police conduct, including statements about the seriousness of the charge and the potential for a lesser charge based on intent, did not constitute an explicit or implicit threat or promise strong enough to overbear the accused's will.

The court also found the jumpsuit did not create oppressive conditions.

The confession was deemed voluntary and admissible.

The defendant, charged with first-degree murder, applied to sit at counsel table during his upcoming jury trial, rather than in the prisoner's dock.

The court considered two lines of authority regarding the presumptive seating position and emphasized the trial judge's wide discretion, which should be contextually driven.

Balancing the defendant's fair trial rights and dignity against security concerns, and noting the absence of specific security risks, the court granted the application, finding it would attenuate prejudice and facilitate solicitor-client communication.

Joseph Crawford pleaded guilty to accessory after the fact murder.

The court considered aggravating factors, including his involvement in planning the initial assault, cleaning the murder weapon, and a lengthy criminal record.

Mitigating factors included his guilty plea, remorse, and rehabilitative potential despite a difficult background.

The court imposed a gross sentence of four years, deducting 3 years and 1 month for pre-trial custody (1.5:1 credit) and an additional 4 months for harsh custodial conditions (lockdowns, triple bunking).

The net sentence to be served was 7 months, followed by 18 months probation, a DNA order, and a lifetime section 109 order.

Joe Ramono, charged with criminal negligence causing death and forged documents, applied to have evidence from searches of his business, Pro Street Auto, ruled inadmissible.

He alleged violations of his Charter right against unreasonable search or seizure, arguing that police failed to make full disclosure in the Information to Obtain (ITO) for the search warrants and that the searches exceeded the warrants' scope.

The court found no evidence of police deception or subversive conduct and determined that the ITO provided reasonable grounds for the warrants.

The court also found that the searches did not exceed the scope of the warrants and that the participation of an MTO officer was lawful.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant, charged with criminal negligence causing death, moved to sever his trial from a co-accused.

The applicant argued that the accused were not jointly charged, did not act in concert, had different conduct, and that severance was necessary for him to call the co-accused as a witness to elicit exculpatory evidence regarding the co-accused's drinking and driving history.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the offences arose from the same series of events, the nexus between the accused was sufficient for a joint trial, and the applicant failed to demonstrate a reasonable possibility that the co-accused would testify or that such testimony would be favourable.

The court also noted the "cut-throat defence" element, which weighs against severance.

A criminal trial for second-degree murder resulted in a finding of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD).

The accused, suffering from schizophrenia, committed a fatal stabbing while experiencing severe delusions and hallucinations, believing the victim was possessed by a demon.

Expert psychiatric testimony, accepted by the court, established that the accused was incapable of appreciating the nature and quality of the act or knowing it was morally wrong under s. 16 of the Criminal Code.

The matter was referred to the Ontario Review Board for disposition.