Christopher Hicks

The accused was convicted of second degree murder after shooting and killing his brother during an argument.

At sentencing, the court considered the accused's status as a youthful first-time Indigenous offender and the role of his undiagnosed schizophrenia in the commission of the offence.

Applying the Gladue framework and considering the mitigating impact of his mental illness, the court sentenced the accused to life imprisonment with a parole ineligibility period of 11 years.

The court denied the accused's request for an exception to the mandatory weapons prohibition for sustenance hunting, citing public safety concerns related to his severe, treatment-resistant mental illness.

During a murder trial, counsel for one co-accused renewed an application to recall two witnesses to testify about the deceased's general reputation for violence and aggression, arguing that the evidentiary basis had changed since both co-accused had now testified.

The court had previously permitted specific Scopelliti evidence of the deceased's prior acts of weaponized intimidation but denied broader character evidence.

The court found that the law and reasons from its prior ruling continued to apply and denied the renewed request, noting that unlike the other co-accused who had established an air of reality for self-defence, the moving co-accused had not satisfied that threshold.

The accused was charged with first degree murder in the death of his half-brother, which occurred on October 24, 2009.

The Crown alleged that the accused shot his brother with a shotgun following an argument about household cleanliness.

The central issues were whether the accused was not criminally responsible due to a mental disorder, whether he possessed the requisite intent for murder, and whether the killing was planned and deliberate.

The court found the accused suffered from a mental disorder (schizophrenia) but was not rendered incapable of appreciating the wrongfulness of his acts.

The court found the accused had the requisite intent for murder but was not satisfied the killing was planned and deliberate.

The accused was convicted of second degree murder rather than first degree murder.

The court sentenced Hugo Munoz to 14 years in prison for the manslaughter of his intimate partner, Cindy Coffey, after he pleaded guilty partway through his trial.

The decision details the facts of the offence, the impact on the victim’s family, Mr. Munoz’s mental health history, and the joint sentencing submission.

The court accepted the joint position, emphasizing the aggravating factors of intimate partner violence and the mitigating factors of Mr. Munoz’s guilty plea, lack of criminal record, and mental illness.

Ancillary orders included a lifetime weapons prohibition, a DNA order, and a no-contact order with specified individuals.

The applicants, Dennis Singh and Justin Sandassie, challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory life sentence without parole eligibility for 25 years for first degree murder under section 745(a) of the Criminal Code.

The court reviewed the facts of the offence, the parties' positions, and the binding Supreme Court of Canada precedents.

The application was dismissed, with the court holding that the mandatory minimum sentence remains constitutionally valid and is not grossly disproportionate or overbroad under the Charter.

This ruling addresses the admissibility of statements made by the accused, Nathaniel Veltman, who was charged with four counts of first-degree murder and one count of attempted murder following an incident where he drove his vehicle into a Muslim family.

The defence sought to exclude statements made to a 911 call-taker, spontaneous statements to arresting officers, and two videotaped statements to a police detective, arguing involuntariness and breaches of the accused's s. 10(b) Charter rights.

The court found all statements to be voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt.

While acknowledging some technical s. 10(b) Charter breaches by arresting officers due to exigent circumstances and delays at the police station, the court determined these were made in good faith and that a "fresh start" was achieved by the detective's thorough re-cautioning.

The court concluded that the accused had an "irresistible desire to speak" and would have made the statements regardless of the breaches, thus rendering them admissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The offender was convicted by a jury of four counts of first-degree murder and one count of attempted murder after driving his truck into a Muslim family in London, Ontario.

The sentencing judge found that the murders constituted terrorist activity under the Criminal Code, as they were motivated by white nationalist ideology and intended to intimidate the Muslim community.

The offender was sentenced to a mandatory life sentence with no parole eligibility for 25 years for each murder, and a concurrent life sentence for the attempted murder, reflecting the extreme brutality and terrorist nature of the attack.

The accused brought a motion seeking leave to communicate with defence counsel between the completion of the Crown's cross-examination and the commencement of re-examination, contrary to the presumptive Ontario Rules of Professional Conduct.

The court granted the motion, finding that the constitutional rights to a fair trial and full answer and defence, coupled with the gravity and complexity of the charges (four counts of first-degree murder and one of attempted murder) and the extensive nature of the accused's testimony, justified a departure from the rule.

The ruling permits counsel and client to discuss both the decision to re-examine and the proper scope of re-examination.

The Crown sought a permanent publication ban on excerpts from the accused's "A White Awakening" manifesto and video footage depicting the incident, arguing public harm and inspiration for copycat crimes.

The media coalition opposed the ban, emphasizing the open court principle and the importance of public information.

The court dismissed the ban on manifesto excerpts, finding no serious risk from responsible media reporting, but ordered the unredacted manifesto sealed until trial conclusion and limited video access to exclude the moment of impact.

This ruling addresses the challenge for cause process in a high-profile criminal trial.

It outlines principles from R. v. Chouhan regarding screening for bias, balancing fair trial rights with juror privacy.

The court determined how to screen for potential juror bias related to the disturbing nature of the allegations, bias against those holding extremist views, and the impact of pre-trial publicity, including statements by public officials and participation in commemorative events.

The judge proposed specific questions for the challenge for cause.

This ruling addresses the editing of an accused's statements for admissibility at trial.

The court considered jointly proposed edits by the Crown and defence to remove irrelevant and prejudicial content, such as references to abortion clinics, political views, and Covid-19 vaccine opposition.

However, the court denied the defence's requests to excise statements where the accused asserted he would not plead insanity, characterized his actions as terrorism, and stated he was inspired by other mass killers.

