Gregory John Tweney

The appellant, Ian Bush, appealed his conviction for three counts of first-degree murder.

The appeal was based on two grounds: the trial judge's error in admitting evidence seized from the appellant's home without proper individual analysis of probative value versus prejudicial effect, and an erroneous jury instruction on first-degree murder regarding transferred intent.

The Court of Appeal found that both errors occurred.

However, the court applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, concluding that the overwhelming evidence, particularly the fact that the murders occurred while the victims were forcibly confined (which automatically elevates murder to first-degree), meant no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for attempted murder and sought leave to appeal his life sentence.

The appeal primarily concerned the trial judge's decision to revisit an earlier ruling on similar act evidence (related to triple murders) for cross-examination, despite initially excluding it due to prejudicial effect.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in revisiting the ruling without a material change in circumstances and without re-engaging in the probative value/prejudicial effect analysis.

However, the court applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, finding no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice as the appellant ultimately did not testify, and the potential prejudice from the similar act evidence therefore disappeared.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the life sentence was not demonstrably unfit, despite minor errors in identifying aggravating factors.

The appellant, Jason Lusted, appealed an 18-year sentence for manslaughter, arguing the sentencing judge erred by failing to treat his expression of remorse and his guilty plea as mitigating factors.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal.

The court found that the sentencing judge properly exercised discretion in weighing remorse against the appellant's extensive criminal history and that the guilty plea, though not explicitly mentioned, was clearly considered within the context of the sentencing hearing.

The court emphasized the gravity of the offence and the appellant's long criminal record, affirming the fitness of the sentence.

The appellant, D.M., appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence, which followed convictions for sexual assault and child pornography.

The Crown conceded that the sentencing judge erred by not explicitly considering the appellant's future treatment prospects at the designation stage, as required by R. v. Boutilier.

However, the Court of Appeal found this error to be harmless, concluding that the overwhelming evidence, including consistent psychiatric opinions on the appellant's high risk of sexual recidivism and his lack of credibility regarding amenability to treatment, compelled the dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence.

An application to admit fresh evidence was also dismissed as it would not have altered the outcome.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Daniel Debassige, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder.

The appeal raised five grounds, primarily alleging errors in the trial judge's jury instructions regarding the statutory partial defence of provocation, the effect of intoxication on the fault element for murder, the review of the defence position, and the W.(D.) instruction.

The appellant also argued that the jury's verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, affirming the conviction.

The court found that while there was an error in applying the amended provocation standard retrospectively, it was harmless given the nature of the alleged provocative conduct.

The jury instructions on intoxication, defence position, and W.(D.) were deemed adequate when viewed functionally and in context.

The verdict was found to be reasonable based on the circumstantial and admission evidence.

The appellant, Todd Howley, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, challenging the trial judge's admission of internet search evidence ("nail gun" searches) and the appropriateness of the Crown's closing submissions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the conviction.

The court found the internet search evidence relevant to planning and deliberation, and that the trial judge's timely curative instructions adequately addressed any impropriety in the Crown's closing, thus not warranting a mistrial or a stay of proceedings for abuse of process.

The appellant appealed his designation as a dangerous offender and his indeterminate sentence following guilty pleas to two counts of aggravated sexual assault.

The offences involved failing to disclose his HIV-positive status to two women before having unprotected sex with them, resulting in both women contracting HIV.

The appellant had a lengthy criminal record including convictions for sexual assault causing bodily harm, counselling the murder of a police officer, uttering threats, and possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose.

Both Crown and defence psychiatrists assessed him as having antisocial personality disorder with psychopathic traits and marijuana dependence disorder, presenting moderate to high risk for sexual and violent recidivism.

The sentencing judge designated him as a dangerous offender and imposed an indeterminate sentence.

The Crown conceded two errors: failure to conduct prospective risk assessment at the designation stage and failure to consider Gladue factors.

The appeal was dismissed as there was no reasonable possibility the errors affected the outcome.

The Crown appealed a sentence of 6.5 years imposed on the respondent for 102 counts of sexual offences against 18 young boys committed over more than 20 years while employed in positions of trust.

The respondent pleaded guilty to 43 counts of indecent assault on a male, 47 counts of gross indecency, and 10 counts of sexual assault, and was found guilty of 2 additional counts of gross indecency.

The sentencing judge found the respondent posed a very low to low risk for future sexual offending and imposed a concurrent sentence of 6.5 years, less six months' credit for pre-trial bail.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence demonstrably unfit and varied it to 10 years' imprisonment, less six months' credit for a net sentence of 9.5 years.

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation and two-year custodial sentence imposed following his conviction for criminal harassment and four counts of failure to comply with probation orders.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in finding that criminal harassment constituted a serious personal injury offence and in finding a pattern of repetitive behaviour showing likelihood of inflicting severe psychological damage.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dangerous offender designation and sentence, finding the trial judge's findings were well-supported by evidence and that the sentencing approach properly emphasized the least intrusive sentence required under the statutory scheme.