Dr. Dickey

The appellant father appealed a summary judgment decision finding that his three children were in need of protection due to a risk of sexual harm.

The father argued that the motion judge applied the wrong test for summary judgment, failed to apply the principles for child protection cases set out in Kawartha, and erred in admitting and weighing evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion judge correctly applied the summary judgment test, properly considered the children's Indigenous status and best interests, and made no palpable and overriding errors in his credibility assessments or evidentiary rulings.

The appellant was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder and ordered detained at Waypoint Centre, a maximum security facility.

On appeal, the appellant sought to have the detention order set aside and a new hearing directed to consider placement at Ontario Shores, a medium security facility.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Ontario Review Board's decision, finding that while the appellant's recent conduct was positive, the Board was required to consider the entire picture, including the serious nature of the mental illness, the long history of mental disorder accompanied by serious criminal activity, past non-compliance with medication, and demonstrated history of quick decompensation and violence when medication was discontinued.

The court found the Board's conclusion that a transfer to medium security was premature was not unreasonable.

The children's aid society brought a motion for an interim order pending appeal to stay a lower court decision that permitted the paternal grandparents to supervise the father's access to two young children.

The father had been the subject of sexual abuse allegations involving other children, and the society argued the grandparents were uninformed and uncooperative.

The court applied the three-part test for a stay and considered the best interests of the children.

Finding serious issues to be tried on appeal, including factual errors by the motion judge, and a risk of irreparable harm given the children's young ages and the grandparents' failure to review the evidence of risk, the court granted the society's motion and ordered that access be supervised by the society pending the appeal.

The accused was charged with first-degree murder after stabbing a stranger to death in a cafe.

The court found the elements of second-degree murder were proven, as the attack was unprovoked and not planned.

However, based on psychiatric evidence, the court found the accused suffered from schizophrenia and was experiencing severe delusions and paranoia at the time.

The court concluded the accused was incapable of knowing his actions were morally wrong and found him not criminally responsible under s. 16 of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed jury convictions for second degree murder and aggravated assault arising from a fatal attack in a rest home, arguing that the jury unreasonably rejected his NCR defence based on schizophrenia and conflicting expert evidence.

The court held that, although the evidence could have supported an NCR finding, there was also evidence capable of supporting the jury’s conclusion that the appellant had not met his burden on a balance of probabilities.

The court further held that the jury charge adequately distinguished the NCR and mens rea inquiries, properly limited the use of protected assessment statements, and did not misdirect the jury on malingering or recall evidence.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed.

The young person appealed a sentence of 12 months' closed custody and supervision followed by 12 months' probation for sexual interference.

The appellant, who had intellectual limitations and a high risk to re-offend, argued the trial judge erred by denying pre-sentence custody credit and imposing a sentence focused on incapacitation contrary to the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding this was an exceptional case where denying pre-sentence credit was justified, and the sentence appropriately prioritized rehabilitation and accountability in a highly structured setting.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault and his sentence as a dangerous offender.

He argued the trial judge made several errors in his jury instructions, including failing to charge on the mens rea of consent and improperly instructing on prior consistent statements.

He also argued the sentencing judge committed a Johnson error by failing to consider a long term offender designation before imposing a dangerous offender designation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the jury charge.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the court found no reasonable possibility that a long term offender designation would have been imposed given the expert evidence of the appellant's high risk to reoffend.

The appellant appealed an Ontario Review Board disposition granting the respondent an absolute discharge.

The respondent had been found not guilty of second-degree murder by reason of insanity in 1983.

The Board concluded the respondent posed a minimal risk to the public, relying partly on his attending psychiatrist's belief that he would continue his relationship with the hospital.

On appeal, the appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence showing that the respondent severed his relationship with the psychiatrist following the absolute discharge.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, finding it undermined a central premise of the Board's reasoning, and ordered a new hearing.

The appellant, convicted of first-degree murder, applied for a reduction in his parole ineligibility period under s. 745 of the Criminal Code after serving 15 years.

At the hearing, the jury refused to reduce the period.

The appellant appealed directly to the Supreme Court of Canada, arguing the hearing was unfair due to inflammatory remarks by Crown counsel and errors in the judge's charge.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new hearing, finding that Crown counsel's remarks, which discredited the s. 745 process and improperly referenced the death penalty and unrelated crimes, seriously compromised the fairness of the hearing.

The Court also held that victim impact statements may be admissible at a s. 745 hearing at the discretion of the presiding judge.