The judge found these contentious statements highly probative and relevant to the Crown's case on mental state, intention, motive, planning, and deliberation, emphasizing that their probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect, which could be mitigated by limiting instructions to the jury.

The accused, Nathaniel Veltman, facing charges of first-degree murder and attempted murder with terrorism allegations, brought a pre-trial motion regarding the admissibility of ideological evidence found on his devices and expert testimony from Dr. Barbara Perry on right-wing extremism.

The court ruled that the ideological documents (including 'A White Awakening', Tarrant's manifesto excerpts, Breivik's manifesto cover, and mass shooting video existence) were admissible, subject to careful presentation and limiting instructions to the jury.

However, the expert testimony of Dr. Perry was deemed inadmissible, as it was not necessary to assist the jury and its potential prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value, particularly given the accused's own explanations and the general notoriety of some concepts.

The accused, facing charges of first-degree murder and attempted murder, applied for a mental condition assessment under s. 672.11(b) of the Criminal Code to explore a Not Criminally Responsible (NCR) defence.

The defence sought the assessment without disclosing specific grounds to the court or the Crown, and requested that the resulting report not be shared unless and until the defence decided to lead the evidence at trial, citing solicitor-client privilege and fair trial rights.

The Crown opposed on the basis of lack of grounds and security concerns regarding the accused's transfer to Ottawa.

The court granted the assessment, relying on counsel's assertion of grounds and the constitutional imperative of a fair trial, and ordered the report to be prepared but disclosed only to the defence, allowing them to decide whether to use it at trial, thereby protecting solicitor-client privilege.

The court also allowed the assessment to take place at a location of the psychiatrist's choice in Ottawa, balancing efficiency and security.

The accused brought an application under s. 11(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, seeking a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay in their first-degree murder and attempted murder trial.

The total delay from charge to anticipated trial end was 37.12 months (1129 days).

The court deducted 98 days for defence delay (preference for consecutive preliminary inquiry dates) and 11 days for judicial illness, resulting in a net delay of 33.53 months (1020 days), which exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court cases.

The Crown argued that the delay was justified by exceptional circumstances, specifically the COVID-19 pandemic and the complexity of the case.

The court found the case to be of moderate complexity and attributed 107 days (3.53 months) of the delay to the COVID-19 pandemic's systemic impact and backlog.

This brought the net delay down to 30 months, falling within the presumptive ceiling.

The court also found that the defence had not demonstrated meaningful and sustained efforts to expedite the proceedings.

Consequently, the application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The accused, charged with four counts of first-degree murder and one count of attempted murder arising from a vehicle attack on a Muslim family, applied for a change of venue.

The accused argued that extensive media coverage, community events, and political commentary in London, Ontario, rendered it impossible to select an impartial jury there.

The Crown opposed the application, arguing that publicity was widespread and safeguards like challenges for cause were sufficient.

The court granted the application, finding that the saturation of local coverage and the community's sense of personal violation created a risk of subconscious bias that warranted moving the trial to ensure a fair and impartial jury.

The applicant challenged the constitutional validity of s. 577 of the Criminal Code, arguing that the Attorney General's power to direct an indictment without providing reasons or a preliminary hearing violates s. 7 of the Charter.

The court dismissed the application, holding that binding precedent establishes there is no constitutional right to a preliminary hearing and that core prosecutorial discretion, including the decision to direct an indictment, is not subject to routine judicial review absent an abuse of process.

The media parties sought to terminate or vary sealing orders related to Informations to Obtain (ITOs) for search warrants in a high-profile murder and terrorism case.

The Crown and the accused, Nathaniel Veltman, sought to maintain significant restrictions to protect fair trial rights and privacy.

The court applied the Sherman test, finding a serious risk to fair trial rights and privacy due to widespread pre-trial publicity.

The court ordered a publication ban on broad swathes of evidence and a limited sealing order on highly sensitive personal and graphic information, concluding these measures were necessary and proportionate to balance open court principles with fair trial rights and privacy.

The offender was convicted of second-degree murder for the brutal beating of an 82-year-old woman during a home invasion.

The Crown sought 18 years of parole ineligibility, while the defence sought the minimum 10 years, citing the offender's Aboriginal background, mental illness, and the jury's recommendation.

The court found the offender posed a significant danger and set the base parole ineligibility at 18 years.

However, the court found that the 27 months the offender spent in administrative segregation constituted a gross violation of his s. 12 Charter rights against cruel and unusual treatment.

As a remedy, the court reduced the parole ineligibility period by 27 months, resulting in a final period of 15 years and 9 months.

In a murder prosecution, the court ruled on the admissibility of multiple statements made by the accused during a missing person and homicide investigation.

Early out-of-custody statements and a spontaneous cell utterance were found voluntary and admissible.

The first late-night custodial interview was held to violate s. 10(b) because police failed to respect the accused's efforts to consult counsel and belittled the right to legal advice; it was also found involuntary because the interrogation overbore the accused's ability to choose whether to speak.

The second custodial interview was tainted by the first, and later statements were found obtained in a manner connected to Charter breaches, including unlawful and arbitrary continued detention contrary to s. 9 arising from non-compliance with s. 503 of the Criminal Code.

All statements made after 11:16 p.m. on July 5, 2011 were excluded under s. 24(2).

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought a pre-trial motion seeking a ruling that the recent amendments to the Criminal Code under Bill C-75 eliminating peremptory challenges operated retrospectively.

The accused argued that the right to challenge jurors is a substantive right.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the right to a jury trial is substantive, but the right to peremptorily challenge jurors is procedural.

Following recent jurisprudence, the court held that the elimination of peremptory challenges does not breach the right to a fair trial and applies prospectively to the accused's jury selection.