Nadia Thomas

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder for shooting his half-brother in the back with a shotgun.

The appellant admitted to the shooting but claimed he only intended to scare his brother and shoot at the computer or stereo, not to kill him.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's jury instructions on the mens rea for murder contained serious legal errors, particularly regarding the treatment of evidence of mental illness and the distinction between a legal presumption and a permissible inference.

The trial judge incorrectly suggested that evidence of mental illness could only be relevant to sentencing and failed to properly instruct the jury that such evidence could negate the mental element required for murder.

The court also noted deficiencies in how the trial judge responded to the jury's request for clarification on the state of mind required for murder.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellants Collins and Newton were convicted of murder and attempted murder following a five-week trial before a judge and jury.

Collins was found guilty of first degree murder and attempted murder; Newton was acquitted of first degree murder but convicted of second degree murder and attempted murder.

Both appealed their convictions.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by failing to relate the evidence to the legal issues the jury had to decide, instead presenting evidence in a witness-by-witness format.

This error deprived the appellants of a fair trial.

The court rejected Newton's argument that his verdicts were unreasonable.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his sentence for break and enter to commit theft and break and enter with intent.

He had pleaded guilty and received a suspended sentence with two years' probation, with pre-sentence custody credited at 1.5:1 (198 days from 132 days).

The enhanced credit resulted in a custodial sentence exceeding 180 days, triggering mandatory deportation as a convention refugee and barring him from appealing the deportation order.

Fresh evidence on appeal demonstrated that trial counsel failed to appreciate the immigration consequences of the enhanced credit.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on consent of the Crown and reduced the pre-sentence custody credit by 19 days to 179 days, thereby avoiding the immigration consequences.

Conviction appeal from a judge-alone trial for break and enter and robbery.

The sole issue was identification.

The appellant was identified by two witnesses who knew him as "Mack Truck" from a social group.

The witnesses identified him despite being masked and partially obscured during the incident.

The trial judge accepted the identification evidence based on recognition rather than identification of a stranger, and rejected the appellant's denial and his co-accused's claim of amnesia.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the trial judge properly considered the frailties of identification evidence while recognizing that recognition evidence by acquainted witnesses carries different considerations than stranger identification.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual assault causing bodily harm.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding consent and bodily harm, and brought a fresh evidence application alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no misapprehension of evidence and rejecting the appellant's credibility regarding his trial counsel.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court upholding the 13-month reformatory sentence for attempted rape.

The appellant appealed a March 2016 disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot because the March order had been overtaken by a subsequent order made in August 2016, which the appellant had also appealed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for attempted murder, aggravated assault, and assault, arguing the trial judge erred by refusing to allow cross-examination of the victim on his propensity for violence at the outset of the trial.

The Court of Appeal held the trial judge correctly applied the rule in Scopelliti, finding the request premature as there was no appreciable evidence of the victim's aggression at that stage.

The appeal was dismissed, noting the appellant chose not to renew the application later and ultimately, details of the victim's propensity for violence were put to the jury.

The appellant pleaded guilty to assault and breach of probation and was sentenced to 183 days in custody based on a joint submission.

He subsequently discovered that this sentence triggered potential inadmissibility as a permanent resident.

He appealed the sentence based on fresh evidence regarding the immigration consequences.

The Crown conceded that a sentence of six months less a day would have been fit and that the fresh evidence should be admitted.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and reduced the sentence to six months less a day to obviate the unforeseen immigration consequences.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for dangerous driving causing bodily harm.

The appellant argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence relating to causation and arrived at inconsistent verdicts by acquitting the other driver involved in the incident.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge made specific factual findings supported by evidence, including that the appellant ignored repeated warnings to slow down, which distinguished his case from the co-accused.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the five-month custodial sentence was deemed fit.

The appellant challenged an order for a new trial after exclusion of a co-accused’s prior inconsistent Agreed Statement of Facts tendered for its truth in a murder prosecution.

The majority held threshold reliability was not established because available safeguards did not adequately permit testing of truth and accuracy, particularly given curtailed cross-examination following assertions of solicitor-client privilege.

