Gregory John Tweney

The Crown appealed a sentence on the sole issue whether enhanced credit under s. 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code could be granted for pre-sentence custody based on loss of remission and parole eligibility.

The court held that the discretion to grant credit up to 1.5:1 is not confined to exceptional or unusual circumstances and may include parole and remission consequences where the record supports their relevance to the particular offender.

Applying modern statutory interpretation and the sentencing principles of proportionality and parity, the court concluded that a narrower reading would produce unjust disparities between similarly situated offenders.

The sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault and his sentence as a dangerous offender.

He argued the trial judge made several errors in his jury instructions, including failing to charge on the mens rea of consent and improperly instructing on prior consistent statements.

He also argued the sentencing judge committed a Johnson error by failing to consider a long term offender designation before imposing a dangerous offender designation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the jury charge.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the court found no reasonable possibility that a long term offender designation would have been imposed given the expert evidence of the appellant's high risk to reoffend.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree and second-degree murder.

He appealed, arguing that the Crown's closing address was improper, that opinion and hearsay evidence from a police agent was wrongly admitted, and that the Crown's theory of motive was based on speculation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's addendum to the jury charge effectively cured any defects in the Crown's closing address, the police agent's evidence was necessary narrative, and the Crown's theory of motive was based on proper inferences from the evidence.

The Crown appealed a conditional sentence of two years less a day imposed on the respondent for historical sexual assault against a teenaged relative.

The Crown argued the sentence was demonstrably unfit and sought a penitentiary term.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge made no error in principle in weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors and imposing a conditional sentence with strict house arrest.

The court granted the Crown's request to increase the SOIRA order to 20 years on consent.

The appellant appealed his conviction for dangerous driving, arguing the trial judge erred by relying on his own experience driving the curve, failing to comment on a critical curve speed calculation, and improperly assessing a passenger's evidence regarding speed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

The court held that the trial judge's personal experience was irrelevant given the appellant was driving at more than twice the posted limit.

The conviction was reasonably based on excessive speed, oversteering, darkness, and failure to heed warning signs.

The Crown appealed the conditional sentence of two years less a day and a five-year driving prohibition imposed on the respondent for two counts of dangerous driving causing death.

The respondent had driven a sports car at more than twice the legal limit, resulting in a crash that killed two passengers.

The Court of Appeal found the conditional sentence unfit, as it failed to satisfy the principles of proportionality, denunciation, and deterrence given the respondent's intentionally reckless behaviour and prior record.

The conditional sentence was set aside and replaced with a sentence of imprisonment for the remaining time (101 days), and the driving prohibition was increased to seven years.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault following a jury trial.

During the trial, the appellant was excluded from the courtroom twice: once briefly during his own cross-examination, and again for the entirety of the pre-charge conference held in the trial judge's chambers.

On appeal, the appellant argued these exclusions violated his right to be present under s. 650(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal held that while the brief exclusion during cross-examination caused no prejudice and could be saved by the proviso in s. 686(1)(b)(iv), the exclusion from the entire pre-charge conference was a serious breach of the open court principle that impaired the appearance of fairness.

The proviso could not save this breach.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of firearms offences and aggravated assault following an unprovoked shooting in a parking lot after a basketball game.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the verdict was unreasonable due to frailties in the eyewitness identification evidence and that the trial judge improperly handled jury questions.

He also appealed his 8-year sentence, arguing it was unfit given his youth.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the eyewitness evidence was reliable, the trial judge appropriately addressed the jury's questions, and the sentence was fit given the gravity of the offences.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge misapprehended the nature of his denials during his statement to the police.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's characterization of the statement as cryptic and short on details was reasonably open to her.

The appeal from sentence was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal decision dismissing his appeal from a conviction for mischief under $5,000.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, finding that the proposed grounds of appeal were weak, the legal issues lacked broader significance, and the appellant faced no deprivation of liberty as his probation had expired and he was discharged.

The appellant was convicted of criminal negligence causing death while street racing and failing to stop at the scene of an accident.

He appealed his conviction on several grounds, including the trial judge's refusal to allow him to testify about a prior consistent statement made to police five hours after the accident.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the statement lacked spontaneity and its exclusion caused no substantial wrong.

The appellant also appealed his sentence, seeking to realign the terms for each count to avoid deportation under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act without changing the global sentence.

The Court dismissed the sentence appeal, holding that courts should not impose artificial sentences to circumvent Parliament's will on immigration matters.

The appellant pleaded guilty to fraud over $5000 for his role in a massive investment scheme.

At sentencing, while unrepresented, he disputed many facts but the trial judge refused to strike the plea and sentenced him to 8 years' imprisonment and ordered $35.6 million in restitution.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the guilty plea was voluntary, unequivocal, and informed, and that the undisputed facts satisfied the elements of fraud.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal in part, reducing the restitution order to $20 million to better reflect the appellant's degree of criminal responsibility and the funds he retained control over.

The appellants were convicted of second degree murder following the beating death of a young man by a group of attackers.

They appealed their convictions on multiple grounds, including the admission of after-the-fact conduct, the voluntariness of police statements, alleged Charter breaches, jury instructions, and ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all appeals, finding no reviewable errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions, and concluding that trial counsel provided effective representation.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting a videotaped statement of a witness who claimed memory loss at trial, and that the trial judge created a reasonable apprehension of bias by prejudging the witness's veracity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the statement had sufficient indicia of reliability, including being given under oath and corroborated by other evidence.

The court also found no reasonable apprehension of bias, as the trial judge's comments related to the witness's reluctance to testify, not his truthfulness.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his 30-month sentence for criminal negligence causing death by street racing.

He argued that the sentence should be reduced below the penitentiary range to preserve his right to appeal a deportation order under immigration legislation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while deportation consequences may be considered, they cannot take a sentence out of the appropriate range, which for this offence required a penitentiary term as established in a co-accused's case.

On a ministerial review reference treated as a conviction appeal, the court admitted fresh forensic pathology and archival evidence undermining the reliability of the original time-of-death evidence that had been central to the Crown’s theory of exclusive opportunity.

Applying the fresh evidence framework, the court held that the conviction, as affirmed on the earlier reference, could no longer stand and amounted to a miscarriage of justice.

At the remedial stage, the court undertook an extensive review of the historical record, expert evidence, archival material, and the practical impossibility of a retrial.

Although an acquittal was not the only conceivable verdict, the court concluded that an acquittal was clearly the more likely result at a hypothetical new trial and entered that remedy.

The appellant appealed his robbery conviction, arguing the trial judge failed to address material inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence and misapplied the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's failure to address key inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony, particularly regarding whether a robbery actually occurred, deprived the appellant of a fair trial.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

In a Reference directed by the Minister of Justice concerning the 1959 murder conviction of Steven Truscott, the Crown sought to introduce fresh evidence from a witness, Ms. X. The proposed evidence described a brief, unwanted sexual advance by Truscott in a cornfield approximately a year before the murder.

The Crown argued the evidence was relevant to rebut good character, challenge credibility, support another witness's testimony, and act as similar fact evidence identifying Truscott as the killer.

The Court of Appeal ruled on the admissibility without hearing the testimony viva voce, finding the evidence clearly irrelevant to any material fact in issue.

The Crown's application to tender the evidence was dismissed, and the defence's request for a publication ban on the ruling was denied.

In the context of a Reference regarding his 1959 murder conviction, the applicant sought production of third-party nursing school and psychiatric records of a key Crown witness.

The applicant tendered fresh evidence from two individuals who claimed the witness admitted to lying at trial and sought psychiatric hospitalization to avoid testifying at a 1966 Supreme Court rehearing.

The Court of Appeal applied the O'Connor test and ordered production of the nursing school records, finding they provided independent confirmation of the fresh evidence with minimal prejudice to the witness's privacy.

However, the court refused to order production of the psychiatric records, concluding that the witness's high expectation of privacy outweighed the limited probative value of the one-page discharge form.

In the context of a Reference directed by the Minister of Justice regarding a 1959 murder conviction, the Crown applied for a production order under s. 683(1)(a) of the Criminal Code against third-party journalists.

The journalists had produced a documentary about the case and interviewed several witnesses who were now providing fresh evidence.

The journalists resisted, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction to issue a production order against a third party for investigative purposes.

The Court of Appeal held it had jurisdiction to order production where it is in the interests of justice to assist in determining the admissibility of fresh evidence.

The court ordered the production of two of the three retained video recordings.