The Court emphasized deference to trial-level reliability determinations absent error in principle and rejected a request for a new trial based on how the prosecution conducted the voir dire.

It concluded the statement’s surrounding circumstances did not provide sufficient substantive reliability where the declarant had incentives to shift blame during plea negotiations.

The appeal was allowed and the acquittal restored, with dissenting reasons favouring a new trial.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on charges of sexual assault and related offences against his stepdaughter.

At trial, the judge excluded a portion of the child's video-recorded police interview, finding that her unresponsiveness during cross-examination violated the accused's Charter rights to a fair trial.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred by making the exclusionary order without hearing submissions from the parties and by failing to consider the primary purpose of section 715.1 of the Criminal Code, which is to preserve a child's best recollection.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed a conviction entered by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The trial judge had stated that the complainant's viva voce evidence was totally uncontradicted.

The Court of Appeal found this to be a dispositive error, as the appellant's videotaped statement, introduced by the Crown, contained specific denials of the conduct attributed to him.

The trial judge failed to resolve these conflicts and failed to apply the W.D. principles.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The Crown appealed a decision ordering the Ontario Provincial Police to release the respondent's seized firearms to his brother.

The respondent had been sentenced to probation with a condition to abstain from possessing weapons.

The Crown argued the firearms were automatically forfeited under s. 115 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal held that while the probation condition constituted a prohibition order, the respondent was not in possession of the firearms at the commencement of the order because they were in police custody.

Therefore, s. 115 did not apply, and the appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a charge of robbery while armed with a firearm.

The trial judge had acquitted the respondent because she was not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that he was carrying a handgun.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in law by treating the use of a firearm as an essential element of the offence of robbery under section 343 of the Criminal Code, rather than a sentencing factor under section 344.

The acquittal was set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed a three-year sentence for theft of a motor vehicle over $5,000.

The appellant had presented false identification, taken a test drive with a salesman, and forced the salesman out of the vehicle on a highway.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence fit given the premeditated nature of the offence, the terrifying impact on the victim, and the appellant's lengthy criminal record and breaches of court orders.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal as moot because the appellant's underlying finding of not criminally responsible (NCR) had already been reversed on a separate appeal.

The appellant was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) for a robbery committed at an ATM, based on a diagnosis of schizophrenia.

On appeal, he sought to introduce fresh evidence showing that his treating psychiatrists had ruled out schizophrenia and that his symptoms were likely caused by a substance-induced psychosis.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, finding that the NCRMD verdict amounted to a miscarriage of justice since self-induced intoxication cannot support such a verdict.

The appeal was allowed, the NCRMD verdict was set aside, and a conviction for robbery was entered with a sentence of one day's imprisonment, given the seven years the appellant had already spent in custody.

The appellant, a designated long-term offender, was convicted of breaching his long-term supervision order (LTSO) and sentenced to three years' imprisonment.

The sentencing judge intended to grant 1.5 days of credit for each day of pre-sentence custody but made a calculation error, resulting in 228 fewer days of credit.

The appellant appealed, seeking to have the 228 days applied to reduce the length of his LTSO.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that despite the calculation error, the sentence actually imposed was fit.

The court noted that an LTSO continues to run during pre-sentence custody for breaches of the order, making enhanced credit less appropriate.

The appellant appealed his convictions for discharging a firearm, threatening death, and drug offences.

He argued the trial judge failed to address frailties in the complainant's evidence and erred in admitting statements made to police without a caution.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal regarding the complainant's evidence, finding the trial judge was alive to the issues.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the threatening death convictions, finding the statements to police were not voluntary because no caution was given and the second officer did not testify.

A new trial was ordered for the threatening death charges.

The appellant appealed his 30-month sentence for assault.

The assault involved choking the victim to the point of unconsciousness.

The appellant had a record of 33 previous convictions, including many for assault.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge failed to appropriately apply the jump principle and erred regarding rehabilitation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle and noting the sentence was fit given the egregious nature of the assault, the appellant's record, and his history of breaching probation.